Cite as 2019 Ark. 249 Digitally signed by Susan P. SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS Williams No. CV-17-761 Reason: I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Date: 2022.07.15 14:44:21 -05'00' Opinion Delivered: September 19, 2019
BULLOCK’S KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN, INC.; KAREN KING; AND APPEAL FROM THE SALINE ARKANSAS PULPWOOD COMPANY, COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT INC. [NO. 63CV-15-228] APPELLANTS
V. HONORABLE GARY ARNOLD, CITY OF BRYANT, ARKANSAS, JUDGE MUNICIPAL PROPERTY OWNERS’ MULTIPURPOSE IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 84; BANK OF THE OZARKS; AND TND DEVELOPERS, LLC APPELLEES AFFIRMED.
SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice
This case comes to this court from a decision of the Saline County Circuit Court entered
on April 28, 2017, and supplemented on May 23, 2017. The Appellants are Bullock’s Kentucky
Fried Chicken, Inc. (KFC); Karen Bullock (King); and Arkansas Pulpwood Company, Inc.
(APW). Appellees are the City of Bryant, Arkansas, Municipal Property Owners’ Multipurpose
Improvement District 84 (District 84); Bank of the Ozarks (Ozarks); and TND Developers,
LLC (TND). We affirm.
I. Facts
In 2007, TND began contracting to purchase lands comprising 195 acres in Saline
County and closed on most of these transactions in August 2007. Two of TND’s principals, Don Spears and Aaron Jones, were also attorneys with the law firm Spears & Jones, land
developers, and managed a title company that operated out of their law offices. Spears and Jones
were later appointed as initial commissioners of District 84. KFC and King both sold land to
TND and agreed to finance part of the purchase prices. TND purchased land from KFC and
Bullock Investment for $2,680,000––$1,300,000 paid at closing to Bullock Investment for a
tract of land south of Hilltop Road and a $1,380,000 promissory note was issued to KFC for a
tract north of Hilltop Road. The King sale was for $125,000 (paid by a $125,000 promissory
note delivered at closing) for her tract north of Hilltop Road. Under these two contracts, the
KFC and King promissory notes were secured by a first mortgage in the real property they sold
north of Hilltop Road. To obtain the necessary funds to finance these purchases, TND received
a loan for $3,748,452 from Centennial Bank and issued Centennial a promissory note secured
by a first mortgage on all 195 acres.
On August 27, 2007, the Centennial loan and the TND real estate purchases were closed
by Spears & Jones. The firm prepared the TND deeds, promissory notes, and mortgages. On
August 30, 2007, Spears & Jones recorded the Centennial mortgage first and then filed the KFC
and King mortgages shortly thereafter. Ultimately, APW paid off the Centennial mortgage and
was granted an assignment of all its interest. APW later foreclosed its mortgage against lands
owned by TND.
On October 30, 2007, TND filed a petition with the City of Bryant to form an
improvement district for the purpose of “constructing waterworks, sewers, recreational facilities,
and systems for gas pipelines, and . . . grading, draining, paving, curbing, and guttering streets
and laying sidewalks . . . .” The petition was subsequently approved, and District 84 was formed
on November 26, 2007.
2 Commissioners for the improvement district were appointed and they, in turn,
appointed Alan King as assessor for the district. Alan King appraised the benefits that would
result to tracts within the district and arrived at a total value of improvements of $7,366,668.
The assessment of benefits identified real property by lot and block number and an “Order of
Assessment” was issued on January 4, 2008, setting the improvement-district taxes at 6 percent
of the assessed benefits for each lot or parcel. The lots and parcels were eventually matched with
the county assessor records, and tract numbers were assigned to District 84 lands. At issue in
this appeal are tracts 840-11625-028 (tract 028), 840-11631-851 (tract 851), and 840-11811-
000 (tract 000).
To finance development and construction of the improvements, District 84 entered into
a bond indenture for the issuance of $6,110,000 in improvement-district bonds. In conjunction
with the bond issuance, District 84 and Ozarks, as trustee, entered into a “Pledge and Mortgage”
agreement in which District 84 pledged, mortgaged, assigned, transferred and set over to Ozarks
its interest in all special improvement-district taxes then existing or thereinafter levied, including
the proceeds from the special taxes levied by District 84.
