Bullard v. Scott
This text of Bullard v. Scott (Bullard v. Scott) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE FILED AT KNOXVILLE July 13, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt ALLEN BULLARD and WANDA BULLARD, ) C/A NO. Clerk 03A01-9809-CH-00310 et al., ) ) Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) ) ) ) APPEAL AS OF RIGHT FROM THE v. ) HAMILTON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ) ) ) DEWAYNE SCOTT AND RHONDA SCOTT, ) et al., ) ) HONORABLE R. VANN OWENS, Defendants-Appellants. ) CHANCELLOR
For Appellants For Appellees
DONALD MART LASLEY DAVID W. WALLACE Chattanooga, Tennessee Chattanooga, Tennessee
O P I N IO N
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED Susano, J.
1 This controversy focuses on a subdivision lot that is
owned by numerous tenants in common. The lot in question, Lot
10, with dimensions of 196.14' x 100.4' x 245' x 160.2', is
located in Thatcher Shore Acres Subdivision in Hamilton County.
Significantly, it has water access to Chickamauga Lake. In 1981,
it was conveyed to the plaintiffs or their predecessors in title,
38 of the 39 property owners of Thatcher Shore Acres Subdivision,
by the subdivision’s developer, James C. Thatcher. By such
conveyance, each of the grantees received an undivided 1/39th
interest in Lot 10. Such an interest -- a 1/39th -- was also
conveyed to a predecessor in title of defendants Dewayne and
Rhonda Scott (“the Scotts”).
The Scotts purchased a lot in a nearby subdivision,
also developed by James Thatcher, which is referred to as
Thatcher Shore Acres Lots 41 through 68, or the second Thatcher
Shore Acres Subdivision. A third development, known as the
Lasley Subdivision, was also developed on adjacent property
subsequent to the development of the two Thatcher Shore Acres
subdivisions. The second Thatcher Shore Acres Subdivision and
the Lasley Subdivision also contained community “out lots” with
water access; however, the “out lots” in the latter two
subdivisions were ultimately sold in tax foreclosure sales.
Thus, the property owners in these two developments apparently
were left without any community lake access.
The Scotts initially purchased Lot 41 in the second
Thatcher Shore Acres Subdivision. However, they subsequently
purchased Lot 39 in the original subdivision and thereby acquired
2 their grantor’s 1/39th undivided interest in Lot 10 of that
development. Shortly thereafter, the Scotts conveyed a 1/7800th
interest in their 1/39th interest in Lot 10 to property owners in
the second Thatcher Shore Acres Subdivision and the Lasley
Subdivision.1
Following the Scotts’ conveyances, the plaintiffs filed
this action against the Scotts and their grantees, seeking to
void the various conveyances by the Scotts, as well as to recover
punitive damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Following a bench
trial, the trial court found that, although the Scotts’ deed to
Lot 39 did not contain a prohibition against subdividing their
undivided 1/39th interest in the lake-access lot, such action
clearly had the effect of placing an additional burden on the
property, to the detriment of the Scotts’ co-tenants.
Consequently, the court held the conveyances to be void and of no
effect. It awarded nominal compensatory damages of $10 and
punitive damages of $5,000 to the plaintiffs. The court
subsequently set aside the award of punitive damages.
The Scotts appealed, raising the following issue for
our consideration:
Does Tennessee law allow a fee simple co- tenant with an unrestricted fractional interest in a common lot to convey fractional interests to third parties, and did the Chancellor err by voiding such a conveyance?
1 The deed representing the subject conveyance indicates that the Scotts are conveying “a portion of [their] 1/39th...interest.” However, it would appear that the grantees received an undivided 1/7800th interest in Lot 10 rather than 1/7800th of 1/39th interest in that lot.
3 The plaintiffs urge us to uphold the trial court’s decision
voiding the subject conveyances, but to reinstate the award of
punitive damages and award them their reasonable attorney’s fees.
The Supreme Court, in describing the rights and duties
of co-tenants, has quoted with approval the following excerpt
from Tennessee Jurisprudence:
Tenants in common stand in a confidential relation to each other as to the joint property, and the same duties are imposed on them as if a joint trust were created by contract between them. In such case, the relation of trust and confidence between them binds all to put forth their best exertions to protect the common interest, and forbids the assumption of a hostile attitude by any of them towards the rest.
The possession of one is the possession of all unless he claims to hold exclusively for himself. Tenants in common are jointly seized of the entire estate, each having an equal right of entry, and the possession of one is regarded as the possession of all until a disseisin of the others by actual ouster. Each has the same right to the possession, and the title of each extends to the whole.
Headrick v. Carter, 897 S.W.2d 256, 259-60 (Tenn. 1995)(quoting
8 TENN.JUR. Cotenancy § 6 (1992) (emphasis in Headrick omitted)).
Generally speaking, the applicable law regarding the
conveyance of a co-tenant’s share is correctly stated in 8
TENN.JUR., Cotenancy § 9:
A joint tenant may dispose of his share and convey it to a stranger, who will hold undivided, and in common with the other owners.
4 The Scotts assert that a lawful conveyance, by definition, can
never be a hostile act. While this may be generally true, a
lawful conveyance under certain circumstances can have such a
severe adverse impact on the other co-tenants’ known use of the
subject property that it can only be considered a “hostile” act
against the co-tenancy. Such is the situation in the instant
case.
Prior to the conveyance at issue, this relatively small
subdivision lot was burdened only by the comings and goings of
people associated with 39 property owners. However, as a result
of the subject conveyances, the potential use of this lot was
approximately doubled, rendering it subject to use by over 40
additional property owners, the members of their households, and
potentially their invited guests. In fact, to uphold such a
conveyance would conceivably increase potential use of the lot
exponentially, given that any other co-tenant -- whether a holder
of a 1/39th or 1/7800th interest -- could similarly subdivide his
or her interest. Calculation of the ultimate number of potential
users of the lot is subject only to the bounds of one’s
imagination.
It is therefore the opinion of this court that, under
the unique circumstances of this case, the conveyances in
question constitute an “assumption of a hostile attitude” by the
Scotts against their co-tenants, and a violation of the “relation
of trust and confidence” binding each tenant “to put forth [his
or her] best exertions to protect the common interest [of the co-
5 tenancy].” See Hendrick, 897 S.W.2d at 259-60. As such, they
cannot be allowed to stand.
We do not find that the evidence preponderates against
the trial court’s ultimate decision not to award punitive damages
and attorney’s fees. Rule 13(d), T.R.A.P.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs on
appeal are assessed against the appellants. This case is
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