Buck v. Mason

135 F. 304, 68 C.C.A. 148, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 4321
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 15, 1905
DocketNo. 1,417
StatusPublished

This text of 135 F. 304 (Buck v. Mason) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Buck v. Mason, 135 F. 304, 68 C.C.A. 148, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 4321 (5th Cir. 1905).

Opinion

PARDEE, Circuit Judge.

This is a hill of interpleader, instituted in the Circuit Court hy Martin H. Sullivan against the appellant, Samuel H. Buck, and the appellees, Harry B. Mason and W. A. Milliken, and several other parties, whose interests were disposed of during the progress of the cause, by consent. W. A. Milliken recovered in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Florida a judgment against Martin H. Sullivan for $51,202.25. Milliken’s creditors brought suit in both the state and federal courts, and sought, by means of garnishment and otherwise, as stated in bill of interpleader, to arrest the payment of the judgment to Milliken and have it applied to the satisfaction of their demands. The bill of interpleader was filed by consent of all parties, as set forth in an agreement signed by and for them, and which stipulated that the fund in dispute should be paid into the First National Bank of Pensacola, subject to the order of the Circuit Court, and that the contesting claimants should litigate in the interpleader suit in the said court as to their rights. The decree entered in pursuance of the agreement provided that:

“Each and all of the claimants to the said money due upon said judgment should litigate with each other and with the said Milliken and the said Mason as to who was entitled to the said money herein ordered to be deposited in the said bank, and, further, the said Milliken mark on the records of this court the said judgment by him recovered against the said Sullivan satisfied in full; and by consent of all the parties to this suit it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the said Sullivan be, and he is, upon complying with the terms of this decree, forever discharged from all liability for or on the said judgment, and from all liability thereafter to each and' all and every of the parties to this suit for or on account of any and all' matters involved in any and all of the said suits,” etc.

The record shows that all claims against Milliken were paid by consent of all parties, except the claim of Harry B. Mason and the claim of Samuel H. Buck. After deducting these payments there was left the sum of $34,856.34. The claim of Buck being supposed not to exceed $22,000, an order was made ex parte, Milliken not objecting, to pay over $12,856.34 to Mason. Immediately upon the above payments being made, upon motion of Mason, the court made the following order:

“It is ordered that on January 25, 1904, at 11 o’clock a. m., the remainder of the fund deposited in the First National Bank of Pensacola on January 16, 1904, in this cause, said remainder being the sum of twenty-two thousand, [306]*306dollars ($22,000), shall be paid over to the said Harry B. Mason, unless S. H. Buck shall before said time make and file in this court a bill of complaint or petition setting forth particularly and definitely the particulars of his claim against the defendant W. A. Milliken and against the said fund, and shall verify the said bill or petition by his oath, and shall make and execute and file in this court a bond, with good and sufficient security, to be approved by the clerk of this court, in the principal sum of $5,000, conditioned to make good to the said Harry B. Mason any loss which he may sustain by reason of the impounding of said sum of $22,000 under order of this court as aforesaid, and the costs and expenses taxable and incurred herein, and to pay to the said Harry B. Masofa interest upon the said sum at 8 per cent, per annum for the length of time during which the said sum shall be detained upon deposit aforesaid, because of the pendency of the claim of him, the said S. H. Buck, thereto, in the event that the said Harry B. Mason shall be declared entitled by this court to receive said deposit at the end of the said litigation.
“January 18, 1904.”

And on the 33d of January counsel for appellant, Buck, moved the court to set aside the order made upon the application of Mason upon the following grounds:

“(1) Because the said order is beyond the jurisdiction of this honorable court.
“(2) Because there is no authority in the law for the making of such order.
“(3) Because the said order is unwarranted by the practice of this honorable court.
“(4) Because the said order in effect deprives the movant of his right in the premises without an opportunity to have the same legally adjudicated.
“(5) Because the same is contrary to the spirit and intention of the agreement and order bond therein entered into between the complainant and the several defendants, including said Mason, by virtue of which the bill of interpleader herein was filed and this action commenced.”

Such application appears to have been denied upon the same day as made. The making and enforcing of this order is the ground of the first error assigned on this appeal.

At the time of this order, requiring Buck within seven days to plead under oath and give bond to secure the fund in court and interest thereon, Buck himself was in the city of New York and his counsel in Pensacola, and it is evidence of his belief in the justice of his claim that he complied with the hard conditions, although it resulted in a petition requiring substantial amendment to fit the actual evidence after-wards taken in the case. The order to plead and give bond within such short delay was not only a hardship, but, so far as we are advised, was without precedent in bills of interpleader, and was a distinct enlargement, if not actual violation, of the agreement under which the court obtained jurisdiction of the case and the fund. In view of the fact that Milliken was the prima facie owner of the judgment against Sullivan, and prima facie entitled to receive the money paid thereon, it is easy to see that Buck’s position was that of actor, and it was proper to require him to plead according to the equity rules. Beyond this, the order was erroneous.

Martin and Milliken pleaded, but not under oath, taking issue with Buck’s bill, and thereupon the court made an order for the taking of testimony, and after testimony was taken Buck desired to amend his petition so as to make it better conform to the case which he claimed had been established by the evidence, and he made application for leave to [307]*307file such amended petition. The court, without passing upon the application until after the argument and the consideration of the cause on final hearing, thereafter proceeded to a decree refusing Buck’s leave to file his amended petition and adjudging that the $22,000, the fund in court, belonged to Mason, and should be turned over to him, and further adjudged against Buck and his surety on the indemnity bond ■the costs of the proceeding and the further sum of $782.18, amount of interest at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum upon the said $22,000 from the 18th day of January, 1904, to the date of the decree.

Buck’s contention, as set forth in his amended petition, is substantially as follows: In the month of April, A. D. 1900, Milliken assigned to Buck and one C. I* Rathborne a half interest in what he should become entitled to under the terms of the contract between him and Sullivan, in consideration of Buck and the said Rathborne aiding and assisting Milliken in the performance of said contract.

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Bluebook (online)
135 F. 304, 68 C.C.A. 148, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 4321, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/buck-v-mason-ca5-1905.