In 2012, TND ceased payments of improvement-district taxes on the lots it still owned.
On March 30, 2015, District 84 filed its complaint to foreclose its improvement-district tax
liens for delinquent taxes, naming TND, KFC, King, and APW as party defendants. District 84
described the lands to be foreclosed as all of District 84, less and except certain lots previously
sold by TND. On February 29, 2016, APW filed a third-party complaint to bring in Ozarks,
seeking an order granting it the right to make a prepayment of the improvement-district taxes
under section 9.08 of the “Trust Indenture” agreement. On March 14, 2016, APW filed a
3 counterclaim against District 84 seeking an order compelling District 84 to allow prepayment
of the improvement-district taxes for tracts 028, 851, and parts of 000.
On April 28, 2017, the circuit court issued its decree and then a supplemental decree
was entered on May 23, 2017. The circuit court granted District 84’s request for foreclosure
and entered judgment against TND for the total of the unpaid improvement-district taxes, plus
penalties, interest, and attorney’s fees. It further ordered all TND lands within the district sold
with the proceeds applied against District 84’s judgment. The circuit court also ruled that there
was no right to prepay improvement taxes and have particular tracts released from the tax lien.
KFC and King were granted judgment against TND and Aaron Jones individually, for
$1,380,000 and $125,000, respectively, plus accrued interest and their mortgage liens were
ordered foreclosed. Because Jones recorded the KFC and King mortgages after the Centennial
mortgage, the circuit court found that Jones, individually and in his agency capacity for TND,
committed fraud against KFC and King. The circuit court, however, denied KFC’s and King’s
request to find that Jones committed fraud in his capacity as commissioner of District 84, to
impute his fraud to District 84, or to find that Jones’s fraud impacted the validity or priority of
District 84’s lien. The circuit court also denied KFC’s and King’s due-process and equal-
protection claims as well as their affirmative defenses of equitable subordination/estoppel or
subrogation.
II. Foreclosed Property
On appeal, Appellants APW, KFC, and King argue that District 84’s lien for
nonpayment of improvement taxes can only attach to individual tracts upon which taxes were
actually delinquent and unpaid. Specifically, Appellants argue the land north of Hilltop Road is
4 not “real property” under the definition of the governing statute, and therefore an in rem
judgment cannot be attached to those tracts.
This court reviews issues of statutory construction under a de novo standard. Ligon v.
Stewart, 369 Ark. 380, 386, 255 S.W.3d 435, 439 (2007). The basic rule of statutory
construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Dachs v. Hendrix, 2009 Ark. 542, at
8, 354 S.W.3d 95, 100. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the reviewing
court determines legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the language used. City of Little
Rock v. Jung Yul Rhee, 375 Ark. 491, 495, 292 S.W.3d 292, 294 (2009). In considering the
meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually
accepted meaning in common language. Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Bruner, 368 Ark. 74, 82,
243 S.W.3d 285, 291 (2006).
Arkansas Code Annotated sections 14-94-101 et seq. govern the improvement-district
law at issue in the present appeal. Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-94-115(a)(1) (Repl.
1998) requires that upon the creation of an improvement district, an appointed assessor shall
assess the benefits accrued to the real property within the district as a result of any improvements.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-94-118(a)(1) (Repl. 1998) provides that following the
assessment of benefits, the improvement district board will enter an order levying upon the real
property of the district a tax sufficient to pay the estimated cost of the improvements.
Subdivision (a)(2) explains that this tax is to be paid by the real property owners of the district
in proportion to the amount of the assessment of benefits thereon. Ark. Code Ann. § 14-94-
118(a)(2). Appellants contend that the unimproved tracts of 028 and 851 north of Hilltop Road
do not meet the definition of “real property” set forth in this chapter because those lands did
not accrue any direct benefits from improvements and are therefore not subject to the
5 foreclosure proceedings detailed in Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-94-122 (Repl. 1998).
Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-94-103(10) (Repl. 1998) defines “real property” as being
all property subject to assessment. Thus, to be defined as “real property” for the purposes of this
chapter, land need only be subject to assessment––a benefit need not actually be assessed. The
record indicates that the land north of Hilltop Road was subject to the initial assessment and
therefore constitutes “real property.”
