NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3457-17T3
B.S.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
A.S.,
Defendant-Respondent. _____________________________
Submitted April 9, 2019 – Decided September 20, 2019
Before Judges Yannotti, Rothstadt and Gilson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County, Docket No. FM-18-0527-17.
Gomperts Penza McDermott & Von Ellen, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Marisa Lepore Hovanec, of counsel and on the briefs; Jennifer Lee Marshall, on the briefs).
Johnson & Associates At Law, PC, attorneys for respondent (Te D. Smith, of counsel and on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROTHSTADT, J.A.D. Plaintiff B.S.1 appeals from the Family Part's February 23, 2018 Judgment
of Divorce (JOD) that was entered after a trial, ending his marriage to defendant
A.S. On appeal, he challenges the trial judge's custody and parenting time
determinations, as well as the judge's award of alimony, child support, and
equitable distribution. Plaintiff contends that the trial judge abused his
discretion in arriving at these decisions, which he alleges were arbitrary, made
without rational explanation, and unsupported by the record. For the reasons
that follow, we disagree and affirm.
I.
The undisputed facts as found by the trial judge are summarized as
follows. The parties met in Canada where defendant had lived and they had one
child, a daughter who was born in 2009. The family moved to plaintiff's home
in New Jersey, before they were married in June 2012. At the time the parties
met, defendant had a son from a previous relationship, who was born in 1995
and also lived with the parties. The parties separated on October 21, 2016, when
plaintiff left the marital residence and relocated to his parents' home. Defendant
and the two children remained in the marital home. On December 21, 2016,
plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce.
1 We use initials to protect the parties' privacy interests. See R. 1: 38-3(d). A-3457-17T3 2 During the marriage, plaintiff was a full-time municipal employee and
earned approximately $70,000 annually. Defendant became employed in around
2015, and at the time of the parties' separation, she worked as a store manager
at a retail store. In 2017, she earned approximately $28,000, but she stopped
working later that year.
During the parties' marriage, they had one joint bank account into which
they deposited both of their salaries and used to pay the family's expenses. The
family resided in a house they purchased using money loaned to them by
plaintiff's parents.
After plaintiff filed his complaint in this action, he filed a domestic
violence action and obtained a temporary restraining order against defendant.
Plaintiff later dismissed the action when on January 12, 2017, the parties agreed
to the entry of an order in this case that contained civil restraints. The order also
temporarily provided for custody and parenting time, as well as required the
parties to continue to pay the household bills as they did in the past.
Thereafter, the parties engaged in substantial motion practice about their
daughter's custody and parenting time. Among the contentions raised by
plaintiff was that defendant was engaged in a romantic relationship with a
female friend who plaintiff alleged was spending overnights in the marital home
A-3457-17T3 3 and in the presence of the children. Ultimately, on March 3, 2017, a judge
ordered, pendente lite, that the parties have joint legal custody of their daughter
and that defendant remain in possession of the marital home. In May 2017, the
parties executed a Memorandum of Understanding, which stated that they would
share residential and legal custody and established schedules for parenting time
and transportation. A month later, plaintiff filed a motion to alter the parenting
time schedule and for other relief that defendant did not oppose, which the judge
granted in part and denied in part on August 4, 2017. The relief granted included
a bar against "a third party taking up residence within the former marital home."
The matter was tried over three days in February 2018. Plaintiff testified
and explained that he wished to be designated as their daughter's parent of
primary residence (PPR), offered photographic evidence that defendant and her
friend were involved in a romantic relationship, and that defendant allowed her
to stay at the house overnight in the children's presence in contravention of the
earlier court order. He also requested that the parties' marital debts be shared
equally, and opposed any award of alimony because he already paid expenses
pendente lite and defendant did not need the support as she was cohabitating.
Defendant testified that plaintiff had been paying all of the household
expenses related to their home since their separation. Regarding custody and
A-3457-17T3 4 parenting time, defendant stated that she wanted "consistency" for their daughter
and proposed a parenting time schedule that had the child with her from Monday
through Friday and with plaintiff on the weekends and weekday evenings. As
to the marital debt, she did not dispute the amount plaintiff claimed he paid, but
stated that she incurred $17,000 in debt so she could hire her attorney.
