OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
MALONEY, Judge.
Appellant was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to twenty years confinement. The Court of Appeals affirmed appellant's conviction. Buentello v. State, 770 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1989). We granted appellant’s petition to review the holding of the Court of Appeals that the jury’s discussion [611]*611of parole was not so detrimental as to deprive appellant of a fair and impartial trial in violation of Tex.R.App.Pro. 30(b).
Appellant filed a motion for new trial with supporting affidavits from two jurors alleging jury misconduct and receipt of other evidence. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, two jurors testified as to discussions during the penalty stage of the trial regarding the applicability of early release on parole to appellant,1 even though the court had instructed the jury in its charge that they were not to discuss how long the appellant would be required to serve on any sentence imposed. Appellant argued that the jurors’ discussion of the application of parole law violated his right to a fair and impartial trial and constituted reversible error under Sneed v. State, 670 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.Cr.App.1984). The trial court denied the appellant’s motion for a new trial.
The Court of Appeals addressed the applicability of Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 606(b) in its disposition of appellant’s points of error regarding the jurors’ discussion of parole law. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that prior to the effective date of Rule 606(b), grounds for a new trial in felony cases were found in Article 40.03, V.A.C.C.P.2 The court held that although that article was repealed by the adoption of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the substance of the article was carried forward in Rule 30(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Buentello, supra at 918. Viewed in this light, the court held that the “overt act” requirement of jury misconduct has been carried forward and that Rule 606(b) prohibits jurors from impeaching their verdict by affidavit or testimony regarding their mental processes during deliberations “except as relevant to an overt act of jury misconduct.” Id. at 919. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that Rule 606(b) did not change Texas criminal practice. The court further held that the “purpose of the ‘except’ clause of Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 606(b) was to allow the use of juror testimony to determine a question of juror misconduct in the discussion of parole law.” Id. The court applied the five-prong test set forth in Sneed and decided that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant’s motion for new trial. Id. at 920. Both the State and appellant argue in their briefs that the disposition of this case is controlled by this Court’s holding in Sneed.
In Sneed, this Court ruled that in order to show reversible error based on a discussion of parole by a jury, the defendant must prove the existence of the following factors:
1) a misstatement of the law;
2) asserted as a fact;
3) by one professing to know the law;
4) which is relied upon by other jurors;
5) who for that reason changed their vote to a harsher punishment.
Sneed, supra at 266. This Court held that the five-prong test applied to cases under either former Article 40.03 Subdivision 7, V.A.C.C.P., relating to receipt of “other evidence,” or Article 40.03 Subdivision 8, V.A.C.C.P., relating to instances of “jury misconduct.” Id.
Therefore, this Court is called upon to decide whether the adoption of Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 606(b) changed the law with respect to testimony that would be permitted in order to impeach a jury’s verdict, and whether the five-part test set forth in Sneed is still applicable under the new rule of evidence.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF TEXAS RULE OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 606(b)
In 1981, the Texas Legislature created the Senate Interim Study Committee on Rules of Evidence in order to draft and recommend a judicially promulgated “inte[612]*612grated” code of Texas rules of evidence. S.R. 565, 67th Leg., 1981. See generally, Caperton & McGee, “Background, Scope and Applicability of the Texas Rules of Evidence,” 20 Hous.L.Rev. 49 (1983). During deliberations, the committee determined that a separate set of proposed rules would be required only for criminal matters.3 Thereafter, the Senate-House Select Committee on the Judiciary approved legislation that would grant authority to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to adopt and promulgate rules of criminal evidence. Acts 1985, 69th Leg., Ch. 685, pp. 2472-73, §§ 1-4. The proposed draft of Rule 606(b) submitted by the Liaison Committee was worded in the current federal version of the rule. During deliberative proceedings under the auspices of the Select Committee, a subcommittee inserted the “except” clause and this clause was approved as written. This Court adopted the provision and provided for a broad, all-encompassing exception to the first portion of the rule, giving rise to the question by many authors in Texas as to why the preceding language in the rule was included at all.
II. COMPARISON OF TEX.
R.CRIM.EVID. 606(b) TO FED.R.EVID. 606(b)
Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 606(b) states:
Rule 606. Competency of Juror as a Witness
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify as to any matter relevant to the validity of the verdict or indictment. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes, (emphasis added).
The Rule does not lend itself to easy application due to the clear internal contradiction between the first and second part of the rule. Shields v. State, 809 S.W.2d 230, 233-34, n. 4 (Tex.Cr.App.1991); Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (Teague, J., dissenting). One author has stated: “[T]he exception is simple: Jurors may testify as to anything relevant to the validity of the verdict or indictment. Thus, Criminal Rule 606(b) places no independent limits on the ability of jurors to attack the validity of a verdict or indictment. They may testify as to any relevant matter.” Goode, Wellborn, and Sharlot, Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence: Civil and Criminal, § 606.3 (1988). See also, Ray, 1 Texas Law of Evidence Civil and Criminal, §§ 395-96 (Texas Practice 3rd ed. Supp. 1991).