Despite Appellants’ contention that District 84’s tax lien attaches only to individual tracts
in delinquency, section 14-94-118 makes clear that all unreleased property within the district is
subject to the lien. Subsection (b) states that “[t]he tax so levied shall be a lien upon all the real
property in the district from the time it is levied . . . .” (Emphasis added.) A plain reading of the
statute indicates a legislative intent for all property within the district to be subject to the tax
lien. If the legislature had intended for the lien to attach only to individual tracts within an
improvement district to which a benefit had been assessed, it could have so stated.
Additionally, Appellants argue the requirement in this chapter that foreclosure actions
proceed in rem means District 84 could only foreclose on specific tracts that were delinquent,
not all real property within the improvement district. Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-94-
122(b)(4) provides that proceedings and judgments shall be in rem. Our court has defined in
rem proceedings in a foreclosure action as a proceeding against the property. See Simpson v.
Reinman, 146 Ark. 417, 227 S.W. 15 (1920). Given that the legislative intent indicates that the
lien attaches to all unreleased property within an improvement district, it is fair to assume the
requirement of in rem proceedings merely intends to limit the scope of a foreclosure action
under this statute to real property within a district. This is especially true if subdivision (b)(4) is
read together with subsection (b)(5)(B), which states, “Judgment shall be enforced wholly
6 against the lands and not against any other property or estate of the defendant.” Ark. Code Ann.
§ 14-94-122(b)(4)–(5)(B). Because the district assessed all real property within its boundaries
and established delinquent taxes were owed, we hold the circuit court’s judgment can be upheld
on an in rem basis.
III. Land Description
Appellant APW alleges that District 84’s complaint improperly described the lands
within the district that were delinquent and subject to foreclosure and failed to set forth the
amount chargeable to each separate tract. Pursuant to section 14-94-122(e)(4), District 84’s
complaint was required to “allege generally and briefly the organization of the district and the
nonpayment of the taxes, setting forth the description of the lands proceeded against, and the
amount chargeable to each tract . . . .” In its complaint, District 84 described the entire
improvement district without denoting which individual tracts were delinquent. The district
also did not set forth the amount chargeable to each tract. APW argues that District 84’s
description fails to comply with the statute––that each tract within the district should have been
separately described in the complaint and the taxes against each should have been separately
listed.
Although section 14-94-122(e)(4) contains the word “tract,” the legislature does not
define the term anywhere in the chapter nor does it contain specific instructions for how a
district should delineate land to be foreclosed upon within its boundaries. For the purposes of a
foreclosure on a delinquent tax lien, our court has said that a complaint is sufficiently descriptive
if it fully apprises the owner that the particular tract of his land is subject to a tax lien and notifies
the public what lands are to be offered for sale. See N. Rd. Improvement Dist. of Ark. Cty. v.
Simmerman, 188 Ark. 627, 630, 67 S.W.2d 197, 199 (1934). District 84’s complaint plainly
7 describes the land it seeks to foreclose, as well as the tracts excluded from the action. The
complaint also identifies TND as the owner of the land and the total amount of taxes owed.
We conclude the circuit court did not erroneously allow District 84 to proceed on the basis of
a statutorily defective complaint.