Defendant's son also testified. He stated that he and the daughter were
very close despite their age difference, and that he would prefer that she lived
with him and defendant during the school week. He also believed that the
daughter is not as close with plaintiff as she is with defendant, and that defendant
was capable of caring for both him and the daughter. He stated that the daughter
should spend time with plaintiff as well. He also testified as to defendant's
relationship with her friend, stated that she did not live with them, but had spent
nights at defendant's home since December 2017.
Defendant's friend testified and stated that she sees the two children "a
little bit every day"; that she does not provide defendant with any financial
assistance; and that she spends overnights at defendant's home a few times per
week, but never when the daughter is present. She also described her
relationship with the children and household assistance she provided to
defendant, such as mowing the lawn, for which she was paid by defendant,
A-3457-17T3 5 helping to install a screen door, and driving defendant's son to school on
occasion.
At the conclusion of the trial, the judge placed his findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the record. The judge stated that he found all of the
witnesses to be "generally credible," and that there had been "control issues in
[the] relationship" as exemplified by plaintiff's "spying on" defendant. He found
that plaintiff did not establish that defendant and her friend were cohabiting
because there was no evidence of a "mutually supportive, intimate personal
relationship" or commingled finances; there was only evidence of the friend
visiting defendant's home, helping around the house, and staying overnight. The
judge noted that to establish cohabitation, the burden of proof is on the party
asserting it; if that burden is met, the burden shifts to the other party to disprove
it.
The judge next addressed the issue of custody and noted that each party
wished to be the PPR. The judge first granted the parties joint legal custody,
then stated that regarding physical custody, the parties would have "a true joint
custody relationship" with defendant being the PPR. The judge considered the
relevant factors, including (1) "the parents' ability to agree, communicate[,] and
cooperate in matters related to the child"; (2) "the parents' willingness to accept
A-3457-17T3 6 custody," which was sufficient on both parties' parts; (3) "the interaction and
relationship of the child with its parents and siblings," which was good; (4) a
"history of domestic violence," which was "limited" and "in the nature of flare-
ups"; (5) "the safety of the child" and parents, which was not an issue; (6) the
preference of a child of sufficient age and capacity, which was inapplicable; (7)
the child's needs, which were not unusual or above average; (8) "[t]he stability
of the home environment offered," which was adequate at both parties' homes;
(9) the quality of the child's education, which was inapplicable; (10) "the fitness
of the parents," who were both fit; (11) "[t]he geographical proximity of the
parties' homes," which were close; (12) "[t]he extent and quality of the time
spent with the child prior" to separation, which was adequate; and (13) the
parents' employment responsibilities, which did not present an obstacle to
spending time with the daughter.
The judge ordered that the daughter would stay with defendant from 7:00
pm on Sunday until 5:00 pm on Friday, and would spend weekends with
plaintiff. He explained that this arrangement fit best with the parties' work
schedules because plaintiff does not work on weekends, and defendant would
now have the opportunity to do so, which is significant in the retail industry.
The judge emphasized that the daughter is "entering a crucial educational phase
A-3457-17T3 7 in her life" and that it would be best for her to be in one home during the school
week, rather than "bouncing around at [5:00] on Wednesday night to 6:30 on
Wednesday night." The judge also noted the parties agreed upon holiday and " a
very liberal summer visitation schedule which" would give the parties "plenty
of other times to spend . . . with [their] daughter."
The judge addressed equitable distribution of the parties' debt and ordered
plaintiff to pay the balance of the loan on defendant's vehicle, approximately
$1400, so that the daughter is not without a safe and reliable car. As to other
debt, including defendant's credit cards at approximately $8000, personal loan
at approximately $16,000, plaintiff's credit card at approximately $16,000, and
loan at approximately $5000, the judge directed that each party would be
responsible for his or her own, as he did not "have a lot of details on how th[e]
debt was acquired." 2
Regarding spousal support, the judge ordered "limited durational
alimony" for defendant, stating that she and the daughter could not survive
without it. He found that "based on the e-mail evidence," defendant emigrated
from Canada "to her economic detriment" to be with plaintiff. He had noted that
2 The trial judge erroneously stated defendant's credit card debt totaled $47,305, rather than $8000, which defendant testified to at trial. We assume that the trial judge arrived at $47,305 by combining the total debts of the parties. A-3457-17T3 8 neither of the parties brought any income or property into the marriage and that
the standard of living during the marriage was "rough because neither of [the
parties] make a lot of money."
