1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 WESTERN DIVISION
12 BRYANNA G. M., Case No. 2:23-cv-02663-BFM
13 Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OPINION 14 v. A ND ORDER
15 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
16 Defendant. 17
18 19 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 20 Plaintiff Bryanna G. M.1 applied for Supplemental Security Income 21 payments, alleging a disability that commenced on January 1, 2019. 22 (Administrative Record (“AR”) 22, 247-55.) Plaintiff’s application was denied at 23 the initial level of review and on reconsideration, after which she requested a 24 hearing in front of an Administrative Law Judge. (AR 22.) The ALJ held a 25 hearing and heard from Plaintiff, and a vocational expert (AR 38-62), after 26 27 1 In the interest of privacy, this Memorandum Opinion and Order uses only the first name and middle and last initials of the non-governmental party in this 28 case. 1 2 step two of the disability analysis2 that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of 3 bipolar disorder; personality disorder; and posttraumatic stress disorder. (AR 4 24.) At step three, the ALJ concluded that those conditions do not meet or 5 medically equal the severity of any impairment contained in the regulation’s 6 Listing of Impairments—impairments that the agency has deemed so severe as 7 to preclude all substantial gainful activity and require a grant of disability 8 benefits. (AR 25); see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. 9 The ALJ determined at step four that Plaintiff has no past relevant work, 10 but credited the vocational expert’s testimony that an individual like Plaintiff 11 could perform other jobs in the national economy. (AR 32-33.) The ALJ thus 12 found Plaintiff to be not disabled and denied her claim. (AR 33.) The Appeals 13 Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision. (AR 1-6.) 14 Dissatisfied with the agency’s resolution of her claim, Plaintiff filed a 15 Complaint in this Court. Her sole argument here is that the matter should be 16 remanded because the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for 17 rejecting Plaintiff’s allegations regarding her anger outbursts. (Pl.’s Br. at 3.) 18 Defendant requests that the ALJ’s decision be affirmed. 19 20 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 21 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision 22 to deny benefits to determine if: (1) the Commissioner’s findings are supported 23 by substantial evidence; and (2) the Commissioner used correct legal standards. 24 See Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); 25
26 2 A five-step evaluation process governs whether a plaintiff is disabled. 20 27 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(g)(1), 416.920(a)-(g)(1). The ALJ, properly, conducted the full five-step analysis, but only the steps relevant to the issue raised in the 28 Complaint are discussed here. 1 2 “Substantial evidence . . . is ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ It means—and only 3 means—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 4 to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) 5 (citations omitted); Gutierrez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 522-23 (9th 6 Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To determine 7 whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court “must 8 review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that 9 supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion.” 10 Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 710 (9th Cir. 1998). 11 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 The only question this case presents is whether the ALJ provided clear 14 and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence to discount Plaintiff’s 15 testimony regarding her anger outbursts. For the reasons set forth below, the 16 Court determines that the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed. 17 18 A. Legal Standard 19 Where a claimant testifies about subjective medical symptoms, an ALJ 20 must evaluate such testimony in two steps. First, the ALJ must determine 21 whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying 22 impairment that could “reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 23 symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) 24 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 25 Second, if the claimant meets that first standard and there is no evidence 26 of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony only by offering 27 “specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. (citation and internal 28 1 2 disabling pain, or else disability benefits would be available for the asking, a 3 result plainly contrary to the Social Security Act.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 4 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). At the 5 same time, when an ALJ rejects a claimant’s testimony, she must “specify which 6 testimony she finds not credible, and then provide clear and convincing reasons, 7 supported by evidence in the record,” to support that determination. Brown- 8 Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488-89 (9th Cir. 2015). General or implicit 9 findings of credibility will not suffice; the ALJ “must show [her] work.” Smartt, 10 53 F.4th at 499; see also Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 11 1102 (9th Cir. 2014). 