Budget Truck Rental LLC, et al. v. Jacci Simon, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: December 30, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01648
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2 3 Budget Truck Rental LLC, et al., Case No. 2:24-cv-01648-CDS-EJY

4 Plaintiffs Order Denying the Motion to Intervene

5 v.

[ECF No. 18] 6 Jacci Simon, et al.,

7 Defendants

8 9 This is a declaratory action related to a fraudulent automobile collision. See Compl., ECF 10 No. 1. Plaintiffs Budget Truck Rental, LLC, Budget Rent a Car System, Inc., and ACE American 11 Insurance Company seek a declaratory judgment that they are not financially responsible for 12 claims arising out of the collision. See id. On March 11, 2025, the court dismissed defendants John 13 Chesebro, Roshanna Ingram, Temmothis Culverson, and Noah Green due to the plaintiffs’ 14 failure to file proof of service. See Order, ECF No. 16. John Chesebro, Roshanna Ingram, and 15 Temmothis Culverson (the “Proposed Intervenors”) now move to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. 16 Civ. P. 24(a)(2), or in the alternative, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Mot. to intervene, ECF 17 No. 18. The motion is fully briefed. See Resp., ECF No. 19; Reply, ECF No. 20. For the reasons 18 stated herein, I deny the motion to intervene. 19 I. Background 20 On October 16, 2019, defendant Jacci Simon rented a 2019 Ford Econoline vehicle from 21 Budget Truck. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 14. Simon purchased all optional insurance products, which 22 included supplemental liability insurance. Id. That same day, Simon was operating the rental 23 vehicle with Heaven Simon and Noah Green as passengers, when it was involved in a collision 24 with another vehicle. Id. at ¶¶ 20–21. John Chesebro was operating the other vehicle involved in 25 the collision, with Roshanna Ingram, Temmothis Culverson, and Timmothis Culverson as 26 passengers. Id. at ¶ 21. 1 Following the accident, Heaven Simon, Noah Green, and Timmothis Culverson settled 2 their claims against Jacci Simon. Id. at ¶ 24.1 However, the Proposed Intervenors did not settle 3 their claims against Jacci Simon. Id. at ¶ 25. On March 5, 2021, the Proposed Intervenors filed a 4 lawsuit against Jacci Simon in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada (Case 5 No. A-21-830597-C). ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 25–26. In the state action, the Proposed Intervenors 6 obtained summary judgment for liability against Simon, based on Jacci Simon’s failure to 7 respond to their motion. ECF No. 19 at 6. Around October 22, 2024, default judgment was 8 entered against Simon in the state court proceedings. Id. 9 On September 5, 2024, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in this instant action for 10 declaratory relief against Jacci Simon, Heaven Simon, John Chesebro, Roshanna Ingram, 11 Temmothis Culverson, Timmothis Culverson, and Noah Green. ECF No. 1 at 2–3, ¶¶ 7–13. Jacci 12 Simon, Heaven Simon, and Timmothis Culverson were served with the complaint and summons, 13 ECF Nos. 8, 9, 10. Due to their failure to respond, default was entered against Jacci Simon, 14 Heaven Simon, and Timmothis Culverson (“the defendants”) by the Clerk of Court on February 15 14, 2025. ECF No. 15.2 16 On February 7, 2025, the court entered an order providing notice that John Chesebro, 17 Roshanna Ingram, Temmothis Culverson, and Noah Green would be dismissed without 18 prejudice unless the plaintiffs filed proof of service by March 7, 2025. Notice, ECF No. 14. 19 Because no proof of service was filed, the court dismissed John Chesebro, Roshanna Ingram, 20 Temmothis Culverson, and Noah Green on March 11, 2025. Order, ECF No. 16. The Proposed 21 Intervenors now move to intervene. See ECF No. 18. 22 23 24 25 1 As alleged, Budget Truck’s claim administrator resolved the pre-litigation claims. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 32. 26 2 A separate order granting default judgment against Jacci Simon, Heaven Simon, and Timmothis Culverson will be entered in this action. 1 II. Legal Standard 2 A. Motion to intervene as of right 3 Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a court to permit 4 intervention of right by a movant who “claims an interest relating to the property or transaction 5 that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical 6 matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties 7 adequately represent that interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); see also Callahan v. Brookdale Senior 8 Living Cmtys., Inc., 42 F.4th 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2022). 9 The Ninth Circuit applies the following four-part test when analyzing a motion to 10 intervene of right under Rule 24(a)(2): 11 (1) the motion must be timely; (2) the applicant must claim a “significantly protectable” interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of 12 the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and 13 (4) the applicant’s interest must be inadequately represented by the parties to the 14 action. 15 Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 16 F.2d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir. 1993)). “In evaluating whether these requirements are met, courts ‘are 17 guided primarily by practical and equitable considerations.’” United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 18 F.3d 391, 397 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir. 1998)). 