In determining the amount of support, the judge reviewed the statutory
factors under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b), and considered (1) defendant's actual need
for alimony and plaintiff's ability to pay; (2) the short length of the marriage;
(3) the parties' "age[s], physical, and emotional health"; (4) the parties' standard
of living, finding that the parties struggled financially; (5) that the parties are
skilled and employable; (6) that defendant had only been out of the workforce
for a few months; and (7) that defendant would have greater parental
responsibilities, including caring for her son. The judge also considered (10)
the lack of equitable distribution orders and payouts; (12) tax treatment; and
(13) pendente lite support. The judge did not "see equitable distribution as being
a big issue in this case."
In order to "try . . . to give a reasonably comparable standard of living,"
the judge ordered plaintiff to pay $250 per week to defendant in alimony for
four years plus $95 per week in child support. The judge imputed income of
$25,000 per year to defendant before arriving at the alimony figure; regarding
child support, the judge relied upon the Child Support Guidelines.
A-3457-17T3 9 The judge memorialized his decision in the JOD. This appeal followed.
II.
At the outset, we acknowledge that because of the Family Part's "expertise
in family matters," our review of a Family Part judge's fact-findings is limited.
See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. T.S., 429 N.J. Super. 202, 216 (App.
Div. 2013) (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)); N.J. Div. of
Youth & Family Servs. v. I.H.C., 415 N.J. Super. 551, 577 (App. Div. 2010).
We generally defer to factual findings made by a trial judge when such findings
are "supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence." Gnall v. Gnall,
222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12). Accordingly, we
will only reverse a trial judge's factual findings when they are "so manifestly
unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably
credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Rova Farms Resort, Inc.
v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp.
of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963)). In contrast, a "trial
judge's legal conclusions, and the application of those conclusions to the facts,
are subject to our plenary review." Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568
(App. Div. 2013) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan,
140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
A-3457-17T3 10 III.
With that deferential standard in mind, we turn first to plaintiff's challenge
to the judge's custody and parenting time determinations. According to plaintiff,
the parenting time schedule imposed by the judge impermissibly reduced his
time with his daughter as the judge's decision was "arbitrary" and "inconsistent
with the competent evidence presented at trial." Moreover, he contends the
selection of defendant as PPR was "an abuse of discretion because it was
arbitrary and made without a rational explanation." We disagree.
"The touchstone for all custody determinations has always been 'the best
interest[s] of the child.'" Faucett v. Vasquez, 411 N.J. Super. 108, 118 (App.
Div. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276,
317 (1997)). "Custody issues are resolved using a best interest analysis that
gives weight to the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c)." Ibid. (quoting Hand
v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 2007)). "[T]he decision
concerning the type of custody arrangement [is left] to the sound discretion of
the trial court[.]" Nufrio v. Nufrio, 341 N.J. Super. 548, 555 (App. Div. 2001)
(third alteration in original) (citation omitted). Therefore, on appeal, "the
opinion of the trial judge in child custody matters is given great weight . . . ."
Terry v. Terry, 270 N.J. Super. 105, 118 (App. Div. 1994). Nevertheless, "we
A-3457-17T3 11 must evaluate that opinion by considering the statutory declared public policy
and criteria which a trial court must consider." Ibid.
Under the statutory factors, courts have discretion to order joint legal and
physical custody, "sole custody to one parent with . . . parenting time for" the
other parent, or "[a]ny other custody arrangement as the court may determine to
be in the best interests of the child." N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(a) to (c). The "paramount
consideration" in determining custody "is to foster the best interests of the
child." Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 497 (1981). We generally "leave the decision
concerning the type of custody arrangement to the sound discretion of the trial
courts." Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 611 (1995).