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OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
MALONEY, Judge.
Appellant was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to twenty years confinement. The Court of Appeals affirmed appellant's conviction. Buentello v. State, 770 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1989). We granted appellant’s petition to review the holding of the Court of Appeals that the jury’s discussion [611]*611of parole was not so detrimental as to deprive appellant of a fair and impartial trial in violation of Tex.R.App.Pro. 30(b).
Appellant filed a motion for new trial with supporting affidavits from two jurors alleging jury misconduct and receipt of other evidence. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, two jurors testified as to discussions during the penalty stage of the trial regarding the applicability of early release on parole to appellant,1 even though the court had instructed the jury in its charge that they were not to discuss how long the appellant would be required to serve on any sentence imposed. Appellant argued that the jurors’ discussion of the application of parole law violated his right to a fair and impartial trial and constituted reversible error under Sneed v. State, 670 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.Cr.App.1984). The trial court denied the appellant’s motion for a new trial.
The Court of Appeals addressed the applicability of Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 606(b) in its disposition of appellant’s points of error regarding the jurors’ discussion of parole law. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that prior to the effective date of Rule 606(b), grounds for a new trial in felony cases were found in Article 40.03, V.A.C.C.P.2 The court held that although that article was repealed by the adoption of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the substance of the article was carried forward in Rule 30(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Buentello, supra at 918. Viewed in this light, the court held that the “overt act” requirement of jury misconduct has been carried forward and that Rule 606(b) prohibits jurors from impeaching their verdict by affidavit or testimony regarding their mental processes during deliberations “except as relevant to an overt act of jury misconduct.” Id. at 919. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that Rule 606(b) did not change Texas criminal practice. The court further held that the “purpose of the ‘except’ clause of Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 606(b) was to allow the use of juror testimony to determine a question of juror misconduct in the discussion of parole law.” Id. The court applied the five-prong test set forth in Sneed and decided that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant’s motion for new trial. Id. at 920. Both the State and appellant argue in their briefs that the disposition of this case is controlled by this Court’s holding in Sneed.
In Sneed, this Court ruled that in order to show reversible error based on a discussion of parole by a jury, the defendant must prove the existence of the following factors:
1) a misstatement of the law;
2) asserted as a fact;
3) by one professing to know the law;
4) which is relied upon by other jurors;
5) who for that reason changed their vote to a harsher punishment.
Sneed, supra at 266. This Court held that the five-prong test applied to cases under either former Article 40.03 Subdivision 7, V.A.C.C.P., relating to receipt of “other evidence,” or Article 40.03 Subdivision 8, V.A.C.C.P., relating to instances of “jury misconduct.” Id.
Therefore, this Court is called upon to decide whether the adoption of Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 606(b) changed the law with respect to testimony that would be permitted in order to impeach a jury’s verdict, and whether the five-part test set forth in Sneed is still applicable under the new rule of evidence.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF TEXAS RULE OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 606(b)
In 1981, the Texas Legislature created the Senate Interim Study Committee on Rules of Evidence in order to draft and recommend a judicially promulgated “inte[612]*612grated” code of Texas rules of evidence. S.R. 565, 67th Leg., 1981. See generally, Caperton & McGee, “Background, Scope and Applicability of the Texas Rules of Evidence,” 20 Hous.L.Rev. 49 (1983). During deliberations, the committee determined that a separate set of proposed rules would be required only for criminal matters.3 Thereafter, the Senate-House Select Committee on the Judiciary approved legislation that would grant authority to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to adopt and promulgate rules of criminal evidence. Acts 1985, 69th Leg., Ch. 685, pp. 2472-73, §§ 1-4. The proposed draft of Rule 606(b) submitted by the Liaison Committee was worded in the current federal version of the rule. During deliberative proceedings under the auspices of the Select Committee, a subcommittee inserted the “except” clause and this clause was approved as written. This Court adopted the provision and provided for a broad, all-encompassing exception to the first portion of the rule, giving rise to the question by many authors in Texas as to why the preceding language in the rule was included at all.
II. COMPARISON OF TEX.
R.CRIM.EVID. 606(b) TO FED.R.EVID. 606(b)
Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 606(b) states:
Rule 606. Competency of Juror as a Witness
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify as to any matter relevant to the validity of the verdict or indictment. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes, (emphasis added).
