Bug Master Exterminating Service, Inc. v. Abash Exterminating, Inc.

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 31, 2002
Docket03-02-00048-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Bug Master Exterminating Service, Inc. v. Abash Exterminating, Inc. (Bug Master Exterminating Service, Inc. v. Abash Exterminating, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bug Master Exterminating Service, Inc. v. Abash Exterminating, Inc., (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-02-00048-CV

Bug Master Exterminating Service, Inc., Appellant

v.

Abash Exterminating, Inc., Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 261ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 99-00846, HONORABLE PAUL DAVIS, JUDGE PRESIDING

Appellee Abash Exterminating, Inc. (AAbash@) sued its former employee for breach of an

employment agreement and appellant Bug Master Exterminating Service, Inc. (ABug Master@) for unfair

competition. Bug Master filed a motion for sanctions against Abash, and Abash subsequently nonsuited

Bug Master. Following a trial to the court, the court rendered judgment that Abash take nothing by its

claims against its former employee and denied Bug Master=s motion for sanctions. By two issues, Bug

Master appeals from the judgment denying its motion for sanctions. We will affirm the judgment. BACKGROUND1

After Jack L. Sauer, a former Abash employee, began employment with Bug Master, an

Abash competitor, Abash sued Sauer to enforce an employment agreement that included noncompetition

and nondisclosure covenants. Several months later, Abash added Bug Master as a defendant, alleging that

it had interfered with Abash=s business relations and engaged in unfair competition by using Abash=s trade

secrets, which Bug Master obtained when it hired Sauer. Sauer counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that

the employment agreement=s noncompetition clause was void. Sauer also sought attorney=s fees. Bug

Master filed a motion for sanctions, alleging that no evidentiary support existed for the material assertions

made by Abash and requesting reasonable expenses, attorney=s fees, and costs for Ainconvenience,

harassment and out-of-pocket expenses incurred in connection with this litigation.@

Several months after Bug Master filed its motion, Abash nonsuited its case against Bug

Master. A trial to the court commenced on March 21, 2000. On October 29, 2001, the trial court

rendered judgment, declaring the noncompetition clause in Abash=s employment agreement void and

awarding attorney=s fees to Sauer. The district court also denied Bug Master=s motion for sanctions. Bug

Master requested and the court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law Aas to Bug Master.@ This

appeal followed.

1 As no factual-sufficiency issue has been presented, only a brief recitation of the facts is necessary.

2 DISCUSSION

By its first issue, Bug Master contends that the district court erred in denying its motion for

sanctions based on the erroneous conclusion that Bug Master was required to show harassment or bad faith

in order to recover sanctions under chapter 10 of the civil-practice-and-remedies code. The pertinent part

of the statute provides:

The signing of a pleading or motion as required by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure constitutes a certificate by the signatory that to the signatory=s best knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry:

(1) the pleading or motion is not being presented for any improper purpose, including to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;

....

(3) each allegation or other factual contention in the pleading or motion has evidentiary support or, for a specifically identified allegation or factual contention, is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery . . . .

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 10.001 (West 2002). A party may move for sanctions for a violation

of section 10.001. Id. ' 10.002 (West 2002).

The conclusion of law about which Bug Master complains states: AChapter 10, Texas Civil

Practice and Remedies Code, requires Bugmaster to prove that the petition filed against BugMaster was

filed for an improper purpose, including harassment, delay, or increasing the cost of litigation.@ Where the

trial court issues findings of fact and conclusions of law, we treat the court=s findings with the same force and

dignity as a jury=s verdict upon jury questions and review its conclusions of law de novo. Anderson v. City

3 of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991); Black v. City of Killeen, 78 S.W.3d 686, 691

(Tex. App.CAustin 2002, pet. denied). We rely on the fact finder to resolve disputed facts and accord

those facts the same status as if they were determined by a jury. Black, 78 S.W.3d at 691.

We review a trial court=s decision to grant or deny a motion for sanctions under an abuse-

of-discretion standard. Herring v. Welborn, 27 S.W.3d 132, 143 (Tex. App.CSan Antonio 2000, pet.

denied). In order for a party seeking sanctions to prevail, there must be little or no basis for claims, no

grounds for legal arguments, misrepresentation of law or facts, or legal action that is sought in bad faith. Id.

When reviewing a trial court=s finding under the abuse-of-discretion standard, we may not substitute our

judgment for that of the trial court. Schlager v. Clements, 939 S.W.2d 183, 191 (Tex. App.CHouston

[14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied). Rather, we are limited to determining whether the trial court abused its

discretion by either (1) acting arbitrarily and unreasonably, without reference to guiding rules or principles,

or (2) misapplying the law to the established facts of the case. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc.,

701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985); Schlager, 939 S.W.2d at 191. A trial court abuses its discretion in

imposing (or denying) sanctions only if it based its order on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly

erroneous assessment of the evidence. Monroe v. Grider, 884 S.W.2d 811, 816 (Tex. App.CDallas

1994, writ denied). In deciding whether the imposition or denial of sanctions constitutes an abuse of

discretion, we examine the entire record. Herring, 27 S.W.3d at 143.

Bug Master construes the district court=s conclusions of law as imposing an additional

requirement to prevail on its motion for sanctions; that is, Bug Master must establish that Abash=s petition

was filed for an improper purpose, such as for harassment or bad faith, in order to prevail on its motion for

4 sanctions. We agree with Bug Master=s contention. Bug Master sought sanctions based on its claim that

Abash=s petition allegations lacked evidentiary support. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. '

10.001(3). Its burden was, therefore, to establish that there was no evidentiary support for the allegations

in Abash=s petition. It was not required to also prove that Abash=s pleading was presented for any

improper purpose, including harassment, delay, or increasing the cost of litigation, as that was not the

violation that Bug Master alleged to have occurred. See id. ' 10.001(1). Thus, the district court abused his

discretion by basing his order on an erroneous view of the law.

We will not reverse the court=s order, however, if the controlling findings of fact will support

a correct legal theory. Stable Energy, L.P. v.

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Related

Anderson v. City of Seven Points
806 S.W.2d 791 (Texas Supreme Court, 1991)
Stable Energy, L.P. v. Newberry
999 S.W.2d 538 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1999)
Black v. City of Killeen
78 S.W.3d 686 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2002)
Herring v. Welborn
27 S.W.3d 132 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Monroe v. Grider
884 S.W.2d 811 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1994)
University of Texas at Arlington v. Bishop
997 S.W.2d 350 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1999)
Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc.
701 S.W.2d 238 (Texas Supreme Court, 1985)
Schlager v. Clements
939 S.W.2d 183 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1996)

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