Buck v. Culkin

2025 IL App (4th) 240283-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 8, 2025
• Docket: 4-24-0283
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 240283-U FILED This Order was filed under January 8, 2025 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-24-0283 Carla Bender not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

WILLIAM BUCK, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Livingston County JADE CULKIN, ERIN GROOMS, WILLIAM LEE, ) No. 22LA32 JACOB DALTON and ANDREW BRYAN, ) Defendants-Appellees. ) Honorable ) Jennifer Hartmann- ) Bauknecht, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Doherty and Lannerd concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) plaintiff forfeited any issue with the dismissal of his negligence and civil conspiracy claims, (2) plaintiff’s medical battery claims were barred by sovereign immunity, and (3) the circuit court did not err in refusing to award plaintiff a default judgment.

¶2 Plaintiff, William Buck, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of

Corrections, filed a pro se complaint seeking to recover damages from defendants, Jade Culkin,

Erin Grooms, William Lee, Jacob Dalton, and Andrew Bryan, all of whom worked at Pontiac

Correctional Center (Pontiac), for their involvement in administering a medical procedure to him

without his consent. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, finding the claims alleged therein

were barred by sovereign immunity. Plaintiff appeals, arguing the court erred when it (1) dismissed

his complaint and (2) refused to award him a default judgment. For the reasons that follow, we

affirm the court’s judgment. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In September 2022, plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against defendants

alleging claims of medical battery, negligence, and civil conspiracy to commit medical battery.

Plaintiff identified defendant Culkin as a nurse, defendant Grooms as a certified nursing assistant,

and defendants Lee, Dalton, and Bryan as correctional officers. With respect to his claims of

medical battery, plaintiff alleged on September 25, 2021, he was taken to the Pontiac healthcare

unit. Defendants, who “worked” at Pontiac, were present in a room with plaintiff. Plaintiff, who

“was supposed to go to suicide watch as he was having a crisis due to him being a seriously

mentally ill person,” “told [a]ll the defendants he did not wany any medical treatment[ ] and was

not feeling sick.” Defendants “grabbed plaintiff holding him on the bed [where] he couldn’t

move[ ] and covered his mouth with a hand while sticking a tube into his nose with force.” The

procedure was attempted “at least [three] times as plaintiff struggled” and was done to access “his

stomach.” It was “severely painful” to plaintiff and caused him bleeding from the nose and mouth

and difficulty breathing. He was transferred to “suicide watch” following the procedure. Based

upon these allegations, plaintiff asserted defendants committed the tort of medical battery by

holding him down and inserting a tube into his nose without his consent.

¶5 In April 2023, counsel from the Office of the Illinois Attorney General filed

appearances on behalf of defendants Culkin, Lee, Dalton, and Bryan, as well as a motion for an

extension of time to file a response. That same month, plaintiff filed a motion for a default

judgment against defendants based upon the absence of a response to his complaint.

¶6 In May 2023, the circuit court granted the motion for an extension of time to file a

response and denied the motion for a default judgment. The court’s docket entry notes

(1) “[p]laintiff granted 30 days leave to get service on defendant [Grooms]” and (2) “[a]lias

-2- summons to issue at plaintiff’s request.” That same month, plaintiff filed a “motion to inform” the

court defendant Grooms had been served earlier that year as indicated by a prior docket entry.

¶7 In June 2023, defendants Culkin, Lee, Dalton, and Bryan filed a motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS

5/2-619 (West 2022)) because (1) it failed to include a medical malpractice affidavit of merit (see

id. § 2-622) and (2) the claims raised therein were barred by sovereign immunity. They attached

to their motion medical records indicating plaintiff was treated on September 25, 2021, for a

suspected overdose after he was reportedly seen ingesting 20 white pills and then appeared

lethargic and nonresponsive to “direct questions asked” or ammonia inhalants.

¶8 In July 2023, plaintiff filed a response to the motion to dismiss, asserting, in part, a

medical malpractice affidavit of merit was unnecessary as he was not pursuing claims of “medical

malpractice” but rather claims based upon “a total lack of consent.” Along with his response,

defendant filed a renewed motion for a default judgment against defendant Grooms based upon

her failure to respond to his complaint.

