Buck v. Pritchard

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Buck v. Pritchard

75 A.D.2d 719, 427 N.Y.S.2d 116, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11193

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 8, 1980

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 75 A.D.2d 719 (Buck v. Pritchard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Buck v. Pritchard, 75 A.D.2d 719, 427 N.Y.S.2d 116, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11193 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1980).

Pincite

Opinion

Order unanimously reversed, with costs, and motion for a protective order granted in accordance with the following memorandum: Plaintiffs are residents of the State of Tennessee. They initiated these actions to recover for personal injuries sustained in a rear end automobile collision occurring in Syracuse, New York, on August 9, 1973. The case first appeared upon the Trial Calendar on March 6, 1978 but was removed to the general docket when the parties failed to proceed to trial. Upon motion of the plaintiffs it was subsequently removed from the docket on April 30, 1979, the court order improperly restoring it to the Day Calendar rather than to the foot of the General Calendar. A date certain was set for trial but subsequently that date was adjourned generally to accommodate the vacation plans of plaintiffs’ counsel. Thereafter a motion was made by plaintiffs’ Tennessee attorneys, who were not the attorneys of record in this action, to depose plaintiffs’ doctor in Memphis, Tennessee. Defendant then moved for a protective order and plaintiffs cross-moved for an order compelling the taking of interrogatories. Special Term denied the motion for a protective order and granted the cross motion. The order is reversed. The delay of the trial of this action is inexcusable. The case having been twice certified as ready for trial by plaintiffs, it was an abuse of discretion to grant the relief requested and hold the action generally while the case remained on the Day Calendar. The motion for a protective order is granted without prejudice to a proper application to take the physician’s testimony by deposition or interrogatories, if counsel be so advised, but only after the case has been removed to the general docket. When the case is really ready for trial it may be restored to the General Calendar upon a proper application, but if it is restored, it should take its normal place at the foot of the calendar. (Appeal from order of Onondaga Supreme Court— depositions.) Present—Cardamone, J. P., Simons, Schnepp, Doerr and Witmer, JJ.

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Order unanimously reversed, with costs, and motion for a protective order granted in accordance with the following memorandum: Plaintiffs are residents of the State of Tennessee. They initiated these actions to recover for personal injuries sustained in a rear end automobile collision occurring in Syracuse, New York, on August 9, 1973. The case first appeared upon the Trial Calendar on March 6, 1978 but was removed to the general docket when the parties failed to proceed to trial. Upon motion of the plaintiffs it was subsequently removed from the docket on April 30, 1979, the court order improperly restoring it to the Day Calendar rather than to the foot of the General Calendar. A date certain was set for trial but subsequently that date was adjourned generally to accommodate the vacation plans of plaintiffs’ counsel. Thereafter a motion was made by plaintiffs’ Tennessee attorneys, who were not the attorneys of record in this action, to depose plaintiffs’ doctor in Memphis, Tennessee. Defendant then moved for a protective order and plaintiffs cross-moved for an order compelling the taking of interrogatories. Special Term denied the motion for a protective order and granted the cross motion. The order is reversed. The delay of the trial of this action is inexcusable. The case having been twice certified as ready for trial by plaintiffs, it was an abuse of discretion to grant the relief requested and hold the action generally while the case remained on the Day Calendar. The motion for a protective order is granted without prejudice to a proper application to take the physician’s testimony by deposition or interrogatories, if counsel be so advised, but only after the case has been removed to the general docket. When the case is really ready for trial it may be restored to the General Calendar upon a proper application, but if it is restored, it should take its normal place at the foot of the calendar. (Appeal from order of Onondaga Supreme Court— depositions.) Present—Cardamone, J. P., Simons, Schnepp, Doerr and Witmer, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

75 A.D.2d 719, 427 N.Y.S.2d 116, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11193, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/buck-v-pritchard-nyappdiv-1980.

Opinion

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