Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed June 17, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D25-1975 Lower Tribunal No. 25-12892-CA-01 ________________
Bryan Walters, Appellant,
vs.
State of Florida, et al., Appellees.
An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Spencer Eig, Judge.
Bryan Walters, in proper person.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Walter Dale Miller, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Tyler J. Walters, Assistant County Attorney, for appellees.
Before SCALES, C.J., and FERNANDEZ and BOKOR, JJ.
SCALES, C.J. Pro se appellant, plaintiff below, Bryan Walters appeals an October 13,
2025 non-final order (the “Order”) declaring Walters a vexatious litigant
under the Florida Vexatious Litigant Act, section 68.093 of the Florida
Statutes (the “Act”).1 Pursuant to section 68.093(3) of the Act, the challenged
Order, among other things, requires Walters to post a $10,000 security in
order to continue to prosecute his lawsuit. Because the Order is in the nature
of an injunction, we have appellate jurisdiction to review it2 and, discerning
no error, we affirm the Order.
I. Relevant Background
Walters brought a “civil negligence” action against several defendants,
including Appellees State of Florida and the State Attorney of the 11th
1 The Act provides, in part, as follows:
(c) “Vexatious litigant” means a person, as defined in s. 1.01(3), proceeding pro se, who:
1. In the immediately preceding 7-year period, has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained, pro se, five or more actions in any court that have been finally and adversely determined against such person, except that an action may not be included for purposes of this subparagraph if the court finds that the action was commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in good faith[.]
§ 68.093(2)(c)1., Fla. Stat. (2025).
2 Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(B) provides this Court with appellate jurisdiction to review non-final orders that grant injunctions.
2 Judicial Circuit. Walters sought declaratory and injunctive relief and
demanded ten billion dollars in damages based on an assortment of alleged
wrongs, including libel and slander, arising from his trespasses on college
campuses and businesses and a 2012 arrest in Duval County.
In September 2025, Appellees filed, pursuant to sections 68.093(3)
and (4) of the Act, a joint motion to declare Walters a vexatious litigant.
Appellees’ motion identified forty-five3 cases that Walters had commenced
within the preceding seven years that had been “finally and adversely
determined against” Walters and that were allegedly not “commenced,
prosecuted, or maintained in good faith.” See § 68.093(2)(c)1., Fla. Stat.
(2025). Appellees sought from the trial court both (i) an order requiring
Walters to post security in order to continue to maintain his lawsuit as
prescribed in section 68.093(3), and (ii) a pre-filing order prohibiting Walters
from initiating new pro se proceedings.
On October 9, 2025, the trial court conducted a noticed hearing on
Appellees’ motion and, on October 13th, entered the challenged Order. In its
Order the trial court found Walters indeed had filed forty-five pro se cases in
the preceding seven years that were finally and adversely determined
3 Section 68.093(2)(c)1. of the Act establishes a vexatious litigant threshold at five such cases.
3 against him and that were not commenced, prosecuted or maintained in
good faith. The Order also (i) determined that Walters was unlikely to
succeed on the merits of the instant case, (ii) required Walters to post a
$10,000 security with the clerk of the court within thirty days of the date of
the order, (iii) stayed all proceedings in the action for thirty days to allow
Walters to post the required security, and (iv) stated that a failure to post this
security would result in the trial court dismissing the action with prejudice.
See § 68.093(3)(b) and (c), Fla. Stat. (2025).
One day later, on October 14, 2025, Walters filed the instant appeal
challenging the Order.
II. Analysis
A. Jurisdiction
First, we must address the threshold question of whether we have
appellate jurisdiction to review the Order. The current iteration of the Act
was only recently adopted by the Legislature in 2025,4 so there is little
authority discussing appellate jurisdiction to review an order, such as the
instant one, entered pursuant to section 68.093(3)(a) of the Act.
Nonetheless, because the Order requires Walters to post $10,000 security
4 See Ch. 2025-128, Laws of Fla. (2025).
4 in order to proceed in the litigation, we have little difficulty regarding the
Order as in the nature of an injunction.
Florida courts have found similar, non-final judicial imperatives as a
form of injunctive relief reviewable under rule 9.130(a)(3)(B). See CMR
Distribs., Inc. v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 593 So. 2d 593, 594 (Fla. 3d DCA
1992) (“An order requiring the deposit of funds into the registry of the court
prior to judgment is, in effect, an order granting an injunction and is thus
reviewable under Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(B).”); see also Ruckdeschel v.
