Bryant v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedApril 24, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-01203
StatusUnknown

This text of Bryant v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (Bryant v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bryant v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., (D. Md. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

* LATANYA A. BRYANT, * Plaintiff, * v. * Civil No. 25-1203-BAH SELECTIVE PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC., ET AL., *

Defendants. *

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Latanya A. Bryant (“Plaintiff”) filed the above-captioned complaint pro se against Defendants Selective Portfolio Servicing, Inc., U.S. Bank Trust National Association, and JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. related to an allegedly unlawful foreclosure and forcible eviction of 3416 Ramona Ave., Baltimore, MD 21213. See ECF 1. After the Court instructed Plaintiff to cure a deficiency in her initial motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP motion”), see ECF 2 (IFP motion) and ECF 5 (deficiency notice), Plaintiff filed a renewed IFP motion, ECF 6, which shall be granted. Plaintiff also filed an emergency motion for injunctive relief seeking a “full halt of all foreclosure enforcement, eviction enforcement, or attempts to seize, remove, or dispose of any personal or trust-owned property under my care, custody, or control.” ECF 3, at 1 (capitalization removed). The Court will address that motion first. The Court will then turn to service of process. I. Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief (ECF 3) The Court will construe this motion as a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). Motions for TROs (as well as for preliminary injunctions) are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Under that rule: The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if:

(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). “The purpose of a TRO is to ‘preserve the status quo only until a preliminary injunction hearing can be held.’” ClearOne Advantage, LLC v. Kersen, 710 F. Supp. 3d 425, 431 (D. Md. 2024) (quoting Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 422 (4th Cir. 1999)). TROs are “extraordinary remedies involving the exercise of very far- reaching power to be granted only sparingly and in limited circumstances.” MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001). They are not “awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, at 689– 90 (2008)). To succeed on a motion for a TRO, a movant “must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). Preliminarily, Plaintiff’s motion fails because she has not provided the procedural prerequisites under Rule 65(b)(1). See Womack v. Freedom Mortg., Civ. No. GJH-19-3182, 2019 WL 13401859, at *1 (D. Md. Nov. 13, 2019) (denying TRO for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)’s requirements); TFFI Corp. v. Williams, Case No. AW–13–1809, 2013 WL 6145548, at *3 (D. Md. Nov. 20, 2013) (same)). More substantively, Plaintiff has not attempted to meet the four Winter factors, and she has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. While Plaintiff has not provided the case number for any state court proceedings, granting Plaintiff the relief she seeks in the motion would seemingly require enjoining the ongoing state court foreclosure proceeding.1 Under the Anti- Injunction Act, federal courts “may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or

to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. “Because none of these ‘three specifically defined exceptions’ applies to this case, the Court cannot enjoin the pending state foreclosure proceeding.” Singletary v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, Civ. No. TDC-14-3204, 2016 WL 1089419, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 21, 2016) (quoting Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970)); see also Tucker v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 83 F. Supp. 3d 635, 641 (D. Md. 2015) (collecting cases where courts have concluded that the Anti- Injunction Act prevents a court from issuing injunctive or declaratory relief that would actually or effectively enjoin an ongoing foreclosure proceeding); Howes v. SN Servicing Corp., Civ. No. CCB-20-670, 2023 WL 4532802, at *4 n.4 (D. Md. July 13, 2023) (“The court is obligated to raise the Anti-Injunction Act issue sua sponte because it deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction

over the plaintiffs’ claim.” (citing Tucker, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 641 n.4)). Because the Court cannot grant the relief Plaintiff seeks in the motion, it must be denied. See Cade v. O'Sullivan, Civ. No. GJH-19-3260, 2019 WL 6034990, at *1–2 (D. Md. Nov. 14, 2019) (denying a motion for a TRO seeking an injunction of state court foreclosure proceedings both on procedural grounds under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1) and under the Anti-Injunction Act).

1 The Court takes judicial notice of Case No. 24-O-23-000204, a foreclosure action currently pending in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, where Plaintiff appears to be a defendant and which appears to concerns the same property (3416 Ramona Avenue). II. Service of Process Although Plaintiff provided summonses for each of the three defendants along with the complaint, they are deficient because the address for the corporate defendants on each summons is not the registered agent designated for service. Plaintiff will be granted twenty-one (21) days

from the date of this order to correct the deficiency. Plaintiff is forewarned that failure to provide summonses to the Clerk will result in dismissal of the complaint without further notice and without prejudice. Further, it does not appear that Plaintiff has furnished a U.S. Marshal service of process form for each named defendant in this case. Until Plaintiff cures this problem, service shall not be issued. The Clerk shall be directed to mail a copy of the Marshal form for each defendant to Plaintiff, who must complete and return the forms to the Clerk within twenty-one (21) days from the date of this order. Failure to comply with this order may result in dismissal without prejudice of Plaintiff’s complaint.

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Related

Munaf v. Geren
553 U.S. 674 (Supreme Court, 2008)
Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery County
722 F.3d 184 (Fourth Circuit, 2013)
Tucker v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC
83 F. Supp. 3d 635 (D. Maryland, 2015)

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Bluebook (online)
Bryant v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bryant-v-select-portfolio-servicing-inc-mdd-2025.