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6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 7 CARLINE BELLO BUKIKOSA and BELLA ) Case No. CV0408-17 $ ) BELLO MARTINEZ, ) 9 ) ) DECISION AND ORDER Plaintiffs, ) V. ) 11 ) ) 12 BENNY BENAVENTE BELLO, JOSEPHINE 13 BELLO-DUENAS, GEORGE BENAVENTE ) BELLO, BELLO ENTERPRISES, BELLO ) 14 FAMILY GROUP L.L.C., BELLO HOSPITALITY GROUP, and DOES IV XV,) -
) 16 Defendants. ) INTRODUCTION 1$ This matter came before the Honorable Alberto C. Lamorena, III on June 24, 2019 for a 19 hearing on a submission by Defendant Benny Bello (“Benny”) of a Motion to Dismiss. Benny 20
21 is represented by Attorney Daniel J. Berman. Defendants George Bello (“George”) and Bello
22 Hospitality Group (“Bello Hospitality”) are represented by Phillip Torres. Defendants Bello 23 Enterprises and Betlo family Group L.L.C. (“Bello Family LLC”) are represented by Attorney 24 Jeffrey A. Cook. Defendant Josephine Bello-Duenas (“Josephine”) is represented by Attorney 25 Jon A. Visosky. Plaintiffs Canine Bukikosa (“Carline”) and Bella Martinez (“Bella”) are
27 represented by Attorney Carlos L. Taitano. After considering the arguments of the parties, and
2$ Decision and Order CV40$-17, Bukikosa et at. v. Betto et at.
the applicable law, the Court now issues its Decision and Order denying Defendant Benny
2 Bello’s Motion to Dismiss.
BACKGROUND 4 . . On April 26, 2017 Carline and Bella (collectively ‘the Plaintiffs’) filed a Complaint to . ..
5 Compel Distribution of Trust Properties against Benny, Josephine, George, and Does I through 6 V as Defendants. (Complaint, Apr. 26, 2017). Two days later the Plaintiffs filed their Frist
8 Amended Complaint more clearly enumerating the causes of action against the Defendants for
Fraud and Aiding and Abetting Fraud. (First Amended Complaint, Apr. 28, 2017). 10 In March 2018, the Plaintiffs entered into a settlement agreement and release and filed a Ii stipulated judgement in a separate case, Superior Court Case No. CV0937-l6. (Decl. Benny 12
13 Bello at Exhibit A, Apr. 3, 2019); Bttkikosa et at. v. Betto et. at., Superior Court Case No.
14 CV0937-16 (Stip. Judg., Mar. 28, 2019). As part of the terms of that settlement, the parties 15 agreed to release all known and unknown claims against each other, except those already 16 averred or substantially re-pled subsequent to the agreement in the present case. Id. Thereafter, ‘7 the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. (Mem. P. & A.
19 Mot. Leave to file Second Amended Complaint., Jun. 26, 2018). Defendants Benny and George
20 filed a non-opposition to the Motion for Leave. (Non-opposition to Mot. for Leave, Jul. 26, 21 2018). The Court granted the Plaintiffs motion and the plaintiffs subsequently filed a Second . . . .
22 Amended Complaint. (Minute Entry, Aug. 20, 2018); (Second Amended Complaint, Aug. 21, 23 2018). 24
25 On April 3, 2019 Defendant Benny Bello filed a Motion to Dismiss the Second
26 Amended Complaint (Def. Benny Benavente Bello’s Mot. Dismiss, Apr. 3, 2019) (hereinafter 27 “Mot. Dismiss”). Each of the other Defendants filed a joinder to Benny’s motion. (Josephine’s 28
Page 2 of 13 Decision and Order CV408-17, Bukikosa et al. v. Betlo et al.
Joinder in Benny’s Mot., Apr. 22, 2019); (Bello Enterprises and Bello Family LLC joinder in
2 Benny’s Mot., Apr. 22, 2019); (George and Bello Hospitality’s Joinder in Benny’s Mot., Apr.
3 25, 2019). Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss to which Benny replied. (Mem.
P & A. in Opposition to Mot. Dismiss, May 1, 2019) (hereinafter “Plaintiffs’ Opposition”); 5 (Def. Benny Bello’s Reply Mem., May 15, 2019). On June 24, 2019 the Court held a hearing 6 on the motion and subsequently took the matter under advisement. (Minute Entry, Jun. 24,
2019).
DISCUSSION 10 A. Count I of the Complaint has been sufficiently pled.