IV. Prepayment of Improvement Taxes
Next, Appellant APW argues that District 84 and Ozarks improperly refused to allow it
to prepay the improvement taxes on individual tracts within the district to release those tracts
from the tax lien. APW relies on section 14-94-118(b) and section 9.08 of the Trust Indenture
to support its claim that it was entitled to prepay improvement taxes at any time prior to full
rendition of judgment. Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-94-118(b) provides that with the
written approval of a district’s board, the county clerk shall release any lot or tract from the lien
for the assessment following prepayment of the taxes. Section 9.08(a) of the Trust Indenture
provides the procedure for prepaying improvement taxes and obtaining a release from the lien:
(a) Upon the initial sale of a Lot by the Developer, on behalf of the purchaser of that Lot and at the direction of the purchaser of that Lot the Developer may pay . . . the Series A Bonds Prepayment Amount for that Lot, but the Developer shall pay the Series A Bonds -A Prepayment Amount for that Lot. The Special Tax may be prepaid in full and a Lot released from the lien of the Pledge and Mortgage and this Indenture upon the payment to the Trustee either by the owner of said Lot or any third party, of both the following amounts: (i) the Series 2008-A Prepayment Amount associated with that Lot for depositing into the Series 2008-A Tax Prepayment Subaccount (except that current year’s Special Tax and any penalties and interest thereon portion of such Series 2008-A Prepayment Amounts, which shall be paid directly to the Tax Collector) and (ii) the Series 2008-B Prepayment Amount associated with that Lot for depositing into the Series 2008-B Tax Prepayment Subaccount (except that current year’s Special Tax and any penalties and interest thereon portion of such Series 2008-B Prepayment. Amounts, which shall be paid directly to the Tax Collector). Upon receipt of a Series 2008-A Prepayment Amount and a Series 2008-B Prepayment Amount for a given Lot, (a) the Trustee shall execute and deliver to the owner of the Lot for which the Series 2008-A Prepayment Amount and the Series 2008-B Prepayment Amount was paid a
8 release from this Indenture and the Pledge and Mortgage; (b) the District shall deliver to the Tax Collector written authorization for the Tax Collector to release said Lot from the lien of the Special Tax, and (c) a Special Tax lien release to be executed and recorded by the Tax Collector. Upon receipt of the necessary documentation, the Tax Collector shall release the Lot from the lien of the Special Tax and shall immediately remove said Lot from the District’s special assessment and taxation books.
(Emphasis added.)
The first rule in interpretation of a contract is to give to the language employed the
meaning that the parties intended. Cooper v. Kalkwarf (Cooper), 2017 Ark. 331, at 11, 532 S.W.3d
58, 65. In construing any contract, courts must consider the sense and meaning of the words
used by the parties as they are taken and understood in their plain and ordinary meaning. Id.
The best construction is that which is made by viewing the subject of the contract, as the mass
of mankind would view it, as it may be safely assumed that such was the aspect in which the
parties themselves viewed it. Singletary v. Singletary, 2013 Ark. 506, at 10, 431 S.W.3d 234, 240.
Here, section 9.08 of the Trust Indenture sets forth the conditions to be satisfied so as
to remove an assessment lien. The prepayment provision of section 9.08 only comes into effect
“[u]pon the initial sale of a Lot by the Developer . . . .” By the clear and unambiguous terms
of the Trust Indenture, section 9.08 was never triggered because the tracts at issue (028, 851,
000) were never sold by TND. Additionally, APW’s reliance on section 14-94-118(b) is
inapplicable, as there is no evidence of written approval by District 84’s board to release any
tracts, and APW never actually paid the assessments taxes.
APW also relies on First United Bank v. Phase II, Edgewater Addition Residential Property
Owners Improvement District No. 1, 347 Ark. 879, 69 S.W.3d 33 (2002). In Edgewater, this court
held that a trustee had breached the indenture when it refused to release a lot to a purchaser
who had paid the “Lot Release Price.” Id. at 897, 69 S.W.3d 46. The present appeal is factually
9 distinguishable from Edgewater, however, because APW never actually paid the Lot Release
Price to release any District 84 tract from the assessment-tax lien. Moreover, APW’s right to
prepayment is not absolute. Upon the sale of a lot by the developer, the Trust Indenture
provides permissive––not mandatory––language regarding the prepayment of assessment taxes.
Section 9.08 states, “The Special tax may be prepaid in full and a Lot released from the lien . .
. .” (Emphasis added.) According to the clear terms of the Trust Indenture, we find neither
District 84 nor Ozarks improperly refused prepayment of improvement taxes.
V. Jones’s Fraud
Appellants KFC and King argue the circuit court erred by not imputing Aaron Jones’s
fraud to District 84 and in failing to find that his fraud impacted the validity or priority of the
district’s lien. At trial, the circuit court found that Jones had committed fraud individually and
in his agency capacity for TND against KFC and King. Per the terms of the contracts, the
mortgages of KFC and King were both to be first mortgages. Jones, however, recorded the
Centennial mortgage before the KFC and King mortgages, causing KFC and King to have a
third priority lien behind District 84 and Centennial. The circuit court did not find that Jones’s
fraud should be imputed to District 84 or that it impacted the validity or priority of the district’s
lien.