The Rule does not lend itself to easy application due to the clear internal contradiction between the first and second part of the rule. Shields v. State, 809 S.W.2d 230, 233-34, n. 4 (Tex.Cr.App.1991); Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (Teague, J., dissenting). One author has stated: “[T]he exception is simple: Jurors may testify as to anything relevant to the validity of the verdict or indictment. Thus, Criminal Rule 606(b) places no independent limits on the ability of jurors to attack the validity of a verdict or indictment. They may testify as to any relevant matter.” Goode, Wellborn, and Sharlot, Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence: Civil and Criminal, § 606.3 (1988). See also, Ray, 1 Texas Law of Evidence Civil and Criminal, §§ 395-96 (Texas Practice 3rd ed. Supp. 1991).
Texas Rule 606(b) is drafted contrary to its federal counterpart, which is grounded in the common-law rule against admission of jury testimony to impeach a verdict, except to testimony relating to extraneous information and outside influences. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987).
Federal Rule 606(b) provides:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influ[613]*613ence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, (emphasis added).
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), the Advisory Committee Notes,4 as well as the Supreme Court’s discussions in Tanner, make it clear that no inquiry is allowed into the jury’s internal process of arriving at a verdict. A clearly drafted exception into the federal rule allows only an attack upon the verdict by juror testimony on the ground that prejudicial extraneous information was injected into the deliberation process (e.g., a radio newscast or newspaper account), or any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon a juror (e.g., a bribe or threat to the safety of a juror). See generally, Mueller, Juror’s Impeachment of Verdicts or Indictments in Federal Court Under Rule 606(b), 57 Neb.L.Rev. 920, 936-40 (1978). By insulating the jury decision-making process, and juror mental processes, Federal Rule 606(b) adopts the philosophy expressed in McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 35 S.Ct. 783, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915), that:
“[j]urors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation; to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.” McDonald, 238 U.S. at 267-68, 35 S.Ct. at 784, 59 L.Ed. at 1302.
While Texas generally follows the Federal Rules of Evidence and the federal courts’ interpretation of the same, see e.g., Campbell v. State, 718 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), this Court decided not to adopt the wording of the federal rule. The drafters determined that the federal rule and its interpretations were too narrow, and decided to reword the rule to allow for impeachment of the verdict through all relevant testimony as to both internal and external influences.
The plain language of the Texas rule indicates that jurors are not immune from testifying at a hearing on a motion for new trial. In fact, a juror may testify about “any matter,” as long as it is “relevant to the validity of the verdict.” “Any matter” is a broad, all-encompassing term, therefore, the trial judge is unquestionably granted more discretion under this rule to decide whether the testimony sought to be elicited at a hearing on a motion for new trial is relevant to the validity of the verdict. As long as the trial court operates within the boundaries of its discretion, an appellate court should not disturb its decision absent a clear abuse. See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 390 (Tex.Cr. App.1991) (opinion on rehearing).
The decisions of courts of appeals in this State that have had the opportunity to consider the application of Rule 606(b) are unclear as to whether only “overt acts” of jury misconduct will be examined through live testimony at a hearing on a motion for new trial, or whether the “except” clause consumes such a distinction and requires only that the testimony sought to be elicited is “relevant to the validity of the verdict.”
In Reese v. State, 772 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. App.—Waco 1989, pet. ref’d), the Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether live testimony could be utilized under this new rule to show non-compliance with the admonition against consideration of early release on parole. The Court held that a jury that actually receives “other evidence” after it begins deliberations violates the defendant’s constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the “witness” who gave [614]*614the “other evidence” to the jury. Id. at 290, citing Munroe v. State, 637 S.W.2d 475, 482 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). The Court analogized parole discussions to the receipt of “other evidence.” Therefore, the Court found that such testimony was admissible or else Rule 606(b) would run afoul of the defendant’s constitutional protections. Id. The Court made no distinction as to whether the discussions constituted an “overt act” of jury misconduct as under prior caselaw, but merely concluded that the testimony was “relevant to the validity of the verdict” and was therefore admissible under the “except” clause to that rule. Ibid.
However, in Hernandez v. State, 774 S.W.2d 319 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, pet. ref'd), the Court determined that the “except” clause is meaningful only if it is read as a reference to Tex.R.App.P. 30(b) and the caselaw developed under its predecessor as to the grounds on which a new trial must be granted. Id. at 324-25. Therefore, the Court held that “under rule 606(b), jurors remain incompetent to impeach their verdict by affidavit or testimony about their mental processes during deliberations except where relevant to an overt act of jury misconduct,” Id., citing Daniels v. State, 600 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Tex. Cr.App.1980), and Frias v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 549, 335 S.W.2d 765 (1960) (emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals went on to hold that discussion of parole law by jurors constitutes an overt act of misconduct, which is also relevant to the validity of the verdict, and is therefore admissible. Hernandez, supra at 325. See also, Austin v. State, 748 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1988, pet. ref'd). Judge Brook-shire, in his dissenting opinion, argues that Rule 606(b) codifies Texas law and further states that the rule “preserves” the distinction between testimony concerning overt acts and testimony concerning mental processes. Id. at 553-55.