People’s Tr. Ins. Co., 327 So. 3d 311, 313 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (reviewing a
non-final trial court order requiring insureds to pay their deductible, execute
a work order, and allow insurer’s contractor to commence repairs to their
property prior to the trial court adjudicating the insureds’ suit); Minty v.
Meister Fin. Grp., Inc., 97 So. 3d 926, 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (reviewing a
non-final trial court order in a foreclosure action that ordered the borrower
and her attorney to deposit a loan amount into the court registry); Array v.
Alberigi, 832 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (reviewing a non-final trial
court order requiring a party’s counsel’s legal assistant to execute a
mortgage satisfaction); Hughes v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 621 So. 2d
557, 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (“The order in question requires appellants to
5 deposit mortgage payments into the registry of the court as they accrue and
is reviewable as an order granting an injunction.”).5
B. Merits
Having established our jurisdiction, we now address the merits of the
Order. Our standard of review is mixed. Generally, we review a trial court’s
grant of an injunction for an abuse of discretion. Credo LLC v. Speyside Invs.
Corp., 259 So. 3d 893, 897 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018); Clements v. Club Space
Mgmt., LLC, 388 So. 3d 923, 925 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (applying the abuse of
discretion standard of review when a trial court imposes a sanction on a
litigant). With regard to factual findings, the trial court does not abuse its
discretion unless such findings are unsupported by competent, substantial
evidence.
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed June 17, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D25-1975 Lower Tribunal No. 25-12892-CA-01 ________________
Bryan Walters, Appellant,
vs.
State of Florida, et al., Appellees.
An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Spencer Eig, Judge.
Bryan Walters, in proper person.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Walter Dale Miller, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Tyler J. Walters, Assistant County Attorney, for appellees.
Before SCALES, C.J., and FERNANDEZ and BOKOR, JJ.
SCALES, C.J. Pro se appellant, plaintiff below, Bryan Walters appeals an October 13,
2025 non-final order (the “Order”) declaring Walters a vexatious litigant
under the Florida Vexatious Litigant Act, section 68.093 of the Florida
Statutes (the “Act”).1 Pursuant to section 68.093(3) of the Act, the challenged
Order, among other things, requires Walters to post a $10,000 security in
order to continue to prosecute his lawsuit. Because the Order is in the nature
of an injunction, we have appellate jurisdiction to review it2 and, discerning
no error, we affirm the Order.
I. Relevant Background
Walters brought a “civil negligence” action against several defendants,
including Appellees State of Florida and the State Attorney of the 11th
1 The Act provides, in part, as follows:
(c) “Vexatious litigant” means a person, as defined in s. 1.01(3), proceeding pro se, who:
1. In the immediately preceding 7-year period, has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained, pro se, five or more actions in any court that have been finally and adversely determined against such person, except that an action may not be included for purposes of this subparagraph if the court finds that the action was commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in good faith[.]
§ 68.093(2)(c)1., Fla. Stat. (2025).
2 Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(B) provides this Court with appellate jurisdiction to review non-final orders that grant injunctions.
2 Judicial Circuit. Walters sought declaratory and injunctive relief and
demanded ten billion dollars in damages based on an assortment of alleged
wrongs, including libel and slander, arising from his trespasses on college
campuses and businesses and a 2012 arrest in Duval County.
In September 2025, Appellees filed, pursuant to sections 68.093(3)
and (4) of the Act, a joint motion to declare Walters a vexatious litigant.
Appellees’ motion identified forty-five3 cases that Walters had commenced
within the preceding seven years that had been “finally and adversely
determined against” Walters and that were allegedly not “commenced,
prosecuted, or maintained in good faith.” See § 68.093(2)(c)1., Fla. Stat.
(2025). Appellees sought from the trial court both (i) an order requiring
Walters to post security in order to continue to maintain his lawsuit as
prescribed in section 68.093(3), and (ii) a pre-filing order prohibiting Walters
from initiating new pro se proceedings.