Applying that standard, we affirm the judge's custody and parenting plan.
We conclude he thoroughly considered all of the statutory factors in his oral
decision and explained his factual findings, which were supported by "adequate,
substantial and credible evidence" in the record. Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484.
Although the plan is not exactly equal, the arrangement allows each parent to
have significant time with their child, and is a practical plan for a school-aged
child.
A-3457-17T3 12 IV.
We next consider plaintiff's challenge to the trial judge's alimony award.
Plaintiff contends that the judge failed to appropriately address or analyze three
relevant statutory factors in determining an alimony award: the parties' standard
of living during the marriage; the nature, amount, the length of pendente lite
support paid; and the actual need for support as impacted by cohabitation.
According to plaintiff, the judge "failed to make specific findings" about the
parties' standard of living during the marriage, or the amount and duration of
pendente lite support plaintiff paid. He notes that the judge's award exceeded
the length of the parties' marriage by ten months (sixteen months of pendente
lite support plus four years of alimony), which is impermissible for marriages
of fewer than twenty years.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial judge improperly assessed
defendant's need for support and applied the wrong burden of proof in analyzing
her alleged cohabitation with her friend and its effect on her need for alimony.
Plaintiff contends that the burden is on the party seeking alimony to prove that
he or she meets the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b), the first of which
is need. Plaintiff argues that cohabitation is a relevant factor in determining
need and that contrary to the judge's assertion, the burden is on the party seeking
A-3457-17T3 13 alimony to prove that cohabitation is not occurring. Plaintiff contends that if
the judge had applied the proper burden, its determination on cohabitation would
have been different, thus affecting its alimony award. We disagree.
In our review of an alimony award, we defer to a trial court's findings as
long as they "are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Reid
v. Reid, 310 N.J. Super. 12, 22 (App. Div. 1998). Applying that standard here,
we find no reason to disturb the trial judge's alimony award.
"Alimony relates to support and standard of living; it involves the quality
of economic life to which one spouse is entitled, which then becomes the
obligation of the other." Gnall, 222 N.J. at 429. "The basic purpose of alimony
is the continuation of the standard of living enjoyed by the parties prior to their
separation. The supporting spouse's obligation is set at a level that will maintain
that standard." Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496, 503 (1990) (citation omitted).
Alimony awards are governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b), which sets forth
a list of non-exhaustive factors for a court to consider. If the court determines
that one factor is more or less relevant than the other factors, or that one factor
should be given more weight over another factor, the court must "make specific
written findings of fact and conclusions of law" in that regard. N.J.S.A. 2A:34 -
23(b).
A-3457-17T3 14 A trial judge's award of limited duration alimony is appropriate under
certain circumstances. It was "created as a remedy in order to address a
dependent spouse's post-divorce needs following [a] 'shorter-term marriage
where permanent or rehabilitative alimony would be inappropriate or
inapplicable but where, nonetheless, economic assistance for a limited period of
time would be just.'" Gnall, 222 N.J. at 431 (quoting J.E.V. v. K.V., 426 N.J.
Super. 475, 485-86 (App. Div. 2012)).
Again, the trial judge considered and analyzed each of the statutory factors
in his oral decision. He found that, despite the short duration of the marriage,
defendant's ability to gain employment, defendant's greater parental
responsibilities, lesser earning capacity, and the lack of equitable distribution or
pendente lite support, an award of limited duration alimony was warranted. The
judge properly imputed income to defendant, and after doing so, concluded that
she would require temporary assistance providing for herself and her two
children in addition to her own income and child support award.
Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the judge correctly determined that no
pendente lite support was paid. Plaintiff paid various expenses that benefitted
defendant during the pendency of the divorce proceedings pursuant to the
January 12, 2017 order, which stated only that the parties "shall continue to pay
A-3457-17T3 15 bills and manage their income in the same manner as took place during the
course of the marriage." However, at no point did defendant move for pendente
lite spousal or child support, none of the pendente lite orders granted defendant
any monetary support, and no support was actually paid to defendant before the
conclusion of trial. The parties also did not arrive at a mutual agreement for
pendente lite support after their separation. Although plaintiff asserts that the
marital debt was paid from a joint banking account, he failed to prove the extent
to which each party contributed to the account. However, it was apparent that
defendant's income clearly prevented her from making an equal contribution.