Benny moves for the Court to dismiss Count I of the Second Amended Complaint under
13 Guam Rules of Civil Procedure (“GRCP”) 12(b)(6) and 9(b). Guam law permits a party to
14 move for dismissal for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. GRCP 12(b)(6).
In deciding such a motion, a court must “construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the 16 non-moving party, and resolve all doubts in the non-moving party’s favor.” Taitano v. Calvo 17 finance. Corp., 2008 Guam 12 ¶ 9. “Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate only ‘if 18 19 it appears beyond doubt that the [non-moving party] can prove no set of facts in support of his
20 claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id. 21 Generally, fraud claims are subject to heightened pleading standards under GRCP 9(b). 22 See Ukau v. Wang, 2016 Guam 26 ¶ 35. Rule 9(b) provides that “the circumstances constituting 23 fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity” and that “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and
25 other conditions of mind of a person may be averred generally.” GRCP(9)(b). However, “Rule
26 9(b) does not require a plaintiff to prove a claim of fraud at the pleading stage.” Ukati, 2016
Guam 26 ¶ 47. Instead, “what is required is that a plaintiff set forth his claim with sufficient
Page 3 of 13 Decision and Order CV408-17. Btikikosa er at. v. Bello et at.
detail to provide notice to defendants as to what particular fraudulent action is being alleged.” 1
2 Id. This is colloquially referred to as the “who, what,where, and how” requirement. Id.
3 However, when the Plaintiff alleges a claim of constructive fraud where the element of
scienter is not implicated, the Plaintiff is not required to meet the heightened standards of Rule 5 9(b) and instead must only meet Guam’s liberal pleading standard under Rule 8(a). See id. fi 6 40-44. Under Rule 8(a) a pleading must state only: 1) a short plain statement of the court’s
8 jurisdiction; 2) a short plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and, 3) a
demand for the relief sought. GRCP 8(a). 10 After reviewing the Second Amended Complaint, the Court believes that the Plaintiffs,
although they do not state the statute in their pleading, are sufficiently alleging a claim of 12
13 constructive fraud under 19 GCA § 65207. Under Guam law, a trustee commits a fraud against
14 the beneficiary of a trust when he performs any action adverse to the beneficiary as enumerated
in Sections 65201-65206. 19 GCA § 65201-65207. None of the Sections outlining the actions 16 that constitute fraud on a beneficiary requires that the trustee have the intent to defraud as an 17 element. See 19 GCA § 65201-65206. Instead, it is enough to establish a claim of fraud to
19 demonstrate that the trustee has acted against the beneficiary’s interest regarding the trust,
20 generally to the trustee’s own benefit or by abusing the trustee’s position over the trust. See id. 2! Because scienter is not an element that must be proven to establish a claim under 19 GCA § 22 65207, the Plaintiffs are not required to meet the heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b) 23 and must only meet the general pleading standard under 8(a). See Ukau, 2016 Guam 26 fi 40- 24
25 44.
26 Turning to the pleading, we find that the Plaintiffs have more than met the standard
under Rule 8(a). The Second Amended Complaint begins with a statement of the court’s
Page 4 of 13 Decision and Order . CV4O$-17, Bttkikosa et at. v. Belto et at.
jurisdiction under 7 GCA § 3105. (Second Amended Complaint at 1). Count I then begins by
2 stating that Jose and Dolores Bello established a trust, the “Bello Family Trust’,” and served as
3 trustee until their deaths. Id. at 3-4. Subsequently, the Bello siblings: Carline, Bella, Benny,
Josephine, and George accepted appointments as co-trustees of the trust. Id. The Complaint also
alleges that each sibling, as co-trustees, owed a fiduciary duty of good faith and loyalty to each 6 other sibling as beneficiaries of the trust. Id. at 4. On the first and fifth anniversary of Delores’
8 passing, the co-trustees were allegedly required to distribute one-third and one-half of the
‘ properties of the trust to beneficiaries with respect to whom such a trust was established. Id. at 10 7. Since Delores’ passing, each of the properties is alleged to have been practicable to distribute.
