Bullard v. Roger Williams Ins.

4 F. Cas. 643, 1 Curt. 148
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island
DecidedJune 15, 1852
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 4 F. Cas. 643 (Bullard v. Roger Williams Ins.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bullard v. Roger Williams Ins., 4 F. Cas. 643, 1 Curt. 148 (circtdri 1852).

Opinion

CURTIS, Circuit Justice.

The plaintiffs claim to recover from the defendants a sum [644]*644of money alleged to be due under a policy of insurance. They show that at Key West this vessel needed certain repairs. It is incumbent on them to prove that these repairs were rendered necessary by some peril insured against in the policy. Even if you are satisfied, this vessel was seaworthy at the beginning of her voyage, there is no presumption that the necessity for these repairs was occasioned by a peril insured against. The burden is still on the insured to prove that by some peril within the policy, the vessel received injuries requiring the expenditures shown by the surveyors’ testimony. The perils insured against in this policy, so far as the present case is concerned, are “perils of the sea,” and the inquiry is, whether the damage suffered by this vessel was from a peril of the sea. Damage done to a vessel by perils of the sea, includes every species of damage done to the vessel at sea, by the violent and immediate action of the winds, or waves, or both, as distinct from the ordinary wear and tear of the voyage, and as distinct from injuries suffered by the vessel, in consequence of her not being seaworthy at the outset of her voyage, or afterwards, under circumstances in which the master was guilty of negligence in not making her seaworthy.

In this case there is no pretence of any negligence by the master during the voyage, though there is a serious question, for your consideration, whether the vessel was seaworthy at the outset of the voyage. The law in reference to this will be presently stated; but in considering whether this damage was done by a peril of the sea, or was merely a consequence of the action of the sea on a weak, decayed, and unseaworthy vessel, I think you have a right to presume, at the outset, the vessel was seaworthy at the beginning of the voyage, because, as will be presently stated to you, the law so presumes until the contrary appears. You have evidence of the state of the wind and sea from the time the brig left Havana till she arrived in Ivey West. You also have evidence what injuries the vessel sustained, and you will say whether these injuries were done to this vessel by the violent and immediate action of the winds and waves, or whether, though suffered by reason of their action, they were attributable to the weak and decayed state of the vessel at the commencement of the voyage.

It has been stated, by the defendants’ counsel, that the law requires all vessels to be so strong as to resist the ordinary action of the sea, in the voyages for which they are insured. This is true. It is also said, and you will judge whether it is satisfactorily-shown, that a cross sea is ordinarily to be expected to be met with, in the Florida gulf stream, and that if this vessel broke down in such a sea, this is conclusive proof that she was not seaworthy for this particular voyage. But I do not understand that the law requires vessels to be so strong as not to receive injury from any state of the winds and sea which may ordinarily be expected in the voyage for which she is insured. This is not what is meant by the ordinary action of the winds and sea. In some sense gales and heavy seas may be said to be ordinary. They are of very frequent occurrence in some parts of the world. A vessel going round Cape Horn, in the winter, scarcely fails to encounter them. But if damage is suffered by their action on the vessel, or cargo, it would certainly be no defence for the underwriter to say, that in that voyage they almost always occur, and the vessel should have been strong enough to resist them. Dales of wind and heavy cross seas are not the ordinary action of the sea, in the sense of the law of insurance, and when injury is suffered by a seaworthy vessel from their action on her, she is damaged by a peril within the policy. At the same time, if seaworthy vessels usually, and, so far as appears, always, go through such seas as are described by these witnesses to have existed on this passage, without sustaining material injury, it certainly tends to show that the injuries suffered by this vessel are to be ascribed, not to a peril of the sea, but to the insufficiency of this vessel. It is a matter of fact for your good sense to determine. The law-raises no presumption concerning it, and, I apprehend, cannot safely do so. Because, when the winds and seas are not in their ordinary state, it is impossible to say, beforehand, what effects they will produce upon seaworthy vessels. One may get an unlucky twist, as seamen call it, and be broken down, while another, under circumstances apparently no more favorable, receives no injury. And therefore there is no legal presumption to guide you; but you must consider and weigh, the probabilities of the case, and say whether the plaintiffs have satisfied you, considering the state of the wind and sea, the kind and degree of damage suffered by the brig, the general condition in which she was found by the surveyors, and the uniformity with which great numbers of vessels encounter such seas without receiving injury, that these were damages done by perils of the sea. If you find damage was done to the vessel by perils of the sea, which it would cost $300 to repair at Key West, then you must proceed further. The policy does not insure against partial losses of less amount than ten per cent., and therefore you cannot find for the plaintiffs less than $300; but if you find that .more than that sum was necessary to repair damage done to the vessel by a peril of the sea, you will then inquire whether the plaintiffs are to recover for a total or a partial loss.

The vessel was not, in point of fact, totally lost. She remained in specie, and wras capable of being repaired. Bus ?Í,Q 1 the plaintiffs may be entitled to recover as for a total loss. In order to do so, however, they must [645]*645show that they have seasonably tendered to the underwriters a sufficient abandonment, or that this was a case in which no abandonment was necessary. Their letter of abandonment has been produced. It states that the vessel has been condemned at Key West, and refers to a letter from the master to the owners, which was sent therewith. The contents of this last letter are, I think, incorporated into the letter of abándonment by the reference to it which the latter contains; but still there is no statement whatever of the cause of the damage. Nothing is said, in either letter, respecting any peril -of the sea. Now, a letter of abandonment must state the cause of the loss, and the cause stated must be a peril within the policy. I instruct you, therefore, that there was not any sufficient abandonment. Was this a case in which no abandonment was necessary? An abandonment is necessary only in case of a constructive total loss; if the loss be actually total the insured may recover for it, without an abandonment. It has been much discussed what constitutes a total loss when the vessel remains in specie and still retains the form of a vessel, in a place of safety. I shall not trouble you with the different views which have been taken ■of this question, but I will state the rules which I deem proper for your guidance. It is manifest that the form of a vessel may remain and be in a place of safety, and yet, for all useful purposes, the vessel may have ceased to exist If she be absolutely incapable of repair, so as to be fitted to encounter the seas, then she has ceased to exist as a vessel, though great part of her materials may remain, and they may still be in the form of a vessel.

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Bluebook (online)
4 F. Cas. 643, 1 Curt. 148, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bullard-v-roger-williams-ins-circtdri-1852.