Further, we find no merit to plaintiff's contentions about the judge's
findings as to defendant's alleged cohabitation with her friend. Contrary to
plaintiff's argument, the judge applied the correct burden of proof and his
determination that plaintiff failed to meet that burden was supported by the lack
of evidence of cohabitation by defendant.
Cohabitation "involves a mutually supportive, intimate personal
relationship in which a couple has undertaken duties and privileges that are
commonly associated with marriage or civil union but does not necessarily
maintain a single common household." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) (listing seven
factors that a court "shall" consider when determining cohabitation issues) . See
A-3457-17T3 16 also Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 202 (1999).3 Where a supporting
spouse seeks to avoid paying alimony because of the dependent spouse's
cohabitation, "the test for . . . whether the relationship has reduced the financial
needs of the dependent former spouse" is whether "(1) the third party contributes
to the dependent spouse's support, or (2) the third party resides in the dependent
spouse's home without contributing anything toward the household expenses."
Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 150, 153 (1983). Cohabitation is not demonstrated
by evidence of "a romantic relationship between an alimony recipient and
another, characterized by regular meetings, participation in mutually
appreciated activities, and some overnight stays in the home of one or the other."
3 "[T]he Legislature in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) essentially adopted the definition of cohabitation the Court endorsed in [Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 202, that stated]:"
[c]ohabitation involves an intimate relationship in which the couple has undertaken duties and privileges that are commonly associated with marriage. These can include, but are not limited to, living together, intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts, sharing living expenses and household chores, and recognition of the relationship in the couple's social and family circle.
[Landau v. Landau, ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2019) (slip op. at 15 n.8).]
A-3457-17T3 17 Landau, ___ N.J. Super. at ___ (slip op. at 17) (quoting Quinn v. Quinn, 225
N.J. 34, 54 (2016)).
"[A] showing of cohabitation creates a rebuttable presumption . . . shifting
the burden to the dependent spouse to show that there is no actual economic
benefit to the spouse or cohabitant." Reese, 430 N.J. Super. at 570 (quoting
Ozolins v. Ozolins, 308 N.J. Super. 243, 248 (App. Div. 1998)). The court must
focus on the cohabitant's economic relationship to discern "whether one . . .
'subsidizes the other.'" Id. at 571 (quoting Boardman v. Boardman, 314 N.J.
Super. 340, 347 (App. Div. 1998)). Whether this economic benefit exists
requires a fact-intensive inquiry by the trial judge. Id. at 576.
Once the supporting spouse makes a showing of cohabitation, the burden
shifts to the recipient spouse to show that the cohabitation results in no economic
benefit to the spouse or the cohabitant. Id. at 570. "[T]o rebut the presumption
that the living arrangement is tantamount to marriage and has reduced or ended
the need for alimony, a dependent spouse must prove he or she remains
dependent on the former spouse's support." Id. at 571 (citing Gayet, 92 N.J. at
154-55).
Here, plaintiff's evidence if accepted as true, established only that
defendant's friend spent some overnights at defendant's home, assisted in caring
A-3457-17T3 18 for the children, and provided limited physical household assistance on
occasion. Those allegations did not establish that the required economic
relationship existed between defendant and her friend.
We turn our attention to plaintiff's arguments about the trial judge's award
of equitable distribution. Plaintiff contends that the judge's order that each party
be responsible for his or her own debts was an abuse of discretion because courts
may only distribute marital debt in the context of divorce and must require the
parties to prove marital debt "in accordance with the sufficient credible evidence
standard." Plaintiff argues that he proved at trial that the debts for which he
sought equitable distribution were acquired during the marriage. He explains
that although defendant testified to a $17,000 personal loan for the purpose of
paying counsel fees, which was acquired after he filed his complaint, she did not
provide documentation proving the purpose and amount of her credit card debt.