19 Courts construe Rule 24(a) “broadly in favor of proposed intervenors.” Id. (quoting United States 20 ex. rel. McGough v. Covington Techs. Co., 967 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1992)). 21 B. Permissive intervention 22 A person or entity can intervene, even if they do not meet the requirements of 23 intervention as of right under Rule 24(a), if they have “a claim or defense that shares with the 24 main action a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). The Ninth Circuit 25 has held that permissive intervention is appropriate if the movant shows (1) independent 26 grounds for jurisdiction; (2) the motion is timely; and (3) the applicant’s claim or defense, and 1 the main action, have a question of law or a question of fact in common. Freedom from Religion 2 Found., Inc. v. Geithner, 644 F.3d 836, 843 (9th Cir. 2011). A district court has “broad discretion” in 3 determining whether to allow permissive intervention. Orange Cnty. v. Air California, 799 F.2d 535, 4 539 (9th Cir. 1986). 5 III. Discussion 6 A. Proposed Intervenors’ motion to intervene as of right is denied. 7 First, the Proposed Intervenors’ motion is untimely. See ECF No. 18. Timeliness is a 8 threshold issue. Snyder v. Floworks, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64878, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 9 2007). “If the court finds that the motion to intervene was not timely, it need not reach any of 10 the elements of Rule 24.” Id. (quoting United States v. Washington, 86 F.3d 1499, 1503 (9th Cir. 11 1996). Determining whether a motion to intervene is timely is solely within the discretion of the 12 court. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. Hikma Pharms. USA Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83150, at *9 (D. Nev. 13 Apr. 30, 2021) (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has delineated three factors it looks to 14 when determining if a motion to intervene is timely: (1) the stage of the proceedings, (2) the 15 prejudice to other parties, and (3) the reason for and length of the delay. United States v. Oregon, 16 745 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1984). All three factors weigh against the Proposed Intervenors. 17 The Proposed Intervenors assert that their motion is timely, there has been no delay, and 18 the motion was filed at an early stage of this case. ECF No. 18. at 4. Specifically, they argue that 19 no defendants have filed any responsive pleadings, and the plaintiffs have not been diligent in 20 pursuing its case against all the defendants. Id. at 5. In opposition, the plaintiffs argue that the 21 motion is untimely and that the Proposed Intervenors waived their right to intervene. ECF No. 22 19 at 8, 11. The plaintiffs assert that the Proposed Intervenors had been aware of this declaratory 23 relief for over six months at the time they filed the motion and that on October 4, 2024, the 24 plaintiffs advised Proposed Intervenors’ counsel of this action and requested waiver or 25 acceptance of service of the complaint and summons. Id. at 9. The plaintiffs further explain that 26 there was a “procedural agreement” between the plaintiffs and the Proposed Intervenors’ 1 counsel: the Proposed Intervenors would file one responsive pleading at the same time once all 2 of them were served. Id. at 9. But the plaintiffs assert that when they tried to further formalize 3 the procedural agreement on October 29, 2024, the Proposed Intervenors’ counsel failed to 4 respond. Id; see also Pls.’ Ex. E, ECF No. 19-5. 5 Although the court is not making a finding that any party acted unprofessionally, it 6 appears the only reason this motion is pending is because counsel for the Proposed Intervenors 7 failed to respond to the plaintiffs’ October 29, 2024 email, and because the plaintiffs made no 8 further effort to serve the Proposed Intervenors after they failed to respond to that email. The 9 procedural posture of this case demonstrates how gamesmanship is ineffective, and that 10 litigation works more effectively when parties communicate. 11 Given that the Proposed Intervenors have known about this action since at least October 12 2024, their motion to intervene is untimely. Indeed, the “crucial date for assessing the timeliness 13 of a motion to intervene is when proposed intervenors should have been aware that their 14 interests would not be adequately protected by the existing parties.” Smith v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 15 830 F.3d 843, 854 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999)). If, as 16 argued by the Proposed Intervenors, they could be prejudiced if they are not permitted to 17 intervene here, they had that knowledge for almost six months before they filed the instant 18 motion. Further, the court gave notice on February 7, 2025, that the Proposed Intervenors would 19 be dismissed from the action for the plaintiffs’ failure to effectuate service. See ECF No. 14. They 20 were ultimately dismissed on March 11, 2025. ECF No. 15. The Proposed Intervenors still did not 21 file their motion to intervene for five weeks after they were dismissed. The information before 22 the court shows that the Proposed Intervenors were aware that they were named in this lawsuit 23 since at least October 2024, and that their interests would not be adequately protected if 24 dismissed, but failed to act until April 2025. Consequently, this factor weighs against granting 25 intervention. 