On October 9, 2025, the trial court conducted a noticed hearing on
Appellees’ motion and, on October 13th, entered the challenged Order. In its
Order the trial court found Walters indeed had filed forty-five pro se cases in
the preceding seven years that were finally and adversely determined
3 Section 68.093(2)(c)1. of the Act establishes a vexatious litigant threshold at five such cases.
3 against him and that were not commenced, prosecuted or maintained in
good faith. The Order also (i) determined that Walters was unlikely to
succeed on the merits of the instant case, (ii) required Walters to post a
$10,000 security with the clerk of the court within thirty days of the date of
the order, (iii) stayed all proceedings in the action for thirty days to allow
Walters to post the required security, and (iv) stated that a failure to post this
security would result in the trial court dismissing the action with prejudice.
See § 68.093(3)(b) and (c), Fla. Stat. (2025).
One day later, on October 14, 2025, Walters filed the instant appeal
challenging the Order.
II. Analysis
A. Jurisdiction
First, we must address the threshold question of whether we have
appellate jurisdiction to review the Order. The current iteration of the Act
was only recently adopted by the Legislature in 2025,4 so there is little
authority discussing appellate jurisdiction to review an order, such as the
instant one, entered pursuant to section 68.093(3)(a) of the Act.
Nonetheless, because the Order requires Walters to post $10,000 security
4 See Ch. 2025-128, Laws of Fla. (2025).
4 in order to proceed in the litigation, we have little difficulty regarding the
Order as in the nature of an injunction.
Florida courts have found similar, non-final judicial imperatives as a
form of injunctive relief reviewable under rule 9.130(a)(3)(B). See CMR
Distribs., Inc. v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 593 So. 2d 593, 594 (Fla. 3d DCA
1992) (“An order requiring the deposit of funds into the registry of the court
prior to judgment is, in effect, an order granting an injunction and is thus
reviewable under Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(B).”); see also Ruckdeschel v.
People’s Tr. Ins. Co., 327 So. 3d 311, 313 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (reviewing a
non-final trial court order requiring insureds to pay their deductible, execute
a work order, and allow insurer’s contractor to commence repairs to their
property prior to the trial court adjudicating the insureds’ suit); Minty v.
Meister Fin. Grp., Inc., 97 So. 3d 926, 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (reviewing a
non-final trial court order in a foreclosure action that ordered the borrower
and her attorney to deposit a loan amount into the court registry); Array v.
Alberigi, 832 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (reviewing a non-final trial
court order requiring a party’s counsel’s legal assistant to execute a
mortgage satisfaction); Hughes v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 621 So. 2d
557, 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (“The order in question requires appellants to
5 deposit mortgage payments into the registry of the court as they accrue and
is reviewable as an order granting an injunction.”).5
B. Merits
Having established our jurisdiction, we now address the merits of the
Order. Our standard of review is mixed. Generally, we review a trial court’s
grant of an injunction for an abuse of discretion. Credo LLC v. Speyside Invs.
Corp., 259 So. 3d 893, 897 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018); Clements v. Club Space
Mgmt., LLC, 388 So. 3d 923, 925 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (applying the abuse of
discretion standard of review when a trial court imposes a sanction on a
litigant). With regard to factual findings, the trial court does not abuse its
discretion unless such findings are unsupported by competent, substantial
evidence. But to the extent that the trial court construed the Act, such
statutory interpretation involves a pure question of law to which we apply a
5 To be clear, a vexatious litigant against whom a section 68.093(3) non-final security order is entered – whose lawsuit is dismissed for failure to post the court-ordered security – may file an appeal of the final dismissal order; in such event, the scope of appellate review would include the interlocutory order. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(h). Where a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the case prior to the trial court’s disposition of the defendant’s section 68.093 motion, a resulting vexatious litigant order becomes final and subject to plenary appeal. Steinberg ex rel. Fiesta Homeowners Ass’n v. Cudak, 429 So. 3d 21, 24 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026) (observing that the trial court retains case jurisdiction to adjudicate a pending sanctions motion despite a voluntary dismissal); Knezevich v. Serv. Fin. Co., LLC, 375 So. 3d 941, 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (same).
6 de novo standard of review. Buechele v. In re: Est. of Buechele, 366 So. 3d
1165, 1169 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023).
In this case, because we have not been provided with a transcript of
the October 9, 2025 hearing on Appellees’ motion, our scope of review is
significantly narrowed. Indeed, for us to reverse the Order, error would have
to appear on the face of the Order. Brown v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 319 So. 3d
81, 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021).
We have carefully reviewed the record that is before us and find no
error – factual, legal or otherwise – in the trial court’s Order. We therefore
affirm the Order in all respects.
Affirmed.