Id. The Plaintiffs then allege that Benny, Josephine, and George, against Carline and Bella’s
13 wishes, performed actions adverse to Canine and Bella’s interest as beneficiaries of the trust,
14 potentially to the Defendant sibling’s own profit. Specifically, the Plaintiffs contend that a 15 number of lease agreements dated from 2014 to July 2017 entered into by the Defendant 16 siblings have encumbered properties which should have been distributed to the Plaintiffs, in 17 direct breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the Plaintiffs by the Defendant siblings. Id. at 10-11 18
fl24-26 (Paragraph 25 outlines the specific leases stated the date the agreements were entered,
20 the other parties involved and the property encumbered.). Count I ends by stating that because 21 of the Defendant’s actions, Canine and Bella were damaged in the amount of at least ten
thousand dollars ($10,000.00). Id. at 11. 23
Plaintiffs, in their pleadings, have gone beyond requirement of a simple and plain
25 statement under Rule 8(a) and have expressly enumerated the alleged fraudulent transactions
27 It appears to the Court based on the pleading that the Bello family Trust is comprised of five trusts with each of 28 he Bello siblings as a beneficiary to a specific trust, hut that the siblings have control and agency over each individual trust in addition to being beneficiary of one. (See Second Amended Complaint at 3-8).
Page 5 of 13 Decision and Order CV4O8-17, Bukikosa et at. u. Bello et at.
which gives rise to the Defendants’ liability for fraudulent breach of fiduciary duty under 19
2 GCA §65207. Even if the heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b) were required, the
3 Court believes the Plaintiffs have plead violations of 19 GCA § 65201-206 with enough detail
to put the Defendants on notice of which actions the Defendants’ have performed—the 5 encumbrance of properties which should have been distributed to the Plaintiffs—such that the 6 Defendants have sufficient notice of the fraudulent actions they must defend against. Ukatt,
8 2016 Guam 26 ¶ 47. Therefore, under either pleading standard the Plaintiffs have sufficiently
pled their claim of fraud as to Count I of the Complaint. Accordingly, the Court will deny 10 Defendant Benny’s Motion to Dismiss as to Count I of the Complaint. 11 B. The parties’ settlement in CV0937-16 does not bar the claims against Bello Family LLC 12 and Bello Enterprises in this matter. 13 The Defendants next assert that Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed
against Bello Enterprises, Bello Hospitality, and Bello Family LLC (collectively “Corporate
16 Defendants”), because the claims against them have been released via settlement agreement,
17 which was incorporated by reference in a stipulated judgment in Superior Court Case No. 18 CV0937-16. (Mot. Dismiss at 13-14). Plaintiffs argue that their claims against these Defendants
should remain, as they were previously properly plead as fictitious defendants under 7 GCA §
15801 and properly re-plead as defendants subsequent to the settlement agreement. (Plaintiffs’ 21
22 Opposition at 6-8).
23 Because Defendant Benny has presented to the Court, and the Court has considered 24 . .
“matters outside the pleadings,” that is, the stipulated judgment and settlement agreement, the .
25 Court must treat his alleged Rule 12(b)(6) Motion for Dismissal as a Rule 56 Motion for 26
27 Summary Judgment. Core Tech Intern. Corp. ‘. [Jan11 Engineering & Cons. Co., Ltd., 2010
28 Guam 13 ¶ 29. (citing Newby v. Goi’t of Gucim, 2010 Guam 4 ¶ 18. Under GRCP 56, a court
Page 6 of 13 Decision and Order . CV408-17, Bukikosa eta!. v. Belto et ctt.
may grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories. and
2 admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
3 any material fact” and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Iztka
Corp. ‘. Kctwasho Int’l (Guam), Inc., 1997 Guam 10 ¶ 7; Bank of Guam v. Flores, 2004 Guam 5 25 ¶ 8. The movant bears the burden of demonstrating that there are no genciine 6 issues of material fact. See Jzuka Corp., 1997 Guam 10 9[ 8. A genuine issue is exists if there is
$ significant evidence establishing a factual dispute which must be resolved by a fact finder. Id.
A material fact is “one that is relevant to an element of a claim or defense and whose existence 10 might affect the outcome of the suit. Li. Disputes over irrelevant or immaterial facts does not Ii preclude a grant of summary judgment. Id. Summary jLldgment in a contractual dispute is 12
13 proper where an agreement’s provisions are unambigLious or where evidence presented
14 tegarding its meaning is sufficiently one-sided that a reasonable person could not conclude to 15 the contrary. Hawaiian Rock Products Corp. m’. Ocean Housing. The., 2016 Guam 49[ 35 (citing 16 GoVt of Guam i’. Guitierrez, 2015 Guam 8 ¶ 30. Guam law interprets settlement agreements 17 between parties as if they were contracts. Btcts i’. Cruz, 2009 Guam 12 ¶ 11 (citing Leon 18 19 Guerrero v. Movian, 2000 Guam 2$ ¶91 8-9).
