Budner v. Haas

98 A.2d 509, 33 Del. Ch. 561, 1953 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131
CourtCourt of Chancery of Delaware
DecidedJune 25, 1953
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 98 A.2d 509 (Budner v. Haas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Chancery of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Budner v. Haas, 98 A.2d 509, 33 Del. Ch. 561, 1953 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131 (Del. Ct. App. 1953).

Opinion

Seitz, Chancellor:

The question is whether a deed given by defendants to plaintiffs should be reformed to include certain land on the grounds either of mistake of one party known to the other or activity amounting to fraud.

The defendants owned a residence situated on a tract of 3.17 acres located on the Washington Street Extension in Brandywine Hundred. In May 1948 defendants decided to sell the residence and a portion of the tract of land. Defendants intended to retain the balance of the land. Plaintiffs responded to an advertisement of sale. Unless otherwise indicated, reference to “plaintiff” will embrace only Mr. Budner and reference to “defendant” will embrace only Mr. Haas.

If we assume that the Washington Street Extention runs north and south, the tract is on the east side thereof. Because of the curve in the road the dimensions of the tract are irregular. The whole case turns on the factual issue as to what was the agreement of the parties with respect to the southwesterly line, but which I shall call the southern boundary of the tract to be sold. The other boundaries were fixed and are not in dispute.

Defendant claims that they orally agreed that the boundary was to run straight back from a cement marker located in the front property line and was to be about two feet south of the most southerly point of the existing driveway. The deed which plaintiff seeks to have reformed is, with differences not here material, in [563]*563accordance with defendant’s contention. Plaintiff claims they agreed that the southern boundary was to run in front of a row of trees which are about half way back and about 30 feet south of the deed boundary at that point.

The Supreme Court of Delaware recently stated the following principle which governs this case:

“Unless there was a clear understanding with which the formal contract conflicts, there is, of course, no comparative standard upon which to base a reformation, and the contract as executed must stand.”1

Let us consider whether plaintiffs have proved by “clear” and “convincing” evidence2 that they orally agreed with defendants that the so-called southern division line between the property sold plaintiffs and the property retained by defendants would run along and in front of a certain identifiable line of trees rather then, as defendants contend, approximately two feet south of the southern edge of the existing driveway.

Following a number of conversations an agreement was reached orally on June 7, 1948 and a down payment made. Presumably plaintiff and defendant agreed at that time on the southern boundary but what that agreement was is sadly now my problem.

Defendant, with plaintiff’s consent, employed a surveyor to provide a description for the deed. The parties agreed to several matters other than the sale of the property, such as the rental of the plaintiffs’ home, storage of some furniture, the purchase money mortgage, etc. They also agreed to use Mr. Killoran as their mutual attorney and arranged to meet with him on June 8, 1948.

Immediately after the deposit had been made, defendant made a memorandum and wrote out a description of the property which was to be conveyed. In this memorandum defendant described the boundary line in dispute as “extending directly southwest and up [564]*564to a point approximately four feet southwest of the parallel to driveway to 4706 Washington, the land to be surveyed to determine exact boundary of southwest side.” This, with changes not here material, is the boundary described in the deed. It is undisputed that plaintiff did not see this memorandum. However, it shows that defendant’s position with respect to the boundary has been consistent from the time of the oral agreement.

After he had written this description, defendant was able to secure a surveyor to come and write a description which would enable the attorney to write a contract of sale. On June 8, 1948 the surveyor came to the defendants’ home and dictated a description of the property based on information provided by defendant. That description describes the boundary in dispute as follows:

“Thence in a southwesterly direction by a line passing two (2) feet more or less southwest of the southwesterly edge of the driveway on these premises to a point in the aforementioned line of lands of the Mayor and Council of Wilmington, the distance of the last mentioned course to be determined by survey.”

Plaintiff and defendant went to Mr. Killoran’s office on the same day — June 8. Failing to see Mr. Killoran they talked with his secretary. Defendant handed the secretary the description prepared by the surveyor and the parties also gave her the terms of their agreement with respect to the other matters. Plaintiff disclaims any knowledge of the fact that a general description was then given the secretary but defendant insists that plaintiff knew of the contents. I believe such a description was given because it appeared in the agreement prepared by the attorney and dated June 11. As to whether plaintiff knew the description was given, I can only say there is no particular reason to believe one party over the other.

The surveyor’s agent went on the property on June 9 and commenced to lay out the so-called southern boundary in accordance with the description given by defendant. Stakes were placed along the line. Defendant testified that while the survey was being made, he noticed that the line would cut off a corner of a parking area used in connection with the residence, and he therefore instructed the surveyor to turn the line to the south at a certain point in order to include all of that parking area. The surveyor [565]*565indicated that it was turned at defendant’s direction so as to place some shrubbery on plaintiffs’ side. In any event the line was changed.

Defendants testified that they went to Mr. Killoran’s office with plaintiff on June 11 to sign the agreement of sale which contained the rough description dictated by the surveyor. Plaintiff in effect denies that the agreement of sale was signed on June 11 because he says that he signed papers on only one occasion and he admittedly signed papers June 19. Since I do not consider it vital to my decision I need not resolve this dispute as to the date.

Defendant called the surveyor on several occasions after the field work had been completed. Finally, on June 16, he was told that the survey had been prepared. On that date, defendant took the survey to the attorney’s office and left it. Plaintiff was not advised that the survey had been taken to Mr. Killoran’s office. Plaintiff claims that he called defendant several times to inquire about the survey and was told that it was not ready. He insists that he never saw any survey stakes along the line at this time.

On the settlement date, June 19,1948, the plaintiffs and defendants went to the attorney’s office. Defendants executed the disputed deed which, with differences not here material, set forth a legal description of the southern boundary in accordance with the agreement of sale. Plaintiff admitted in his testimony that the legal description would have been meaningless had he read it. A purchase money mortgage for $40,250 was signed by plaintiffs. Both instruments were on the same day recorded in the office of the Recorder of Deeds.

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274 A.2d 705 (Superior Court of Delaware, 1971)
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121 A.2d 293 (Court of Chancery of Delaware, 1956)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
98 A.2d 509, 33 Del. Ch. 561, 1953 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/budner-v-haas-delch-1953.