The standard of review on bench trials is whether the circuit court’s findings were clearly
erroneous. Knight v. Day, 343 Ark. 402, 405, 36 S.W.3d 300, 302 (2001). An appellate court
reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, resolving all inferences in favor
of the appellee. Id.
Appellants assert that Jones, in his position as District 84’s commissioner, knew that by
the issuance of the bonds, the trustee, Ozarks, on behalf of the bondholders, would claim
10 priority over Appellants and cause them further damage. Thus, Appellants argue there existed
an agency relationship between Jones and District 84, thereby necessitating the imputation of
Jones’s fraudulent behavior to the district. The two essential elements of an agency relationship
are (1) that an agent have the authority to act for the principal, and (2) that the agent act on the
principal’s behalf and be subject to the principal’s control. Pledger v. Troll Book Clubs, Inc., 316
Ark. 195, 200, 871 S.W.2d 389, 392 (1994).
Appellants’ argument fails for two reasons. First, Appellants have identified no actions
that Jones took, as a commissioner of District 84, that resulted in damage to Appellants. Jones’s
fraudulent actions in securing promissory notes from Appellants and failing to properly record
those mortgages occurred before District 84 was created. Jones purchased land from KFC and
King in February and June 2007 and recorded the mortgages in August 2007. District 84 was
not created until November 2007. Therefore, an agency relationship between Jones and District
84 did not exist at the time Appellants were defrauded. Second, Appellants’ claim of injury from
the actions of Jones––the creation of a preferential lien by District 84––did not arise as a result
of Jones’s fraud. Rather, the priority of District 84’s lien was the result of statutory procedure
as set out in section 14-94-118(b). Regardless of the actions of Jones, District 84 is statutorily
entitled to first priority of its lien on TND’s real property within the district. It is on this point
that Appellants’ claims for equitable estoppel or equitable subordination also fail.
VI. Due Process
Finally, Appellants KFC and King assert that the circuit court erred in denying their
affirmative defenses of due process and equal protection. Appellants claim that as a result of the
circuit court’s order, there was an unconstitutional taking of their property without due process.
A circuit court’s interpretation of a constitutional provision is reviewed de novo. Gatzke v.
11 Weiss, 375 Ark. 207, 210–11, 289 S.W.3d 455, 458 (2008). In the absence of a showing that
the court erred in its interpretation, that interpretation will be accepted on appeal. Id.
Appellants allege a violation of due process in two instances. First, they contend that
District 84 violated their due-process rights by publishing notice of the creation of the district,
assessment of benefits, and issuance of bonds. Second, District 84 committed an unconstitutional
taking by assessing benefits to property north of Hilltop Road. Due process is based in the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution made applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as article 2, sections 8 and
21 of the Arkansas Constitution.
With their due-process claims, Appellants make what amounts to be a constitutional
challenge to the notice provisions of sections 14-94-101 et seq. Yet Appellants concede in their
brief that there is a presumption of validity of a statute’s constitutionality, and this court will
construe a statute as constitutional whenever possible. See Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc., 2016 Ark.
157, at 3, 490 S.W.3d 298, 300. Before an act will be held unconstitutional, the incompatibility
between it and the constitution must be clear. See id. Further, this court will refrain from
addressing constitutional issues if or when the case can be disposed of without determining
constitutional questions. See Prock v. Bull Shoals Boat Landing, 2014 Ark. 93, at 17, 431 S.W.3d
858, 869. Appellants argue that the notice provisions within Arkansas Code Annotated sections
14-94-101 et seq. violate the principles of due process because they failed to provide personal
service.1 Nevertheless, this court has said that indirect notice, such as notice by publication, is
1 In 2009, after the formation of District 84, Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-94- 106 (Supp. 2017) was amended to require notice of the hearing on the formation of the district to be sent to any mortgagee holding a first mortgage lien on real property constituting more than ten percent (10%) of real property located in the district. See Ark. Code Ann. § 14-94-
12 sufficient in matters affecting real estate. See House v. Rd. Improv. Dist., 158 Ark. 330, 340–41,
251 S.W. 12, 15 (1923); Cypress Creek Farms v. L’Anguille Improv. Dist. No. 1, 274 Ark. 518,
626 S.W.2d 357 (1982). Appellants fail to establish that notice by publication is not appropriate
to the circumstances of this case. Further, Appellants’ argument regarding the assessment of
benefits to the property north of Hilltop Road is not preserved because they failed to timely
appeal the “Order of Assessment.” See Ark. Code Ann. § 14-94-116(b) (Repl. 1998). For these
reasons, the circuit court’s order did not violate Appellants’ due-process rights.
