Buffin v. City and County of San Francisco

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 RIANA BUFFIN, ET AL., CASE NO. 15-cv-04959-YGR

5 Plaintiffs, ORDER STAYING JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 6 vs. 62 AND IMPOSING BOND REQUIREMENT

7 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, ET Re: Dkt. No. 400 AL., 8 Defendants. 9 10 On March 23, 2020, the Court entered an order granting plaintiffs and defendant Sheriff of 11 San Francisco’s stipulated request for entry of attorneys’ fees against the State of California. The 12 State appealed. Now before the Court is the State’s motion to stay the March 23, 2020 order 13 pending appeal without requiring the State to post a supersedeas bond. 14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(b) allows for a stay of the execution of a final 15 judgment pending appeal when the moving party posts a supersedeas bond. District courts have 16 “inherent discretionary authority in setting supersedeas bonds.” Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 17 831 F.2d 1503, 1505 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987). District courts also have discretion to waive the bond 18 requirement. See Int’l Telemeter Corp. v. Hamlin Intern. Corp., 754 F.2d 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 19 1985). Courts typically consider five factors in determining whether waiver is appropriate: (1) the 20 complexity of the collection process; (2) the amount of time required to obtain a judgment after it 21 is affirmed on appeal; (3) the degree of confidence that the district court has in the availability of 22 funds to pay the judgment; (4) whether the defendant’s ability to pay the judgment is so plain that 23 the cost of a bond would be a waste of money; and (5) whether the defendant is in such a 24 precarious financial situation that the requirement to post a bond would place other creditors of the 25 defendant in an insecure position. Dillon v. City of Chicago, 866 F.2d 902, 904-905 (7th Cir. 26 1988).1 27 1 The State, which “has the burden to ‘objectively demonstrate’ the reasons for departing 2 from the usual requirement of a full supersedeas bond,” Cotton ex rel. McClure v. City of Eureka, 3 Cal., 860 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2012), primarily argues that it has sufficient funds to 4 pay the judgment and thus a bond would serve no purpose. The State’s financial resources alone, 5 however, do not warrant waiver of the bond requirement.2 Nor is the Court persuaded by the 6 State’s assertion that it routinely pays judgments and has an established process for doing so. The 7 existence of a process, even if routinely used, does not answer the question of whether that process 8 is expedient. Here, evidence indicates the State’s process for collecting plaintiffs’ fee award likely 9 may require a complex and time-consuming legislative appropriation or the passage of bills 10 through the California legislature. Delay imposes a particularly acute hardship on a small public 11 interest law firm like Equal Justice Under Law, which depends on fee awards for its continued 12 operations and which faces challenges in light of the current public health and economic crisis. 13 Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of Pauma & Yuima Reservation v. California, 14 No. 3:09-CV-1955-CAB-MDD, 2014 WL 12669557 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2014) highlights the 15 importance of exercising caution in waiving the supersedeas bond requirement. There, the district 16 court granted the State’s request for a waiver of the bond requirement. It took two years for the 17 State to complete the appellate process, and another several months for the State to complete a 18 legislative appropriation allowing plaintiffs to collect their judgment. Pauma Band of Luiseno 19 Mission Indians of the Pauma & Yuima Reservation v. California, 136 S. Ct. 2512, 2513 (2016) 20 (denying cert. on June 27, 2016); S.B. 1187 (CA 2016) (appropriating funds to Pauma plaintiffs 21 on Sept. 9, 2016). The Court anticipates the process here similarly will unfold laboriously, even if 22 plaintiffs prevail through appeal after a period of years. On balance, the Dillon factors do not 23 weigh in favor of waiving the bond requirement. 24

25 2 The State provides evidence that it has a specific statutory process for a legislative apportionment and an alternative process by way of writ of execution. However, the State has not 26 “guarantee[d]” its ability and willingness to pay as of date the appeals process concludes. COVID-19’s effect on the state budget introduces additional uncertainty to the process. “[U]ntil 27 there is absolute certainty that the [entity] has agreed unconditionally to pay the judgment in th[e] 1 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby STAYS the March 23, 2020 order pending 2 appeal. Further, the Court DENIES the request for waiver of the bond requirement and ORDERS 3 the State to post a bond at 1.25 times the judgment. In light of potential procedural issues, the 4 || bond shall be posted no later than October 30, 2020. Failure to timely post the bond shall result 5 in automatic lift of the stay. 6 This Order terminates Docket Number 400. 7 IT Is SO ORDERED. 8 9 Dated: June 30, 2020 10 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 11 12

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