¶9 In January 2024, the circuit court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, finding the claims

raised therein were barred by sovereign immunity. Plaintiff later filed a motion inquiring about the

status of his renewed motion for a default judgment, which the court struck “as moot.”

¶ 10 This appeal followed.

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 On appeal, plaintiff argues the circuit court erred when it (1) dismissed his

complaint and (2) refused to award him a default judgment. Defendants Culkin, Lee, Dalton, and

Bryan, through counsel from the Office of the Illinois Attorney General, disagree. Defendant

Grooms has not taken a position in this appeal.

-3- ¶ 13 At the outset, we must address our jurisdiction. The parties contend jurisdiction

exists pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) because plaintiff timely

appealed from a final judgment dismissing all the claims raised in his complaint. We agree.

Although defendant Grooms did not appear or join in the motion to dismiss, our review of the

record indicates the circuit court dismissed the complaint in its entirety on the grounds the claims

raised therein were barred by sovereign immunity, thereby rendering a final judgment. See Merritt

v. Randall Painting Co., 314 Ill. App. 3d 556, 559, 732 N.E.2d 116, 117-18 (2000) (finding an

order dismissing a complaint on motion of some, but not all, of the defendants is final and

appealable where the grounds for dismissal apply to all the defendants alike). Because plaintiff

filed a timely notice of appeal from the final judgment, we have jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 301.

¶ 14 We must also address matters of forfeiture. While plaintiff raised claims of medical

battery, negligence, and civil conspiracy in his complaint, he only contests the dismissal of his

medical battery and civil conspiracy claims on appeal. Plaintiff took a similar approach in the

circuit court after the filing of the motion to dismiss. In fact, not only did plaintiff not address his

claims of negligence in his response to the motion to dismiss, but he overtly asserted he was not

asserting a “medical malpractice” claim. We find plaintiff has effectively abandoned his claims of

negligence and forfeited any issue with their dismissal on appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff.

Oct. 1, 2020) (requiring the argument section of an appellant’s brief to contain “the contentions of

the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities *** relied on”); Reynolds v.

Jimmy John’s Enterprises, LLC, 2013 IL App (4th) 120139, ¶ 55, 988 N.E.2d 984 (“Where an

appeal is from dismissal of multiple counts of the complaint but the appellant only argues certain

counts in the brief on appeal, the other counts are not considered as they are deemed forfeited

pursuant to [Rule 341(h)(7)].”). We likewise find plaintiff has forfeited any issue with the

-4- dismissal of his civil conspiracy claims. While plaintiff contests the dismissal of those claims on

appeal, he fails to provide a developed argument in support thereof. He simply argues “conspiracy

to commit [a medical battery is not] protected.” This court is not “a repository into which the

appellant may dump the burden of argument and research.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re Marriage of Katsap, 2022 IL App (2d) 210706, ¶ 143, 214 N.E.3d 945; see Ill. S. Ct. R.

341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Therefore, on forfeiture grounds, we affirm the circuit court’s

judgment dismissing plaintiff’s negligence and civil conspiracy claims and need not consider those

claims further.

¶ 15 We now turn to the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s medical battery claims.

These claims were dismissed pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West

2022)). “[A] section 2-619 motion to dismiss admits the sufficiency of the complaint, but asserts

an affirmative defense or other matter that avoids or defeats that claim.” (Internal quotation marks

and citations omitted.) Illinois Road & Transportation Builders Association v. County of Cook,

2022 IL 127126, ¶ 10, 204 N.E.3d 189. “In deciding a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, a court is

to accept all well-pled facts in the complaint as true and will grant the motion only when it appears

that no set of facts could be proved that would allow the plaintiff to recover.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Pinkston v. City of Chicago, 2023 IL 128575, ¶ 22, 234 N.E.3d 735. We review a

dismissal pursuant to section 2-619 de novo. Illinois Road & Transportation Builders Association,

2022 IL 127126, ¶ 10.

¶ 16 The circuit court dismissed plaintiff’s medical battery claims upon finding they

were barred by sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity generally prohibits the State of Illinois

from being “made a defendant or party in any court.” 745 ILCS 5/1 (West 2022); see Parmar v.

