Bufford v. CENTURYLINK

E.D. North Carolina

Bufford v. CENTURYLINK

759 F. Supp. 2d 707, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131160, 2010 WL 5173570

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. North Carolina

DecidedDecember 10, 2010

Docket5:09-cv-559

StatusPublished

This text of 759 F. Supp. 2d 707 (Bufford v. CENTURYLINK) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bufford v. CENTURYLINK, 759 F. Supp. 2d 707, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131160, 2010 WL 5173570 (E.D.N.C. 2010).

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Opinion

ORDER

JAMES C. DEVER III, District Judge.

On August 11, 2010, Embarq Management Corporation (“Embarq” or “defendant”) filed a motion to dismiss Kimbly C. Bufford’s (“Bufford” or “plaintiff”) amended complaint [D.E. 22]. In the amended complaint, Bufford seeks relief under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and N.C. Gen.Stat. § 143-422.2 for failure to hire due to her race [D.E. 16].

In analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a court must determine *708 whether the complaint is legally and factually sufficient. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. —,—, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190-91 (4th Cir.2010); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir.2008); Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir.2007) (en banc); Kloth v. Microsoft Corp., 444 F.3d 312, 319 (4th Cir.2006); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam). In considering a motion to dismiss, a court need not accept a complaint’s legal conclusions drawn from the facts. Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190-91; Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir.2009).

Bufford’s claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are legally and factually sufficient to state a claim against Embarq. Thus, Embarq’s motion to dismiss those two claims is denied. However, Bufford’s claim against Embarq under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.2 does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Simply put, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 143-422.2 does not create a private right of action. See, e.g., McLean v. Patten Cmtys., Inc., 332 F.3d 714, 719 (4th Cir.2003); Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th Cir.2000); Bratcher v. Pharm. Prod. Dev., Inc., 545 F.Supp.2d 533, 544 (E.D.N.C.2008); Roberts v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 503 F.Supp.2d. 787, 788-89 (E.D.N.C.2007); Mul lis v. Mechs. & Farmers Bank, 994 F.Supp. 680, 687 (M.D.N.C.1997). Moreover, to the extent that Bufford seeks relief under North Carolina law for the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and cites section 143^22.2 as the public policy source, the claim fails. The tort requires a discharge. By definition, the tort does not apply to applicants. See, e.g., Garner v. Rentenbach Constructors Inc., 350 N.C. 567, 568-73, 515 S.E.2d 438, 439-42 (1999); Imes v. City of Asheville, 163 N.C.App. 668, 670-71, 594 S.E.2d 397, 398-99, aff'd, 359 N.C. 182, 606 S.E.2d 117 (2004) (per curiam); Ridenhour v. IBM Corp., 132 N.C.App. 563, 568-69, 512 S.E.2d 774, 778 (1999); Gravitte v. Mitsubishi Semiconductor Am., Inc., 109 N.C.App. 466, 472, 428 S.E.2d 254, 258 (1993).

In sum, Embarq’s motion to dismiss [D.E. 22] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Bufford’s claim under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 143-422.2 is DISMISSED with prejudice. Bufford’s claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 may proceed.

SO ORDERED.

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ORDER

JAMES C. DEVER III, District Judge.

On August 11, 2010, Embarq Management Corporation (“Embarq” or “defendant”) filed a motion to dismiss Kimbly C. Bufford’s (“Bufford” or “plaintiff”) amended complaint [D.E. 22]. In the amended complaint, Bufford seeks relief under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and N.C. Gen.Stat. § 143-422.2 for failure to hire due to her race [D.E. 16].

In analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a court must determine *708 whether the complaint is legally and factually sufficient. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. —,—, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190-91 (4th Cir.2010); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir.2008); Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir.2007) (en banc); Kloth v. Microsoft Corp., 444 F.3d 312, 319 (4th Cir.2006); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam). In considering a motion to dismiss, a court need not accept a complaint’s legal conclusions drawn from the facts. Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190-91; Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir.2009).

Bufford’s claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are legally and factually sufficient to state a claim against Embarq. Thus, Embarq’s motion to dismiss those two claims is denied. However, Bufford’s claim against Embarq under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.2 does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Simply put, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 143-422.2 does not create a private right of action. See, e.g., McLean v. Patten Cmtys., Inc., 332 F.3d 714, 719 (4th Cir.2003); Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th Cir.2000); Bratcher v. Pharm. Prod. Dev., Inc., 545 F.Supp.2d 533, 544 (E.D.N.C.2008); Roberts v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 503 F.Supp.2d. 787, 788-89 (E.D.N.C.2007); Mul lis v. Mechs. & Farmers Bank, 994 F.Supp. 680, 687 (M.D.N.C.1997). Moreover, to the extent that Bufford seeks relief under North Carolina law for the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and cites section 143^22.2 as the public policy source, the claim fails. The tort requires a discharge. By definition, the tort does not apply to applicants. See, e.g., Garner v. Rentenbach Constructors Inc., 350 N.C. 567, 568-73, 515 S.E.2d 438, 439-42 (1999); Imes v. City of Asheville, 163 N.C.App. 668, 670-71, 594 S.E.2d 397, 398-99, aff'd, 359 N.C. 182, 606 S.E.2d 117 (2004) (per curiam); Ridenhour v. IBM Corp., 132 N.C.App. 563, 568-69, 512 S.E.2d 774, 778 (1999); Gravitte v. Mitsubishi Semiconductor Am., Inc., 109 N.C.App. 466, 472, 428 S.E.2d 254, 258 (1993).

In sum, Embarq’s motion to dismiss [D.E. 22] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Bufford’s claim under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 143-422.2 is DISMISSED with prejudice. Bufford’s claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 may proceed.

SO ORDERED.

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759 F. Supp. 2d 707, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131160, 2010 WL 5173570, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bufford-v-centurylink-nced-2010.

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