A distinction as to “overt acts” and mental processes of jurors regarding jury misconduct has never been clearly drawn. This Court finds that there is no meaningful distinction under Rule 606(b) between acts of jury misconduct and “overt acts” of jury misconduct.
We hold that the test for admission of juror testimony at a hearing on a motion for new trial is not whether the conduct constitutes an “overt act,” but whether the matter sought to be elicited is deemed by the trial court to be relevant to the validity of the verdict. What is considered “relevant” will be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the court’s experiences and observations, the grounds for a new trial set forth in Tex.R.App.Pro. 30(b), and the caselaw which was developed under the predecessor to 30(b), Art. 40.03, Y.A.C.C.P. Thus, the test adopted in Sneed is still a viable means of determining whether a jury’s discussion of parole law constitutes reversible error.
III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS OF CASE
A review of the testimony of jurors Montgomery and Dowd shows that the length of time appellant would serve in the penitentiary as a result of parole considerations was discussed by the jury and that jurors Norris and Gaines expressed their personal knowledge, experience, and opinion as to how long the appellant would have to serve in the penitentiary. Montgomery testified in pertinent part:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Now, the people who discussed parole, did they, in any way, led [sic] you to believe they knew something about parole law?
MONTGOMERY: Yes, sir.
Q. Can you tell us how they did that?
A. Mr. Norris stated that he had known of people, acquaintances, that had been punished for whatever, and his example was they got 10 years, and they were out in two, with no problem.
Q. And did Ms. Gaines lead you to believe that, in any way, that she knew something about parole law?
A. Yes, sir.
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Q. Do you recall whether or not she stated to the rest of the jurors how much time this man would probably serve on a 20-year sentence?
[615]*615A. Yes, sir. She stated that if he got 20 years, ..., that he would not do more than two. That he would get out on good behavior is how she stated it to us.
Q. Did she express that to you as an opinion, or as her actually knowing that that’s what would happen?
A. As she actually knew.
Q. And can you tell this Court whether or not, ..., you relied upon that information provided by Sally Gaines?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And can you tell us, ma’am, whether or not subsequent to that discussion, and because of that discussion, you voted for a higher punishment?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You did?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now let’s talk about Mr. Norris. Can you tell us, ma’am, whether he, ..., related to the jury how long Mr. Buentel-lo would have to serve on a 20-year sentence?
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A. He stated he would be out in two years, three at the very most.
Q. Do you recall whether or not he stated that as a fact or as an opinion?
A. I feel like as an opinion.
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A. He did continue to say, “I know this is how the criminal justice system is.”
Q. ... did that influence you in arriving at a higher amount of time for actual punishment?
A. Yes, sir.
The following examination of Juror Dowd transpired:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: The people who discussed parole with you, sir, did they in any way profess to know the parole law, or know something about it?
DOWD: Yes.
Q. Now, you say Ms. Gaines indicated that he would serve how much time on a 20-year sentence?
A. Oh, probably one to five years, if that much.
Q. And did she assert that just as a bald-faced fact or as an opinion?
A. We — I took it as fact.
Q. ... In reaching a verdict of twenty years in the penitentiary, did her assertions concerning the amount of time this man would have to serve influence your decision?
A. Yes, sir. It did.
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Q. As regards Mr. Norris, do you recall whether or not he professed to know something about the parole law?
A. He made comments directed towards, you know, good behavior time, that a person that gets, you know, anywhere from 20 — 20 years or so, they’ve got all this good time that they can gather and still get out, ..., within one to five years.
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Q. And the comments made by Mr. Norris and Sally [Ms. Gaines] were comments upon which you relied in reaching a higher verdict?
A. Yes, sir.
The State did not present controverting affidavits or testimony from any other juror who participated in this trial. Neither juror, at any time during their testimony, indicated that the foreman or any other member of the jury attempted to stop discussion of the parole law even though the court’s instructions clearly prohibited such discussions.
The Court of Appeals analyzed the testimony of jurors Montgomery and Dowd and held that since “there was no testimony that any juror professed to actually know the law concomitantly with a factual misstatement of that law,” there was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in overruling the motion for new trial. Buentello, supra at 920. We disagree with the appellate court’s assessment of the testimony. The discussions by the jurors in this case are very similar to those presented in Shields, supra at 231-32.5 The testimony [616]*616of Montgomery and Dowd indicates that jurors Norris and Gaines presented a misstatement of the law and asserted it to the others as a fact, within the context of the test set out in Sneed.6 It is also apparent that at least two jurors relied upon the misstatements of Norris and Gaines, as to the application of the parole law, when they voted for a harsher punishment than they would have if not for the misstatement.7
Appellant’s first ground for review is sustained.8 The judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are reversed and the instant cause is remanded to the trial court.