Bryne v. Bryne
This text of 95 N.E. 88 (Bryne v. Bryne) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
It is plain, we think, that the instrument declared on is a promissory note. It is not a negotiable promissory note and is not declared on as such. The word “ payable ” in the connection in which it occurs imports a promise by the maker to pay at the time fixed the sum named. The promise is not one implied by law from an acknowledgment; of indebtedness, but is the maker’s own promise. It is not contended that the other elements necessary to constitute a promissory note are not included in the instrument declared on. See Kimball v. Huntington, 10 Wend. 675; Mitchell v. Rome Railroad, 17 Ga. 574; Carver v. Hayes, 47 Maine, 257; Pepoon v. Stagg, 1 Nott. & McC. 102; Cowan v. Hallack, 9 Col. 572; Waithman v. Elsee, 1 C. & K. 35; Richer v. Voyer, L. R. 5 P. C. 461, 476. The question whether the instrument was or was not a promissory note was one of law for the court and evidence that it was intended by the defendant as a memorandum merely was rightly excluded.
Exceptions overruled with double costs and interest at twelve per cent.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
95 N.E. 88, 209 Mass. 179, 1911 Mass. LEXIS 921, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bryne-v-bryne-mass-1911.