Affirmed.
Special Justice REX TERRY joins.
HART, J., dissents.
WOOD, J., not participating.
JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Justice, dissenting. The majority mischaracterizes APW’s
argument. APW argues that if no taxes were owed on a tract of land within District 84, there
can be no delinquency; and with no delinquency, there can be no foreclosure. APW does not
dispute that TND failed to pay improvement taxes on improved tracts of land subject to
assessment that TND owned within District 84’s boundaries. However, TND owned other
tracts––specifically, tracts 028 and 851, which had no improvement, no assessment levied, and
no delinquency. Even so, these tracts, too, were included within District 84’s foreclosure action.
Additionally, APW asserts that the proceeding to recover the delinquent taxes is “in rem,” and
other assets of the landowner’s estate are not subject to foreclosure to satisfy the improvement-
106(a)(2)(B). The statute allowing publication notice of the assessment of benefits remains unchanged.
13 tax assessment and its delinquency. This argument is compelling.
The plan for developing District 84 contemplated two phases. Phase I involved the lands
south of Hilltop Road, and those lands were subject to improvements. The lands north of
Hilltop Road, including tracts 028 and 851, were part of Phase II that were not improved.
Likewise, TND received no benefit from the improvements placed on lands in Phase II.
Accordingly, District 84 tax assessor Alan King assessed no improvement taxes for those lands.1
Nonetheless, these tracts were made subject to the foreclosure action. This was clear error.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-94-122(b)(3) specifies that the “judgment shall
provide for the sale of delinquent lands.” (Emphasis added.) If no taxes were owed on the
property in Phase II, there can be no tax delinquency. Furthermore, section 14-94-122(b)(5)(B)
expressly states, “Judgment shall be enforced wholly against the lands and not against any other
property or estate of the defendant.” Including those tracts owned by TND that were not
“delinquent lands” is a clear violation of section 14-94-122(b)(5)(B).
Accordingly, the circuit court’s final judgment in this case––granting District 84 a money
1 January 4, 2008 - The Commissioners for District 84 issued an Order of Levy approving the Assessment of Benefits as prepared by Alan King. The total assessment for the entire district was $7,366,668. One 17-acre parcel was assessed with $150,000 and a 143.3-acre parcel was assessed with $266,000. Two tracts north of Hilltop road (included within the 143.3-acre tract), tracts 028 and 851, had no assessment at all.
December 1, 2012, Alan King instructed the Saline County collector that there were no assessments or delinquencies for any lands north of Hilltop Road, listed as tracts #840-11625-028 (028) and #840-11631-851 (851).
September 18, 2013, Alan King instructed the Saline County collector there were no assessments or delinquencies for lands north of Hilltop Road, listed as tracts 028 and 851. April 22, 2014, Alan King advised in an email that the assessments for all lands lying north of Hilltop Road were zero.
14 judgment in personam against TND for the total of the delinquent improvement taxes and
granting District 84 a priority lien on all the land, described in gross, owned by TND within
the district and not on a lot-by-lot, tract-by-tract basis for the delinquent taxes against each lot
or tract––was outside of the clear statutory authority granted to the circuit court.
I am troubled not only with specific provisions of this act but also with the majority’s
interpretation that, in my view, renders this act constitutionally infirm. This case should
therefore be reversed and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings without this
mistake of law.
I respectfully dissent.
James, House Downing & Lueken, P.A., by: Richard C. Downing and Charley E. Swann,
for appellants Bullock’s Kentucky Fried Chicken and Karen Bullock King.
Harrell, Lindsey & Carr, P.A., by: Paul E. Lindsey, for appellant Arkansas Pulpwood
Company, Inc.
Don A. Eilbott – Attorney, PLC, by: Don A. Eilbott, for appellee City of Bryant
Municipal Property Owners’ Multipurpose Improvement District No. 84.
Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, P.L.L.C., by: Lance R. Miller and Megan
D. Hargraves, for appellee Bank of the Ozarks.