Bryant Wilson v. United States
This text of Bryant Wilson v. United States (Bryant Wilson v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 27 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRYANT LAKEITH WILSON, No. 19-56215
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:19-cv-01285-FMO-AFM
v. MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Fernando M. Olguin, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 20, 2021**
Before: McKEOWN, CALLAHAN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Federal prisoner Bryant Lakeith Wilson appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment in his action alleging deprivation of his personal property. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Bramwell v. U.S. Bureau of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Prisons, 348 F.3d 804, 806 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Wilson’s action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) bars claims
against the United States arising out of deprivation of property by a law
enforcement officer, including claims of negligent handling or storage of detained
property. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c); Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 854
(1984) (exception to FTCA under § 2680(c) includes a claim resulting from
negligent handling or storage of property).
To the extent Wilson sought to allege due process claims against individual
named correctional officers for deprivation of property under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
even if a Bivens remedy is available for such claims, dismissal was proper because
Wilson failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (neither intentional nor negligent deprivation of
property violates due process when an adequate post-deprivation remedy is
available); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3723 (permitting damages claim for property
damages or loss caused by negligence of federal employee acting within scope of
employment); 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 (purpose and scope of Bureau of Prisons
Administrative Remedy Program).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
2 19-56215 in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 19-56215
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