Madigan, 2018 IL 122265, ¶ 19, 106 N.E.3d 1004 (“[T]he General Assembly adopted the State

-5- Lawsuit Immunity Act, reinstituting the doctrine of sovereign immunity.”). This prohibition

“cannot be evaded by making the suit nominally an action against a State employee when the real

claim is one against the State.” Rideaux v. Winter, 2020 IL App (1st) 190646, ¶ 8, 155 N.E.3d

1120.

¶ 17 A claim, although nominally brought against a State employee, is considered a

claim against the State “when (1) there are no allegations that an agent or employee of the State

acted beyond the scope of his authority through wrongful acts, (2) the duty alleged to have been

breached was not owed to the public generally independent of the fact of State employment, and

(3) the actions complained of involve matters ordinarily within that employee’s normal and official

functions for the State.” Kucinsky v. Pfister, 2020 IL App (3d) 170719, ¶ 51, 162 N.E.3d 426.

¶ 18 In this case, plaintiff alleged defendants were involved in the administration of a

medical procedure to him against his expressed wishes and, therefore, were each personally liable

for medical battery. Critically, the claims plaintiff alleged against each defendant were based upon

the same allegations. That is, plaintiff alleged each defendant breached the same duty by

committing a medical battery. Any duty applicable to all defendants to assist in the medical

procedure necessarily arose solely from their State employment. Indeed, the correctional officer

defendants would have no duty to assist in the procedure outside their employment as correctional

officers. Throughout these proceedings, plaintiff has attempted to avoid sovereign immunity by

asserting defendants had an independent duty not to commit a battery. Plaintiff, however, asserted

claims of medical battery in his complaint, not battery. C.f. Rideaux, 2020 IL App (1st) 190646,

¶ 12. Plaintiff also, for the first time on appeal, attempts to avoid sovereign immunity with respect

to the medical personnel defendants by asserting those defendants had an independent duty as

nurses not to commit a medical battery. Plaintiff, however, did not allege the medical personnel

-6- defendants breached such a duty in his complaint. Plaintiff’s attempts to avoid sovereign

immunity, thus, fail. We note plaintiff does not dispute defendants acted within the scope of their

authority and their actions involved matters ordinarily within their normal and official functions

for the State. Therefore, we conclude the circuit court correctly found plaintiff’s medical battery

claims were barred by sovereign immunity.

¶ 19 Finally, we turn to the circuit court’s refusal to award plaintiff a default judgment.

A court may enter a default judgment “for want of an appearance, or for failure to plead, but the

court may in either case, require proof of the allegations of the pleadings upon which relief is

sought.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(d) (West 2022). Furthermore, “[a]lthough the court may enter a

default judgment for want of an appearance, a default judgment is a drastic measure, not to be

encouraged and to be employed only as a last resort.” Dupree v. Hardy, 2011 IL App (4th) 100351,

¶ 57, 960 N.E.2d 1. The decision to grant or deny a motion for default judgment “will not be

disturbed absent an abuse of the court’s discretion.” Id. ¶ 51. A court “abuses its discretion when

it acts arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or if its decision exceeds the

bounds of reason and ignores principles of law such that substantial prejudice has resulted.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.). Id.

¶ 20 In this case, we cannot say the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to award

plaintiff a default judgment. The record shows counsel appeared for defendants Culkin, Lee,

Dalton, and Bryan shortly before plaintiff filed his initial motion for a default judgment and then

filed a motion for extension providing an explanation for counsel’s delay in filing a response, an

explanation which plaintiff has not addressed. Additionally, at the time of the initial motion there

appears to have been uncertainty with whether defendant Grooms had been served. Indeed, the

court’s docket entry indicates an alias summons would be issued at “plaintiff’s request.” While

-7- plaintiff later renewed his request for a default judgment, the court elected to rule on all the claims

rather than resorting to the drastic measure of issuing a default judgment, a decision which does

not constitute an abuse of discretion. See id. ¶ 59. Therefore, we conclude the circuit court did not

err in refusing to award plaintiff a default judgment.

¶ 21 In so concluding, we note plaintiff has argued for the application of a de novo

standard of review. The case law he cited, however, does not support his position. See Gonzalez

v. Profile Sanding Equip., Inc., 333 Ill. App. 3d 680,776 N.E.2d 667 (2002) (cited by plaintiff).

Without more, plaintiff’s argument fails.

¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 24 Affirmed.

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