Bryant v. BD. OF SUPERVISORS OF RANKIN CTY.

10 So. 3d 919, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 595, 2008 WL 4401663
CourtCourt of Appeals of Mississippi
DecidedSeptember 30, 2008
Docket2007-CA-01644-COA
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 10 So. 3d 919 (Bryant v. BD. OF SUPERVISORS OF RANKIN CTY.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bryant v. BD. OF SUPERVISORS OF RANKIN CTY., 10 So. 3d 919, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 595, 2008 WL 4401663 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

MYERS, P.J.,

for the Court.

¶ 1. On January 5, 2006, Lisa Bryant (Bryant) and Jimmy D. Bryant (collectively, the Bryants) filed a complaint in Rankin County Circuit Court against Doris Jones, Wallace L. Jones, and Janice T. Jones, seeking to recover damages for injuries suffered by Bryant in an automobile accident that occurred on Monterey Road, in Rankin County, Mississippi. 1 The Rankin County Board of Supervisors (Board of Supervisors) was initially added as a defendant, but it was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. Shortly thereafter, the Bryants filed a separate complaint against the Board of Supervisors seeking to recover damages suffered by Bryant in the same accident. The cases were subsequently consolidated. On August 16, 2007, the trial court entered summary judgment for the Board of Supervisors.

FACTS

¶ 2. On July 25, 2005, Bryant was traveling north on Monterey Road in Rankin County. A motorist traveling south on Monterey Road came into her lane. To avoid a collision with the southbound automobile, Bryant swerved to the right causing her vehicle to travel on the shoulder of the northbound lane of Monterey Road. Before Bryant could steer her vehicle back on to Monterey Road, she collided with Jones’s mailbox. Jones had constructed a brick and mortar mailbox and placed it on the shoulder of Monterey Road to service her residence. The collision totaled Bryant’s car and caused injuries to Bryant’s lower extremities and midsection. Bryant underwent emergency surgery on the day of the accident and multiple surgeries thereafter to repair the injuries she suffered as a result of the accident. She has also sought further medical treatment for her injuries. 2

¶ 3. Bryant appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment arguing that: (1) the trial court erred by ignoring the duties imposed by statute on the Board of Supervisors to inspect Monterey Road, failing to remove obstructions from the road, and the failure of the defendants to perform those statutory duties; (2) the trial court committed reversible error by failing to acknowledge a factual dispute on whether the county owned the property, whether the county had notice of a danger *921 ous condition, and whether the county had a reasonable opportunity to protect against the dangerous condition; and (3) the trial court committed reversible error by failing to find that the constitutional prohibitions on donations prevented the defendants, the Board of Supervisors and Rankin County, from allowing a private party to locate a mailbox on county property and failing to find that the unlawful gratuity was a cause of the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 4. For a summary judgment motion to be granted there must exist no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M.R.C.P. 56(c). We apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Moss v. Batesville Casket Co., 935 So.2d 393, 398(¶ 15) (Miss.2006). “The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the non-moving party must be given the benefit of the doubt concerning the existence of a material fact.” Howard v. City of Biloxi, 943 So.2d 751, 754(¶4) (Miss.Ct.App.2006).

DISCUSSION

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ACKNOWLEDGE A FACTUAL DISPUTE CONCERNING THE OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY.

¶ 5. The Board of Supervisors contend they are immune from liability under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). Bryant argues that the Board of Supervisors created a dangerous condition which would bring the Board of Supervisors out from the protective shield of the MTCA. In order to state a cause of action under the dangerous condition exemption of the MTCA, a plaintiff must show: (1) a dangerous condition, (2) on the government entity’s property, (3) which the government entity caused, or of which it had notice, either actual or constructive, and time to protect or warn against, and (4) that the condition was not open and obvious. Miss.Code Ann. § ll-46-9(l)(v) (Rev.2005). 3 See Lowery v. Harrison County Bd. of Supervisors, 891 So.2d 264, 267(¶ 12) (Miss.Ct.App.2004). Applicability of this section begins with a determination of which party owned the subject property.

¶ 6. Each party submitted evidence regarding ownership on the right-of-way on Monterey Road. Bryant submitted two surveys conducted by T.E. McDonald. The surveys concluded the mailbox was located on the north right-of-way on Mon-terey Road, and not on Jones’s property. Bryant also submitted affidavits of two lay persons who live on Monterey Road. Their affidavits stated they both have witnessed Rankin County personnel control and maintain the shoulders and ditches of Monterey Road, and it was their understanding that Rankin County owned the property on each side of Monterey Road. Their observations are buttressed by the *922 affidavit of the current Rankin County road manager stating that Rankin County maintains Monterey Road. Lastly, Bryant submitted an affidavit from Mark Bailey, an engineer with extensive experience. Bailey investigated the accident, which included reviewing the warranty deed granting the land to Jones. Based upon his review of the warranty deed and McDonald’s surveys, Bailey concluded that the mailbox lies outside of Jones’s property.

¶ 7. The Board of Supervisors argued that the mailbox was not located on county property. In support of its contention, the Board of Supervisors cites an affidavit and title opinion of an attorney claiming the property was never conveyed to Rankin County; thus, they did not own the property. The Board of Supervisors also submitted an affidavit of the county engineer asserting that Monterey Road is not maintained as a state-aid road, nor, to his knowledge, had any state-aid funds been used on improving Monterey Road, or had any state-aid inspections been performed on Monterey Road.

¶ 8. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Bryants, the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment on this issue. The Bryants provided surveys, reports, and affidavits regarding ownership of the property. This evidence never established that Rankin County owned the property where the mailbox was located. The evidence only asserted that Jones did not own the property. On the other hand, the Board of Supervisors provided a title opinion stating that Rankin County never owned the property and an affidavit of the county engineer stating that Monterey Road is not a state-aid road. Thus, Bryant’s evidence failed to establish that Rankin County owned the property where the mailbox was located.

¶ 9. Because Bryant failed to prove the mailbox was located on property owned by Rankin County, it is not necessary to address the following issues: whether the mailbox was a dangerous condition, whether the Rankin County defendants had knowledge of the dangerous condition, and whether the dangerous condition was open and obvious, as all prongs of Mississippi Code Annotation section 11 — 46—9(1)(v) must be met.

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10 So. 3d 919, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 595, 2008 WL 4401663, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bryant-v-bd-of-supervisors-of-rankin-cty-missctapp-2008.