26 1 While “general delay of the action without more does not cause prejudice,” Woods v. 2 County of Los Angeles, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96147, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2022), more than a 3 mere delay occurred here. The plaintiffs assert that they have incurred the time and expense to 4 prepare and file a motion for entry of default judgment against the remaining defendants, and 5 allowing an “eleventh-hour intervention” would be prejudicial. ECF No. 19 at 10. In reply, the 6 Proposed Intervenors cite to Chapman v. Vallejo, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19538, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 7 5, 2018) (which in turn cites to Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552 (1872)).3 The Proposed Intervenors 8 argue that plaintiffs’ counsel failed to notify the Proposed Intervenors of the adverse action, 9 seeking a default judgment against the remaining defendants. ECF No. 20 at 4. But devoid from 10 their argument is the fact that they were previously dismissed from this action. This is 11 distinguishable from Chapman, which held that when a complaint alleges that defendants are 12 jointly liable and one of them defaults, judgment should not be entered against the defaulting 13 defendant until the matter has been adjudicated for all defendants. 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19538, 14 *at 2. Here, the Proposed Intervenors were no longer parties to the suit as they were dismissed 15 in March 2025. So I find this argument unpersuasive. 16 The proposed Intervenors assert that there “is absolutely no prejudice” to any party by 17 granting the motion to intervene. ECF No. 20 at 5. In assessing their argument, the appropriate 18 standard in determining prejudice is “how much prejudice would result from the would-be 19 intervenor’s failure to request intervention as soon as he knew or should have known of his 20 interest in the case.” See Smith, 830 F.3d at 857. But intervention has been denied even at pretrial 21 stages when “a lot of water has passed under the litigation bridge.” See United States v. Alisal Water 22 Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up). 23 3 The Proposed Intervenors improperly raised new arguments for the first time in their reply—asserting 24 that they were due notice of the motion for default judgment. See ECF No. 20. The only reference to the Chapman case in the motion to intervene was in their exhibit attached to their motion. See Mot. to set 25 aside default, Ex. A, ECF No. 18-1 at 7. But such arguments were never directly raised in their motion. While I find this improper, I still briefly address their argument. See Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 26 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”). 1 Further, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that “existing parties cannot complain about 2 delay or prejudice caused by their own efforts to thwart the provision of meaningful notice to 3 affected parties.” Smith, 830 F.3d at 858. The Proposed Intervenors do not provide any reason for 4 their delay. Instead, they assert that there has been no delay as the motion was filed at an early 5 stage of the case. ECF No. 18 at 5. The individuals “seeking intervention must provide a reason to 6 the court for its delay in seeking to enter into the case.” See S. Yuba River Citizens League v. Nat’l 7 Marine Fisheries Serv., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81636, at *36 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2007); Alisal Water 8 Corp., 370 F.3d at 923. The Proposed Intervenors failure to explain their delay weighs against 9 them in this factor. But I also consider the length of delay. “When considering the length of 10 delay, the court [also] looks to the date that the would-be intervener realized its interest would 11 not be adequately presented by the parties.” Nat’l Marine Fisheries, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81636, at 12 *36. The would-be intervenor should have realized its interest would not be adequately 13 presented by the parties once the court entered notice that they were being dismissed as 14 defendants and when default against the remaining defendants was entered. So I find this factor 15 also weighs in favor of finding that this motion was untimely. 16 As noted above, the record shows that the Proposed Intervenors were previously named 17 defendants in this action, and in October 2024, plaintiffs’ counsel attempted to communicate 18 with the Proposed Intervenors’ counsel to inquire if the proposed intervenors would be willing 19 to waive service or accept personal service on behalf of their clients. See Pls.’ Ex. D, ECF No. 19-4 20 at 2; Pls.’ Ex. E, ECF No. 19-5 at 2. The Proposed Intervenors were initially notified of the 21 plaintiffs’ declaratory relief but did not respond to communications with the plaintiffs’ counsel 22 regarding service and their initial proposal to file one singular response for the Proposed 23 Intervenors when they were named as defendants in this action. See Pls.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 19-2 at 2. 24 25 26 1 Now, they come before the court after they have been dismissed from this action, and after 2 default has been entered against the remaining defendants and argue that:

