Buchner v. Douglas

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedFebruary 26, 2024
Docket5:23-cv-12185
StatusUnknown

This text of Buchner v. Douglas (Buchner v. Douglas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Buchner v. Douglas, (E.D. Mich. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Tony Buchner,

Petitioner, Case No. 23-12185

v. Judith E. Levy United States District Judge Adam Douglas, Mag. Judge Kimberly G. Altman Respondent.

________________________________/

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER S MOTION TO STAY HABEAS PROCEEDINGS [8]

Before the Court is Petitioner Tony Buchner’s motion to “file protective petition to stay and abey habeas corpus proceedings.” (ECF No. 8.) Petitioner is currently confined at the Saginaw Correctional Facility in Freeland, Michigan, and filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner was convicted of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b, and two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c, following a jury trial in Eaton County Circuit Court. (Id. at PageID.1–2.) He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 50 to 90 years in prison on the first-degree counts and concurrent terms of 10 to 15 years in prison on the second-degree

counts in 2019. People v. Buchner, No. 351701, 2021 WL 5974162, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2021). In his petition, he raises claims concerning

the admission of alleged hearsay, the admission of expert testimony, and the effectiveness of trial counsel. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3–6.) Petitioner files a motion to stay the proceedings and hold his habeas

petition in abeyance so that he may return to the state courts and exhaust additional claims concerning the effectiveness of trial and appellate counsel. (ECF No. 8, PageID.176–177.) For the reasons stated,

the Court denies Petitioner’s motion. I. Procedural Background Following his convictions and sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal

of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals raising several claims, including those presented on habeas review. The court denied relief and affirmed his convictions. People v. Buchner, No. 351701, 2021 WL

5974162, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2021). Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which

2 was denied in a standard order. People v. Buchner, 981 N.W.2d 733 (Mich. 2022).

Petitioner dated his federal habeas petition on August 22, 2023. (ECF No. 1.)

II. Analysis A prisoner filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must first exhaust all state remedies. See O’Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (“[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review

process.”); Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994). To satisfy this requirement, the claims must be “fairly presented” to the state courts, meaning that the prisoner must have asserted both the factual and legal

bases for the claims in the state courts. McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 681 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 806 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing McMeans, 228 F.3d at 681). The claims must also

be presented to the state courts as federal constitutional issues. Koontz v. Glossa, 731 F.2d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 1984). A Michigan prisoner must

3 properly present each habeas issue in both the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.

Welch v. Burke, 49 F. Supp. 2d 992, 998 (E.D. Mich. 1999); see also Hafley v. Sowders, 902 F.2d 480, 483 (6th Cir. 1990). While the exhaustion

requirement is not jurisdictional, a “strong presumption” exists that a petitioner must exhaust all available state remedies before seeking federal habeas review. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131, 134–35

(1987). The burden is on the petitioner to prove exhaustion. Rust, 17 F.3d at 160. A federal court has discretion to stay a mixed habeas petition,

containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims, to allow a petitioner to present unexhausted claims to the state courts and then return to federal court on a perfected petition. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276

(2005). Stay and abeyance is available only in “limited circumstances” such as when the one-year statute of limitations poses a concern; when the petitioner demonstrates “good cause” for the failure to exhaust state

remedies before proceeding in federal court, the petitioner has not engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics, and the unexhausted

4 claims are not “plainly meritless.” Id. at 277. Petitioner has not demonstrated his need for a stay. His current

habeas claims are exhausted, and he fails to show that the one-year statute of limitations applicable to federal habeas actions, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d), poses a concern. The one-year limitations period does not begin to run until 90 days after the conclusion of direct appeal, see Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 120 (2009) (stating that a conviction becomes

final when “the time for filing a certiorari petition expires”) (quoting Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003)); Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 333 (2007). The Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner leave to

appeal on December 7, 2022, and the time for seeking a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired 90 days later, on March 7, 2023. Petitioner dated his federal habeas petition on August 22, 2023.

Consequently, 168 days of the one-year period had run when he instituted this action. While the time in which this case has been pending in federal court

is not statutorily tolled, see Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181–82 (2001) (holding that a federal habeas petition is not an “application for

5 State post-conviction or other collateral review” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) so as to statutorily toll the limitations period), such

time is equitably tolled. See, e.g., Johnson v. Warren, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1088–89 (E.D. Mich. 2004). The limitations period will also be

tolled while any properly filed post-conviction or collateral actions are pending in the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Carey v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Granberry v. Greer
481 U.S. 129 (Supreme Court, 1987)
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel
526 U.S. 838 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Duncan v. Walker
533 U.S. 167 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Carey v. Saffold
536 U.S. 214 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Clay v. United States
537 U.S. 522 (Supreme Court, 2003)
Rhines v. Weber
544 U.S. 269 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Lawrence v. Florida
549 U.S. 327 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Jimenez v. Quarterman
555 U.S. 113 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Earl Glen Hafley v. Dewey Sowders, Warden
902 F.2d 480 (Sixth Circuit, 1990)
Johnson v. Warren
344 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (E.D. Michigan, 2004)
Welch v. Burke
49 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D. Michigan, 1999)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Buchner v. Douglas, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/buchner-v-douglas-mied-2024.