Bryant v. Pittman

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Bryant v. Pittman

115 S.E.2d 418, 101 Ga. App. 842, 1960 Ga. App. LEXIS 1022

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedJune 14, 1960

Docket38211

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 115 S.E.2d 418 (Bryant v. Pittman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bryant v. Pittman, 115 S.E.2d 418, 101 Ga. App. 842, 1960 Ga. App. LEXIS 1022 (Ga. Ct. App. 1960).

Pincite

Opinion

Felton, Chief Judge.

The petition shows that the defendants were guilty of negligence per se .in violating Code (Ann.) § 68-1633 (Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dee. Sess., pp. 556, 581), by driving in the left lane of the highway; that they violated Code (Ann.) § 68-1647 (same act, p. 587) in turning their vehicle from a di *844 rect course and moving to the right before the movement could be made with reasonable safety; that they violated the part of the act next above referred to in not giving a signal. The petition shows also that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence per se in violating Code (Ann.) § 68-1635 (Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dee. Sess., pp. 556, 582), in attempting to pass the school bus on the right, since the passing alleged does not fall within the exceptions in the act, Code (Ann.) § 68-1636. The general rule is that where one voluntarily and knowingly takes a risk involving imminent danger he is precluded from recovery by reason of another’s negligence. However, under the allegations of the petition in this case, and despite the fact that both the plaintiff and the defendants were guilty of negligence per se and were charged with knowledge that the other might otherwise be guilty of negligence per se, justice requires the submission of the case to a jury for the determination of which party was the more negligent, if one was more negligent than the other, and whether the plaintiff is barred by his own negligence in taking the risk he took- in this case. In this case the driving of the school bus in the left-hand lane under the circumstances related in the petition might reasonably become an important factor in the jury’s determination of the measure of the plaintiff’s negligence. The mere fact that a plaintiff is guilty of a failure to exercise ordinary care does not necessarily bar his recovery. Willis v. Jones, 89 Ga. App. 824 (81 S. E. 2d 517). The question of proximate cause is not an issue since the negligence of both parties combined as contributing proximate causes to produce the collision.

The court erred in sustaining the defendant’s general demurrers.

Judgment reversed.

Nichols and Bell, JJ., concur.

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Felton, Chief Judge.

The petition shows that the defendants were guilty of negligence per se .in violating Code (Ann.) § 68-1633 (Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dee. Sess., pp. 556, 581), by driving in the left lane of the highway; that they violated Code (Ann.) § 68-1647 (same act, p. 587) in turning their vehicle from a di *844 rect course and moving to the right before the movement could be made with reasonable safety; that they violated the part of the act next above referred to in not giving a signal. The petition shows also that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence per se in violating Code (Ann.) § 68-1635 (Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dee. Sess., pp. 556, 582), in attempting to pass the school bus on the right, since the passing alleged does not fall within the exceptions in the act, Code (Ann.) § 68-1636. The general rule is that where one voluntarily and knowingly takes a risk involving imminent danger he is precluded from recovery by reason of another’s negligence. However, under the allegations of the petition in this case, and despite the fact that both the plaintiff and the defendants were guilty of negligence per se and were charged with knowledge that the other might otherwise be guilty of negligence per se, justice requires the submission of the case to a jury for the determination of which party was the more negligent, if one was more negligent than the other, and whether the plaintiff is barred by his own negligence in taking the risk he took- in this case. In this case the driving of the school bus in the left-hand lane under the circumstances related in the petition might reasonably become an important factor in the jury’s determination of the measure of the plaintiff’s negligence. The mere fact that a plaintiff is guilty of a failure to exercise ordinary care does not necessarily bar his recovery. Willis v. Jones, 89 Ga. App. 824 (81 S. E. 2d 517). The question of proximate cause is not an issue since the negligence of both parties combined as contributing proximate causes to produce the collision.

The court erred in sustaining the defendant’s general demurrers.

Judgment reversed.

Nichols and Bell, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

115 S.E.2d 418, 101 Ga. App. 842, 1960 Ga. App. LEXIS 1022, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bryant-v-pittman-gactapp-1960.

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