12 The sufficiency of the explanation should be judged in light of its 13 purpose—ensuring that this Court’s review is “meaningful.” Brown-Hunter, 806 14 F.3d at 489. That is, the explanation must be “‘sufficiently specific to allow a 15 reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on 16 permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony 17 regarding pain.’” Id. at 493 (citation omitted). A “reviewing court should not be 18 forced to speculate as to the grounds for an adjudicator’s rejection of a claimant’s 19 allegations of disabling pain.” Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345-46 (9th 20 Cir. 1991). 21 Judged by that standard, the ALJ’s explanation of the decision to reject 22 Plaintiff’s testimony about her symptoms was sufficient. 23 24 B. The ALJ’s Decision 25 The ALJ set out the two-step analysis for considering a claimant’s 26 testimony. After doing so, she discounted Plaintiff’s testimony, finding that her 27 testimony about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms 28 1 2 (AR 29.) Specifically, since starting regular medication management, Plaintiff 3 has required medication adjustments and reported persistent symptoms of 4 anger and social anxiety, but “there has been no reporting of hallucinations 5 despite increased anger and fighting with her girlfriend’s father.” (AR 29.) 6 During the period Plaintiff was compliant with medications, she only reported 7 two angry outbursts, one in August 2020 and the other in June 2021. A third 8 incident, a fight that reportedly occurred in March/April 2020, happened at a 9 time when Plaintiff was not taking her medications.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 WESTERN DIVISION
12 BRYANNA G. M., Case No. 2:23-cv-02663-BFM
13 Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OPINION 14 v. A ND ORDER
15 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
16 Defendant. 17
18 19 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 20 Plaintiff Bryanna G. M.1 applied for Supplemental Security Income 21 payments, alleging a disability that commenced on January 1, 2019. 22 (Administrative Record (“AR”) 22, 247-55.) Plaintiff’s application was denied at 23 the initial level of review and on reconsideration, after which she requested a 24 hearing in front of an Administrative Law Judge. (AR 22.) The ALJ held a 25 hearing and heard from Plaintiff, and a vocational expert (AR 38-62), after 26 27 1 In the interest of privacy, this Memorandum Opinion and Order uses only the first name and middle and last initials of the non-governmental party in this 28 case. 1 2 step two of the disability analysis2 that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of 3 bipolar disorder; personality disorder; and posttraumatic stress disorder. (AR 4 24.) At step three, the ALJ concluded that those conditions do not meet or 5 medically equal the severity of any impairment contained in the regulation’s 6 Listing of Impairments—impairments that the agency has deemed so severe as 7 to preclude all substantial gainful activity and require a grant of disability 8 benefits. (AR 25); see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. 9 The ALJ determined at step four that Plaintiff has no past relevant work, 10 but credited the vocational expert’s testimony that an individual like Plaintiff 11 could perform other jobs in the national economy. (AR 32-33.) The ALJ thus 12 found Plaintiff to be not disabled and denied her claim. (AR 33.) The Appeals 13 Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision. (AR 1-6.) 14 Dissatisfied with the agency’s resolution of her claim, Plaintiff filed a 15 Complaint in this Court. Her sole argument here is that the matter should be 16 remanded because the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for 17 rejecting Plaintiff’s allegations regarding her anger outbursts. (Pl.’s Br. at 3.) 18 Defendant requests that the ALJ’s decision be affirmed. 19 20 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 21 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision 22 to deny benefits to determine if: (1) the Commissioner’s findings are supported 23 by substantial evidence; and (2) the Commissioner used correct legal standards. 24 See Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); 25
26 2 A five-step evaluation process governs whether a plaintiff is disabled. 20 27 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(g)(1), 416.920(a)-(g)(1). The ALJ, properly, conducted the full five-step analysis, but only the steps relevant to the issue raised in the 28 Complaint are discussed here. 1 2 “Substantial evidence . . . is ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ It means—and only 3 means—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 4 to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) 5 (citations omitted); Gutierrez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 522-23 (9th 6 Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To determine 7 whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court “must 8 review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that 9 supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion.” 10 Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 710 (9th Cir. 1998). 