Bryant v. Hayes

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Bryant v. Hayes

11 S.E.2d 360, 63 Ga. App. 440, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 118

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedOctober 28, 1940

Docket28510.

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 11 S.E.2d 360 (Bryant v. Hayes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Bryant v. Hayes, 11 S.E.2d 360, 63 Ga. App. 440, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 118 (Ga. Ct. App. 1940).

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Felton, J.

(After stating the foregoing facts.)

1. It is contended that the contract sued on was not binding on the defendant because of lack of mutuality, and because the defendant’s promise to pay a percentage of the commissions is indefinite as to time. The plaintiff testified: “It was a part of the consideration of the sale to him that I was to get thirty per cent, of the commissions which Hayes received, either operating the agency in my name, or in his name as my successor.” *443 The contract also recited that as a part of the consideration of the sale Hayes agreed to pay the commission of thirty per cent. Such testimony and such a provision in the contract, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, necessarily mean that the agreement to pay the commissions was made at the time of the sale of the equipment, and that the sale was a consideration for the promise to pay the commissions. 1 Williston on Contracts, 508, § 142. If the agreement to pay the commissions was not in contemplation of the parties at the time of the sale, then a later promise to pay them would be without consideration, and the promise would not have been a part of the consideration of the sale. It would have been competent for the defendant to show that what the contract and the plaintiff called a consideration was in fact not a consideration in law, because the promise to pay the commissions was based on a past consideration which in law would be no consideration; but there was no such evidence, and that contract and the testimony, in the absence of attack, must stand for their face value and on their legal import. If the agreement to pay the commissions was intended at the time of the sale as a part of the consideration for the sale, the sale was a valid consideration for the promise to pay the commissions, and it is immaterial that the plaintiff did not sell the agency to the defendant and that he was not instrumental in procuring it for the defendant.

2. The contract sued on is a unilateral contract under which the consideration flowing from the plaintiff had already been supplied, and stands upon the same footing as a bilateral contract fully performed by the plaintiff. In such a case it is not necessary that the promise to pay the commissions be definite as to time, if the time can be made certain by extrinsic facts. 1 Williston on Contracts, 134, § 47; Id. 346, § 103F.

The court erred in finding for the defendant, and in overruling the motion for new trial.

' Judgment reversed.

Stephens, P. J., concurs.

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Felton, J.

(After stating the foregoing facts.)

1. It is contended that the contract sued on was not binding on the defendant because of lack of mutuality, and because the defendant’s promise to pay a percentage of the commissions is indefinite as to time. The plaintiff testified: “It was a part of the consideration of the sale to him that I was to get thirty per cent, of the commissions which Hayes received, either operating the agency in my name, or in his name as my successor.” *443 The contract also recited that as a part of the consideration of the sale Hayes agreed to pay the commission of thirty per cent. Such testimony and such a provision in the contract, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, necessarily mean that the agreement to pay the commissions was made at the time of the sale of the equipment, and that the sale was a consideration for the promise to pay the commissions. 1 Williston on Contracts, 508, § 142. If the agreement to pay the commissions was not in contemplation of the parties at the time of the sale, then a later promise to pay them would be without consideration, and the promise would not have been a part of the consideration of the sale. It would have been competent for the defendant to show that what the contract and the plaintiff called a consideration was in fact not a consideration in law, because the promise to pay the commissions was based on a past consideration which in law would be no consideration; but there was no such evidence, and that contract and the testimony, in the absence of attack, must stand for their face value and on their legal import. If the agreement to pay the commissions was intended at the time of the sale as a part of the consideration for the sale, the sale was a valid consideration for the promise to pay the commissions, and it is immaterial that the plaintiff did not sell the agency to the defendant and that he was not instrumental in procuring it for the defendant.

2. The contract sued on is a unilateral contract under which the consideration flowing from the plaintiff had already been supplied, and stands upon the same footing as a bilateral contract fully performed by the plaintiff. In such a case it is not necessary that the promise to pay the commissions be definite as to time, if the time can be made certain by extrinsic facts. 1 Williston on Contracts, 134, § 47; Id. 346, § 103F.

The court erred in finding for the defendant, and in overruling the motion for new trial.

' Judgment reversed.

Stephens, P. J., concurs.

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11 S.E.2d 360, 63 Ga. App. 440, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 118, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bryant-v-hayes-gactapp-1940.

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