3 [They] have a great interest in the outcome of the Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment. If Plaintiffs’ default is permitted to stand and the motion for entry of 4 default judgment is granted the final judgment in the Eighth Judicial District Court 5 for the State of Nevada, Department 29, in Case No. A-21-830597-C, may be unjustly abrogated and rights of the litigants therein unjustly prejudiced as it 6 would likely result in a denial of recovery which is the result being sought by Plaintiffs herein. Instead this matter should proceed upon the merits. 7 8 ECF No. 18 at 5. But lacking from this argument is how or why the Proposed Intervenors rights 9 cannot be vindicated in the Eighth Judicial District Court. And the Proposed Intervenors do not 10 explain in their argument why “this matter should proceed upon the merits” given defendants 11 Jacci Simon, Heaven Simon, and Timmothis Culverson failed to respond to the complaint 12 against them. Id. While proceeding on the merits is always preferred, the Proposed Intervenors 13 fail to explain how proceeding on the merits is even a possibility here. In other words, I find that 14 the Proposed Intervenors’ interest would not be prejudiced and their argument to the contrary is 15 unconvincing. Ultimately, because timeliness is a threshold matter, I do not address the 16 remaining factors. The Proposed Intervenors motion to intervene as a matter of right is denied. 17 B. Permissive intervention is also denied. 18 The proposed intervenors conclusively argue that the motion is timely and granting the 19 motion will not prejudice the proceedings or existing parties. ECF No. 18 at 7. But they do not 20 provide support for their position. As with motions for intervention of right, “a finding of 21 untimeliness defeats a motion for permissive intervention.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. 22 Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1308 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Washington, 86 F.3d at 1499) (cleaned up). 23 Because I find that this motion was untimely for the reasons stated above, I also deny the motion 24 to intervene on permissive intervention grounds. 25 26 Conclusion 2 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Proposed Intervengrs motion to intervene [ECF No. is DENIED. /, / 4 Dated: December 30, 2025 LZ Cristina □□□ Silva 6 Uni eqrates District Judge

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