11 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 The only question this case presents is whether the ALJ provided clear 14 and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence to discount Plaintiff’s 15 testimony regarding her anger outbursts. For the reasons set forth below, the 16 Court determines that the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed. 17 18 A. Legal Standard 19 Where a claimant testifies about subjective medical symptoms, an ALJ 20 must evaluate such testimony in two steps. First, the ALJ must determine 21 whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying 22 impairment that could “reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 23 symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) 24 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 25 Second, if the claimant meets that first standard and there is no evidence 26 of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony only by offering 27 “specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. (citation and internal 28 1 2 disabling pain, or else disability benefits would be available for the asking, a 3 result plainly contrary to the Social Security Act.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 4 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). At the 5 same time, when an ALJ rejects a claimant’s testimony, she must “specify which 6 testimony she finds not credible, and then provide clear and convincing reasons, 7 supported by evidence in the record,” to support that determination. Brown- 8 Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488-89 (9th Cir. 2015). General or implicit 9 findings of credibility will not suffice; the ALJ “must show [her] work.” Smartt, 10 53 F.4th at 499; see also Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 11 1102 (9th Cir. 2014). 12 The sufficiency of the explanation should be judged in light of its 13 purpose—ensuring that this Court’s review is “meaningful.” Brown-Hunter, 806 14 F.3d at 489. That is, the explanation must be “‘sufficiently specific to allow a 15 reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on 16 permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony 17 regarding pain.’” Id. at 493 (citation omitted). A “reviewing court should not be 18 forced to speculate as to the grounds for an adjudicator’s rejection of a claimant’s 19 allegations of disabling pain.” Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345-46 (9th 20 Cir. 1991). 21 Judged by that standard, the ALJ’s explanation of the decision to reject 22 Plaintiff’s testimony about her symptoms was sufficient. 23 24 B. The ALJ’s Decision 25 The ALJ set out the two-step analysis for considering a claimant’s 26 testimony. After doing so, she discounted Plaintiff’s testimony, finding that her 27 testimony about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms 28 1 2 (AR 29.) Specifically, since starting regular medication management, Plaintiff 3 has required medication adjustments and reported persistent symptoms of 4 anger and social anxiety, but “there has been no reporting of hallucinations 5 despite increased anger and fighting with her girlfriend’s father.” (AR 29.) 6 During the period Plaintiff was compliant with medications, she only reported 7 two angry outbursts, one in August 2020 and the other in June 2021. A third 8 incident, a fight that reportedly occurred in March/April 2020, happened at a 9 time when Plaintiff was not taking her medications. But after starting her 10 medications again, she reported a “significant improvement in her mood” and 11 said that she was “more in control of her emotions.” (AR 29.) Her treating 12 providers have also generally noted her to be calm and cooperative, and there 13 was no change in her mental status examinations even after changes in 14 routines, “like being kicked out of the house for a month or being out of town ‘for 15 a while.’” (AR 29.) And, contrary to Plaintiff’s hearing testimony, she reported 16 better control and recognition of her mood swings and anger with treatment. 17 (AR 29 (citing AR 401, 424, 427).) 18 For those reasons, the ALJ concluded that the limitations in the residual 19 functional capacity was adequate to accommodate Plaintiff’s symptoms. (AR 30.) 20 Those limitations included never having contact with the public, occasional 21 contact with supervisors and co-workers, and occasional changes in the work 22 setting. (AR 26-27.) 23 24 C. Analysis 25 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred, both in overlooking significant 26 portions of Plaintiff’s testimony that contradicted the ALJ’s conclusion, and in 27 failing to give reasons supported by substantial evidence for rejecting Plaintiff’s 28 1 2 One of Plaintiff’s primary argument is that the ALJ mischaracterized the 3 prevalence of Plaintiff’s anger issues. The ALJ noted that there were only two 4 reported incidents of angry outbursts since Plaintiff has been compliant with 5 her medication, one in August 2020 and one in June 2021. Plaintiff asserts that 6 this is a mischaracterization because she “has reported anger a number of 7 times.” (Pl.’s Br. at 6 (citing AR 371, 377, 398, 412, 422, 429).) But Plaintiff’s 8 citations do not bear out her claim. Of the six record cites, two are duplicates of 9 each other and discuss her August 2020 outburst (AR 412, 422), and one reflects 10 the outburst ten months later in June 2021 (AR 429.) Those three citations 11 support the ALJ’s conclusion. 12 Of the remaining three citations, one reflects Plaintiff’s report to her 13 therapist that she “is feeling well, her household is getting along well, and she 14 denies any recent impulsivity or anger/aggressive behavior.” (AR 398 (emphasis 15 added).) The last two reflect Plaintiff’s general description of her anger 16 symptoms to the consultative psychiatric examiner and on intake at the mental 17 health clinic. (AR 371, 377.) But the ALJ considered both reports. As for the 18 consultative examiner, Dr. DeBattista described Plaintiff’s report of her history 19 of angry outbursts, but noted that the Plaintiff was not agitated or distressed in 20 the moment. Dr. DeBattista reported his views on the limitations warranted 21 based on his examination—including ones relating to Plaintiff’s ability to work 22 with the public and coworkers. (AR 373.) The ALJ thoroughly discussed Dr. 23 DeBattista’s examination, adopted part of it as persuasive, and analyzed how 24 Dr. DeBattista’s report undermined Plaintiff’s testimony. (AR 30.) In no way 25 was this report overlooked, nor does Plaintiff persuade the Court that the ALJ 26 wrongly understood the nature or frequency of Plaintiff’s anger issues. 