20 On March 2$, 201$ the Honorable Michael J. Bordallo approved a stipulated judgment 2! between Canine and Bella, as plaintiffs, and Benny, Josephine, George, Bello Enterprises, Bello 22 Family LLC, and Joe Sicad, as defendants. The relevant provisions of the stipulated judgment 23 state: 24
25 11. Any other claims of the parties are addressed in the parties’ Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims (“Release”) in the possession of the parties. 26 Upon fulfillment and completion of the Stipulated Judgement matters, the parties shall file a Satisfaction of Judgment. All other claims asserted by the parties in - the matter are dismissed with prejudice. 28
Page 7 of 13 Decision and Order CV4O8-17, Bukikosa et at. v. Betto et at. . 12. Notwithstanding any other term, condition, or other provision of this eight (8) page Stipulated Judgment or other instrument related hereto that is or might be to the contrary, any or all of the terms, condition, or other provisions of this Stipulated Judgement shall not have any res jtidicata or collateral estoppels 3 effect whatsoever upon (and, therefore, neither res judicata nor collateral estoppels shall be pled), and shall not affect in any manner whatsoever, or are 4 without any prejudice whatsoever to, any cause of action, claim, or defense, 5 which is actually averred in any pleading actually filed prior, or substantially re-pled subsequent, to the date of this Stipulated Judgment, of 6 any of the parties in Bukikosa v. Betlo, Superior Court of Guam Civil Case No. CV0408-17.
8 Bttkikosa et al., Superior Court Case No. CV0937-16 (Stip. Judg. at 6) (bolded emphasis added,
italicized text in the original). The portions of the Settlement Agreement that are referenced by 10 paragraph eleven of the stipulated judgment state:
2. Scope of Release. This release shall apply to all claims arising out of, or 1 - relating to directly or indirectly to, the Operation of [Bello Enterprises and Bello . . .
13 family LLC] and [CV0937-16].
14 3. Nature of Claims Released. Each party, upon compliance with all the terms and conditions of this Release, and subject to the terms and conditions of the 15 settlement set forth in this Release, releases, acquits and forever discharges all 16 the other parties, and their respective heirs, successors, assigns, directors, representative, officers, agents, employees, subsidiaries, affiliates, parent I? corporations, associates, attorneys and insurers, and further releases and discharges any and all persons or entities against which each party has or 18 might have from all claims, demands, obligations, losses, causes of action, 19 damages, penalties, costs, expenses, attorney’s fees, liabilities, and indemnities of any nature whatsoever (collectively “Claims”) whether based 20 on contract, tort, statute, or other legal or equitable theories of recovery, whether known or unknown, contingent or uncertain, which, as of the - effective date of this Release, which each party has, or claims to have against the other parties, arising out of, or traceable either directly or indirectly to, the Operation of [Bello Enterprises and Bello family LLC] or [CV0937-16J. 23 4. Release of Unknown Claims. This Release applies to all claims for injuries - damages, or losses to or claimable by each party (whether those injuries, 25 damages, or losses are known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen, or patent or latent) that each party may have against another party, and each party 26 expressly waives the provisions of 18 GCA § $2602.. 27 Each party understands even if the party should eventually suffer additional 28 damages arising out of the facts and claims referred to in this Release, that party
Page 8 of 13 Decision and Order CV408-17, Bukikosa et a!. v. Belto et a!.
will not be able to make any claim for damages against the other parties. Further each party intends these consequences as to claims for damages that may exist as 2 of the date of this Release, but which he does not know exists, and which, if known, would materially affect his decision to execute this Release, regardless of 3 whether this lack of knowledge is the result of ignorance, oversight, error, negligence, or any other cause. 4
(Dccl. Benny Bello, Exhibit A at 1-2, Apr. 3, 2019) (emphasis added). All parties agree that
6 they entered willingly and knowingly into this settlement agreement and stipulated judgment,
and that agreement is evidenced by the signatures of their counsel on the stipulated judgement
lodged with the court in CV0937-16. (Joint Dccl. Canine Bello Bukikosa & Bella Bello 9
10 Martinez at 2 ¶ 3); (see e.g. Mot. Dismiss at 2); Bttkikosa et al., Superior Court Case No.
ii CV0937-16 (Stip. Judg. at 7-8). As such, the parties do not dispute the existence of the 12 settlement agreement and each parties’ entry into the agreement as a matter of fact, which 13 means the Court must only determine as a matter of law whether the settlement agreement bars
the causes of action against the Corporate Defendants.