Because defendant failed to prove the amount of her debts or that they were
marital, plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion in "accepting
those debts as an offset against the marital debt proven to have been incurred"
by him.
A-3457-17T3 19 Plaintiff also argues that the judge abused his discretion in determining
that defendant could retain her vehicle, but plaintiff would be responsible for
paying the balance of the loan, because the judge failed to supply any rational
explanation for the appropriateness of such an arrangement.
"[E]quitable distribution [applies] to 'property, both real and personal ,
which was legally and beneficially acquired by [the parties] or either of them
during the marriage or civil union.'" Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269,
284 (2016) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(h)). "The goal of equitable
distribution . . . is to effect a fair and just division of marital assets." Steneken
v. Steneken, 367 N.J. Super. 427, 434 (App. Div. 2004) (citing Rothman v.
Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 228-29 (1974)), aff'd as mod., 183 N.J. 290 (2005).
Although a court shall consider the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1
in making an equitable distribution, "the manner of distribution . . . remains
within the broad discretion of the trial court." Id. at 435.
"A Family Part judge has broad discretion . . . in allocating assets subject
to equitable distribution." Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J. Super. 61, 71 (App. Div.
2012).
We will reverse only if we find the trial judge clearly abused his or her discretion, such as when the stated 'findings were mistaken[,] . . . the determination could not reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible
A-3457-17T3 20 evidence present in the record[,]' or the judge 'failed to consider all of the controlling legal principles[.]'
[Id. at 72 (alterations in original) (quoting Gonzalez-Posse v. Ricciardulli, 410 N.J. Super. 340, 354 (App. Div. 2009)).]
"Generally speaking, in dividing marital assets the court must take into
account the liabilities as well as the assets of the parties." Slutsky v. Slutsky,
451 N.J. Super. 332, 348 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Monte v. Monte, 212 N.J.
Super. 557, 567 (App. Div. 1986)); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1(m) (requiring
"debts and liabilities of the parties" to be considered when determining equitable
distribution). The allocation of responsibility for the parties' marital debts is
subject to the same factors as the equitable distribution of assets. Slutsky, 451
N.J. at 348; see also Ionno v. Ionno, 148 N.J. Super. 259, 262 (App. Div. 1977);
Rothman, 65 N.J. at 232 (stating that a court must first identify the property
subject to distribution; determine its value; and then allocate it most equitably).
Once the court identifies the debts that are subject to distribution, it must
allocate them after considering the sixteen statutory factors identified in
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1. Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 444 (App. Div.
2015). "Where marital debts are proven, courts should deduct marital debts from
the total value of the estate, or allocate the obligations between the parties."
Slutsky, 451 N.J. Super. at 348.
A-3457-17T3 21 We conclude that the trial judge properly performed his obligation under
the statute in his equitable distribution of the parties' assets and debts. At the
time of trial, defendant was unemployed, which she alleged was due to plaintiff's
unwillingness to care for their daughter during her work hours. As to the
vehicle, the trial judge recognized that defendant was responsible for caring for
both children, as defendant's son, although of age, cannot drive due to a vision
impairment. As the trial judge noted, defendant requires a safe and reliable
vehicle to transport her children to school and transport herself to work. Under
these circumstances, we discern no abuse of the trial judge's discretion and
conclude that he properly "exercise[ed his] inherent equitable jurisdiction and
decide[d] the case based upon equitable considerations." Thieme, 227 N.J. at
287 (quoting Kingsdorf v. Kingsdorf, 351 N.J. Super. 144, 157 (App. Div.
2002)).
We also conclude the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in equitabl y
distributing the parties' debt as he did, even though there was some apparent
confusion over the exact amount that was caused by the parties' failure to
adequately establish the exact amount of their debts and whether they were
marital.
A-3457-17T3 22 VI.
In light of our decision to not disturb the trial judge's custody and
parenting time determination, we need not consider plaintiff's remaining
argument that child support be recalculated under the holding in Deffler v.
Deffler, 406 N.J. Super. 505, 509 (Ch. Div. 2009).
Affirmed.
A-3457-17T3 23