Bryant v. Tyler

District Court, E.D. Wisconsin·Decided July 2, 2020·No. 2:20-cv-00631·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

LAROI BRYANT,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 20-C-631

LT. TYLER and MILWAUKEE COUNTY SHERIFF OFFICE,

Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Laroi Bryant, who is currently incarcerated at the Milwaukee County Jail and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee and to screen the complaint. MOTION TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE Plaintiff has requested leave to proceed without prepayment of the full filing fee (in forma pauperis). A prisoner plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee over time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint, as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), and has been assessed an initial partial filing fee of $24.33. On July 1, 2020, Plaintiff filed a letter indicating he has insufficient funds to pay the initial partial filing fee. Accordingly, the court will waive the fee and screen the complaint. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The court is required to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, and dismiss any complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that

fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In screening a complaint, I must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, Plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must at least provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter “that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). THE COURT’S ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that he refused to go into a cell that he believed had “very poor living conditions.” Dkt. No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff claims that, once correctional officers put Plaintiff on the ground, Lt. Tyler tased Plaintiff for no legitimate reason. Plaintiff asserts Lt. Tyler used excessive force against him. “To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he or she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that this deprivation occurred at the hands of a person or persons acting under the color of state law.” D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan– Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Supreme Court has held that the core judicial inquiry in an excessive force case is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992). Based on the allegations contained in the complaint, in particular, the allegation suggesting that Plaintiff was not doing anything improper once he was on the ground, Plaintiff may proceed on his claim that Lt. Tyler used excessive force against him. Plaintiff has also named Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office as a defendant, but the complaint does not contain any allegations against it. Accordingly, the Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office will be dismissed as a defendant. The court finds that Plaintiff may proceed on his excessive force claim against Lt. Tyler. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office is DISMISSED as a defendant. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to the informal service agreement between Milwaukee County and this court, copies of Plaintiff’s complaint and this order are being

electronically sent today to Milwaukee County for service on the Milwaukee County defendants. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to the informal service agreement between Milwaukee County and this court, the defendants shall file a responsive pleading to the complaint within sixty days of receiving electronic notice of this order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the agency having custody of the prisoner shall collect from his institution trust account the $350.00 balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments from Plaintiff’s prison trust account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s trust account and forwarding payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The payments shall be clearly identified by the case name and number assigned to this action. If

Plaintiff is transferred to another institution, the transferring institution shall forward a copy of this order along with Plaintiff’s remaining balance to the receiving institution.

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Related

Hudson v. McMillian
503 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)