16 On its face, the plain language of the settlement is clear, each of the parties in CV0937-
17 16 agreed to release all known and unknown claims against the other parties with the exception
of any claims previously averred or re-pled in the current matter before this Court: CV0408-17. 19 Bttkikosa et al., Superior Court Case No. CV0937-16 (Stip. Judg. at 7-8, Mar. 28, 2019); (Dccl. 20 Benny Bello, Exhibit A at 1-2). Accordingly, the Court must grant summary judgment in favor
22 of the defendants for any claims that have not been previously averred before or substantially
23 re-pled subsequent to March 28, 2019—the date the stipulated judgment was entered.2 24 Hawaiian Rock Products Corp., 2015 Guam 8 ¶ 30; BIas i’. Cruz, 2009 Guam 12 9111. 25
26 2 As a matter of law the Court cannot grant summary judgment in favor of Bello Hospitality with regard to the 27 parties’ settlement agreement. 3db Hospitality was neither a party in CV0937-l6 nor was it named in the agreement or signed the stipulated judgment. (Dccl. Benny Belle, Exhibit A); Bukikosa eta!., Superior Court Case 2$ No. CV0937-16 (Stip. Judg. at 7-8). Accordingly, the terms of the settlement agreement do not alThct claims against or held by Belle Hospitality.
Page 9 of 13 Decision and Order e CV408-17, Bukikosa et cii. v. Betlo et cii. . The Plaintiffs assert that Counts I and II against Bello Enterprises and Bello Family LLC
2 should remain as having been previous averred in the First Amended Complaint as Does I and II
3 and subsequently substantially re-pled as named defendants in the Second Amended Complaint 4 pursuant to 7 GCA § 15801. (See Plaintiffs Opposition at 4-8). The Court agrees. 5 Title 7 Section 15801 of the Guam Code, which was adopted from California Code of 6
Civil Procedure § 474, permits a plaintiff who is ignorant of a defendant’s name to sue that
8 defendant under a fictitious name until such time as the plaintiff can discover that defendant’s
identity and subsequently amend the pleadings to include that defendant. 7 GCA § 15801. This 10 ignorance must be genuine and in good faith, not feigned. General Motors Corp. v. Superior
Ct., 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 880 (Cal. App. 1996). A plaintiff who knows a defendant’s actual
identity is still “ignorant” with the meaning of the fictitious name statute if he lacks knowledge
14 of that person’s connection with the case or with his injuries. Id. at 879. The fact that the b plaintiff had the means to obtain knowledge is irrelevant. Id. (citing Garret v. Crown Coach 16 Corp., 66 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1968)). California courts interpret Section 474, which was adopted by 17 Guam as 7 GCA § 15801, liberally in favor of plaintiffs. Id. 18
19 In the present matter there is no question that the Plaintiff knew the actual names of the
20 Defendants Bello enterprises and Bello Family LLC at the time of filing the Complaint. See 21 Bukikosa et at., CV0937-16 (Verified Complaint at 4, October 27, 2016) (stating that Carline -‘7
and Bella are minority shareholders in Bello Enterprises and Bello Family LLC). However, a 23
plaintiff’s knowledge of a defendant’s name is not enough to find that the defendant was not 24
25 ignorant under the fictitious name statute. General Motors Corp. i’. Superior Ct., 55 26 Cal.Rptr.2d at 879. It appears from the filings in the record that the Plaintiffs were unaware of
facts establishing Bello Enterprises and Bello Family LLC’s liability until sometime after the
Page 10 of 13 Decision and Order CV408-17, Bukikosa et al. v. 3db et al.
Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint. (Mem. P. & A. Plaintiffs Mot. or Leave to
2 Amend First Amended Complaint at 2); (stating new facts have been discovered and seeking
3 leave to add Bello Enterprises, Bello Family LLC, and Bello Hospitality as Defendants in place
of Does 1-111). Defendant Bello, ironically, filed a non-opposition to the Plaintiffs’ motion
seeking leave to add the Corporate Defendants under 7 GCA § 15801, despite now asserting the 6 exact opposite position. (Non-opposition to Mot. Leave to Amend first Amended Complaint).
8 Accordingly, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs were “ignorant” within the meaning of Section
15801, and were allowed to re-plead Does 1-111 as the Defendants Bello Enterprises, Bello 10 Family LLC, and Bello Hospitality in the Second Amended Complaint.