27 Likewise, the information contained in the intake note is described in the 28 1 2 sought treatment from Los Angeles County in January 2020, before she was 3 stabilized on medication. (AR 28 (discussing AR 377).) Her statement describing 4 her condition at the outset of treatment does not undermine the ALJ’s 5 determination that Plaintiff’s anger symptoms improved after she began 6 treatment. In short, the record does not bear out Plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ 7 overlooked significant incidents of angry outbursts while she was compliant 8 with her medication regime. 9 Plaintiff points to other claims in her testimony: that she lives with her 10 girlfriend and her girlfriend’s grandparents and has “gotten kicked out five or 11 six times because I like lose control and I spaz out and I’ve gotten into it with 12 people in the house.” (Pl.’s Br. at 6 (citing AR 50).) She also testified that her 13 “main thing right now is like my social anxiety” (AR 46, 51), and noted that she 14 has “been good” but “lose[s] it a little bit here and there but it’s not like 15 aggressive, and me throwing things or punching things,” although she feels like 16 she is “starting to spaz out again” and feels herself “getting back into that same 17 pattern” of wanting to throw something or hit something.” (AR 50-51.) 18 Again, the ALJ did not overlook that testimony; she simply concluded that 19 that testimony was not entirely consistent with the evidence in the record—and 20 in particular, that Plaintiff’s anger issues were greatly reduced while she was 21 compliant with her medication. (AR 28.) In contrast to her testimony during the 22 hearing, Plaintiff told her therapist in July 2021 that, while “anger outbursts . 23 . . are her main symptoms,” her last episode was a month before that. (AR 29, 24 429.) At that same visit, Plaintiff reported that her anger symptoms are “way 25 better with medications,” and she will catch herself when she gets mad, can feel 26 herself getting upset, and “nowadays . . . is recognizing it more.” (AR 429.) The 27 ALJ observed that Plaintiff reported fewer outbursts when complying with her 28 1 2 at that time was her social anxiety, a condition for which she started receiving 3 medication about a month before the hearing. (AR 29, 46, 51, 52, 55, 424, 427, 4 429.) Once again, the Court is not persuaded that the ALJ’s conclusion with 5 respect to Plaintiff’s anger issues is not supported by substantial evidence. 6 Plaintiff’s brief suggests the ALJ overlooked that her condition caused her 7 to drop out of school. (Pl.’s Br. at 6.) But Plaintiff dropping out of school had 8 nothing to do with her anger. In July 2021, she reported to her therapist that 9 she dropped out of cosmetology school due to being overwhelmed. She said the 10 same during the hearing, where she testified that she only completed 3 months 11 of a 2-year cosmetology program, because she was overwhelmed when classes 12 went back to being in-person. (Pl.’s Br. at 6 (citing AR 45, 429).) Plaintiff’s 13 testimony that she dropped out of cosmetology school when it returned to in- 14 person classes does not undermine the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s anger 15 outbursts decreased after starting treatment. As for Plaintiff’s social anxiety, 16 the ALJ took that condition into account when she limited Plaintiff to no public 17 interactions and only occasional interactions with supervisors and coworkers, 18 and Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s findings as to her social anxiety. (AR 19 30.) 20 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s “sole reason” for rejecting Plaintiff’s 21 testimony regarding her anger is because “there is no indication that she would 22 not improve.” (Pl.’s Br. at 5 (citing AR 30).) The Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s 23 characterization. The ALJ’s reference to potential future improvement, again, 24 related to Plaintiff’s social anxiety, not her anger. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff 25 had had a good response to medication management of her manic and depressive 26 symptoms, and opined that there is no indication that her “social anxiety 27 symptoms would not [also] improve” with medication—medication that had only 28 1 || been instituted the prior month. (AR 30 (emphasis added).) In other words, the 2 || ALJ’s conclusion was not premised on any assumptions that Plaintiff's anger 3 || symptoms were on an upward trajectory. 4 For these reasons, the Court determines that the ALJ provided specific, 5 || clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for discounting 6 || Plaintiffs anger symptoms. Biestek, 1389 S. Ct. at 1154. Remand is not 7 || warranted on this issue. 8 9 IV. CONCLUSION 10 For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the 11 || Commissioner finding Plaintiff not disabled is AFFIRMED. ‘ety 13 |} DATED: October 19, 2023 BRIANNA FULLER MIRCHEFF 14 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28