Bulloch v. The Lamar

4 F. Cas. 654, 8 Law Rep. 275
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Georgia
DecidedMay 15, 1844
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 4 F. Cas. 654 (Bulloch v. The Lamar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bulloch v. The Lamar, 4 F. Cas. 654, 8 Law Rep. 275 (circtdga 1844).

Opinion

WAYNE, Circuit Justice.

The libellant seeks to recover compensation for two ne-groes, who were his property, and who were drowned, the canoe in which they were, having been run under by the steamer Lamar, in tide water, in the Savannah river. He alleges, that the negroes were going in a staunch, well built, and safe boat from the city of Savannah to his plantation. That, as they were on the way up the river, it being about eight o’clock and bright moon light, the steamboat Lamar, with two towboats attached to her, and with a strong current, ran with great violence and force against the canoe, sunk her, and that the negro slaves, Mary and Andrew, the property of the li-bellant, were drowned. That when the collision happened, it was impossible for the negroes in the canoe to get out of the way of the Lamar, on account of the rapidity with which she approached, and the space occupied by her and the freight boats, one of them being on the starboard, and the other on the larboard side, but that there was ample time for the Lamar to have been stopped, and so have avoided a collision with the canoe, if the master of the steamer had not refused, or at least neglected to keep clear of it, which might with care and safety have been done.

The respondents answer, that the accident occurred in the river Savannah, about three miles above the city, the Lamar being on her way from Savannah to Augusta, being the trade in which she is habitually employed, and being interior navigation. The jurisdiction of the court is then denied. The correctness of the statement, as made in the libel, is also denied, and the respondents proceed to state, that the Lamar, being well equipped [655]*655and manned, started from Savannah for Augusta, that after passing a shoal in the river, ■which required the progress of the steamer to be cheeked, her steam was again put on, and she was proceeding under her usual pressure, but without having attained her usual speed. That she was nearly under her usual headway, and had reached the Georgia shore, following the channel of the river in the track of steamboats, having two boats attached to her; that after she had made an oblique passage across the river, from the shoal towards the shore, she was straitened up the river; that at this time, it being dark, and no moon up, an alarm was given by a hand in the inner fiat, or towboat; that the master of the Lamar immediately ■ordered her to be stopped, which was done; that it was then ascertained, a canoe had been run over by the inner boat; that at the time of the accident it was dark, that there was no moon, that the canoe was not seen, and could not be seen in time to prevent the accident; that as soon as the alarm was given, every exertion was made to stop the boat instantly; that the accident was not occasioned by the negligence, want of care or skill of the master or crew of the steamer; but if there was negligence, it was that of the negroes in the canoe, in not keeping nearer the shore, and out of the reach of the steamer, as they must have heard her approach, some time before she reached them. From the answer it is conceded that a canoe was run down by the Lamar, at the time stated, in tide water, in Savannah river, and that the canoe and Lamar, were both going up the river with the flood tide. The evidence establishes that two negroes, belonging to the libellant, were in the canoe when she was run under. That the canoe was a safe, well built boat, not overloaded, was paddled by an able man in a fit condition to manage her; that he and the woman with him were drowned, by the canoe having been run under by the inner or larboard towboat attached to the Lamar; and that they were worth one thousand dollars. It appears also that the captain of the Lamar, was in his place on board of her, on the look out when the alarm was given, that he instantly gave orders to stop her, which was done, and that after the canoe was run under, he did all that could be done under the circumstances, to ascertain the extent of injury which had occurred, and to save the lives of those who might have been on board the canoe, if any such hope could be indulged in a case in which a boat had been run under, passing a distance of more than one hundred feet, under the bow of the tow boat, out at her stern, before she was seen again.

The point then in the case is, was the canoe run down, by such negligence, want of skill, or carelessness in the navigation and management of the Lamar, as to entitle the libellant to recover compensation from her owners, for the loss which he has sustained. To recover, the libellant must prove not only negligence upon the part of the respondent, but ordinary care on his own part. Lane v. Crombie, 12 Pick. 177. But, if the evidence discloses that the captain of the Lamar had neglected an ordinary or proper measure of prevention, then the burthen of proof is thrown upon the respondents, to shew, that the collision was not owing to such neglect. Clapp v. Young [Case No. 2,780]. In all cases of collision then, the essential enquiry is, whether proper measures of precaution have been taken by the vessel which runs down another. With these principles in view, what are the legal consequences of the evidence in this case? It will be viewed in two ways. Does it shew that the libellant has complied with the first requirement mentioned, to enable him to recover? Did the captain of the Lamar neglect a proper measure of prevention, and have the respondents shewn that the collision was not owing to that neglect. Both depend upon the testimony of the captain and mate of the Lamar, of Captain Nock, of the steamer Santee, and J. E. Dillon. Captain Cresswell, and Adams, his mate, agree in their statement of all the facts which bear upon the enquiry. They concur in the time when the Lamar, with a towboat on each side of her, left Savannah. It was in the evening, after or about six o’clock, in October. When the Lamar reached McGilvry’s bar, between two and three miles from Savannah, the steam “was checked down,” that the boat might go slow, as the water was shallow on the bar. The channel over the bar runs in an oblique direction, towards the Georgia shore, close to it When the Lamar, following the channel, had crossed the bar, the captain called for headway. The Lamar was put under her customary pressure of steam, and straitened up the river in the channel, which commences to “run jam in” at the place where the Iron Steamboat Company repair their flats, and runs up above McAlpin’s brick yard. In two minutes, after the order was given for headway, the canoe was run under. It happened, according to the precise statement of Adams, not more than twenty-five or thirty feet from Stiles’ landing, or sunken fiats. This, he says, “is the point where the accident occurred — Here there was a thick verdure of trees, and in the back ground a brick kiln. It was very dark in consequence of the shade of the trees, which was not penetrated by the moon.” Captain Nock says: “The channel of the river between the place where the Iron Steamboat Company repair their boats and Stiles’ landing, runs close to the landing as a steamboat can go, to keep her clear of some sunken flats which adjoin Stiles, which form part of the landing; that between the two points referred to, at a half or two-thirds flood, two steamboats might possibly pass each other; one of the boats might possibly have to run ashore; between those points the bank is very high [656]*656and well shaded by trees on the main Georgia side, and it is a very dark part of the river. It is considered a very bad part of the river on account of the trees, which throw a shade out and make the river dark. This darkness commences when you run to the bank and continues until you get up to McAlpin’s foundry.” J. B.

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Bluebook (online)
4 F. Cas. 654, 8 Law Rep. 275, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bulloch-v-the-lamar-circtdga-1844.