Because Does I and II were actually averred prior to the parties settlement agreement in
3 CV0937-16, and Defendants Bello Enterprises and Bello family LLC were substantially re-pled
14 subsequent to the agreement, the Court holds as a matter of law that the claims against 15 Defendant’s Bello Enterprises and Bello Family LLC are not barred by the settlement 16 agreement and stipulated judgment in CV0937-16. Claims against Bello Hospitality, who was 17 not a party to the settlement agreement, are not barred, and the Plaintiffs have properly re-pled 18 Bello Hospitality pursuant to 7 GCA § 15801. Therefore, the Defendant’s converted motion for
20 summary judgment is denied as to the Corporate Defendants. 21 C. Count II of the Complaint is sufficiently pled.
Finally, the Court considers whether Count II of aiding and abetting fraud has been 23 properly pled in the Second Amended Complaint. As stated above, the heightened pleading 24
25 standards of GRCP 9(b) only apply to “circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” GRCP
26 9(b). However, when the Plaintiff alleges a claim of constructive fraud where the element of
scienter is not implicated, the Plaintiff is not required to meet the heightened standards of Rule
Page 11 of 13 Decision and Order CV408-17, Bukikosa et at. v. Bello et at.
9(b) and instead must oniy meet Guam’s liberal pleading standard under Rule 8(a). See Ukau,
2 2016 Guam 26 ¶(J[ 40-44.
3 As explained above, the claim of fraud the Plaintiffs allege in Count I does not require
an element of scienter, and is, therefore, not subject to heightened pleading standards. Supra, 5 Part A. Similarly, the claim of Count II, aiding and abetting the fraud, only adds the additional 6 element of aiding the actual perpetrators of that constructive fraud. As a result, the Court
$ believes that where a claim of constructive fraud does not require an element of scienter and is
not subject to heightened pleading standards under GRCP 9(b), any aiding and abetting claims 10 that arise out of other parties’ assistance in that constructive fraud similarly do not require an 11 element of scienter. As a result, those aiding and abetting claims are only subject to the liberal 12
13 pleading rules under GRCP 8(a). See Uk-au, 2016 Guam 26 fi 40-44. Under Rule 8(a) a
14 pleading must state only: 1) a short plain statement of the court’s jurisdiction; 2) a short plain IS statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and, 3) a demand for the relief sought. 16 GRCP 8(a). 17 Count II of the Second Amended Complaint begins by alleging the same facts as in 18 19 Count I. (Second Amended Complaint at 12. It next asserts that Defendants Bello Enterprises,
20 Bello LLC, and Bello Hospitality, or Does IV through X, were aware of the fiduciary duty ‘1 Benny, Josephine, and George owed to the Plaintiffs. Id. The Complaint then alleges that the 22 Corporate Defendants aided, abetted, or otherwise participated in Benny, Josephine, and 23 George’s fraudulent activities to the detriment of the Plaintiffs. Id. at 12-13. Last, the Plaintiffs
25 contend that as a result of the actions of Bello Enterprises, Bello LLC, and Bello Hospitality, the
26 Plaintiffs were damaged in the amount of at least ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00). Id. at 13. 27
Page 12 of 13 Decision and Order CV408-17, Bukikosa et at. v. 3db et at. . After reviewing the pleadings for Count II, the court is satisfied that the Plaintiffs have
2 met the pleading requirements under GRCP 8(a). Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant
3 Benny’s Motion to Dismiss as to Count II of the Complaint. 4 In summation the Court finds that Counts I and II of the Second Amended Complaint 5 have been sufficiently pled. In addition, the Court holds that the claims against the Corporate 6 Defendants are not barred by the parties’ settlement agreement and the stipulated judgement in 7
8 Superior Court Case No. CV0937-16 and that the Corporate Defendants have been properly
9 added pursuant to 7 GCA § 15801. Having disposed of all of the Defendant’s arguments, the 10 Court will deny Defendant Benny Bello’s Motion to Dismiss. II CONCLUSION I2
13 for the reasons stated above, the Court hereby DENIES the Defendant Benny Bello’s
14 Motion to Dismiss. 15
16 IT IS SO ORDERED this 20th day of September, 2019. 17
22 HONORABLE ALBERTO C. LAMORENA III 23 Presiding Judge, Superior Court of Guam 24
26 0W°tl t3C t It I COJ it tile 10 as pLces n the 15t a ric at the i Wa fl ed rn the 27
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