Brusselback v. Cago Corporation

85 F.2d 20, 1936 U.S. App. LEXIS 4014
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedJuly 13, 1936
Docket437
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 85 F.2d 20 (Brusselback v. Cago Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brusselback v. Cago Corporation, 85 F.2d 20, 1936 U.S. App. LEXIS 4014 (2d Cir. 1936).

Opinion

MANTON, Circuit Judg e.

Appellants, holding $132,000 in bonds, creditors of the Chicago Joint Stock Land Bank which was closed by the Federal Farm Loan Board, sue on behalf of themselves and all other creditors to recover, from 91 named stockholders of the bank, the amount of their statutory liability as such stockholders.

The Chicago Joint Stock Land Bank had outstanding $4,000,000 in capital stock, divided into 40,000 shares, when it failed in October, 1932. At the time of its failure, the bank’s liabilities exceeded its assets by approximately 12 million dollars, so that the stockholders would be liable to the creditors in the full amount of the par value of the stock owned by each. A suit was brought by creditors in the United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, against all the bank’s stockholders to assess and enforce their liability, and a decree was entered assessing the stockholders 100 per cent of the par value of the shares of stock held by them.

It is here alleged that such decree, to the extent that it fixes the necessity for and the amount of the assessment, is effective and binding upon all stockholders of the bank irrespective of whether or not they were served in that proceeding. The bill proceeds to allege that the amount sought in this suit will be held for the benefit of appellees and all other creditors who may file claims against the bank and that an accounting will be necessary to properly apportion the recovery among the creditors. The prayer for relief is that the suit be treated and regarded in all respects as a class suit in equity wherein and whereby appellants sue as representatives of all the creditors of the bank for the purpose of enforcing the liability of appellee s stockholders, to the end that there may be provided a fund to be administered by the court for the equal benefit of all the creditors of the bank and that the sums realized and collected from the appellees be administered by the court as a court of equity and be distributed ratably and equitably among the creditors of the bank in such manner as the court may direct.

On motions by a number of the appellees, the bill was dismissed as to them, the court holding that an action in equity did not lie since the appellants relied on the 100 per cent, assessment already levied against the stockholders. The court reasoned that since there was no necessity for an accounting to determine the amount of the assessment, and since each creditor could sue each stockholder for the proportion of the appellees’ statutory liability to which he was entitled, the remedy at law was adequate. Transfer of the case to the law side was refused on the ground that the bill failed to allege that the jurisdictional amount was solved,

The Federal Farm Loan Act (July 17, 1916, c. 245, § 16, 39 Stat. 374, 12 U.S.C.A. § 812) provides: “Shareholders of every joint stock land bank organized under this charter shall be held individually responsible, equally and ratably, and not one for another, for all contracts, debts, and engagements of such bank to the extent of *22 die amount of stock owned by them at the par value thereof, in addition to the amount paid in and represented by their shares.”

This statute was intended to provide security to creditors as a whole. It creates a liability to creditors as a body, not to each creditor individually, and must be enforced in a representative suit on behalf of all creditors. The amounts collected are considered to constitute a trust fund, which the court will administer for the equal benefit of all creditors. Such a suit can be maintained only in equity where jurisdiction necessarily follows from the nature of the stockholders’ liability. Since the stockholders’ liability under the harm Loan Act is one to the creditors as a body, equity jurisdiction is not dependent upon the amount of the liability claimed, whether or no it is the full amount. In Terry v. Little, 101 U.S. 216, 25 L.Ed. 864, a single creditor -sued at law to recover for himself from stockholders liable under a statute which provided that “each stockholder * * * shall be liable and held bound individually for any sum not exceeding twice the amount of his * * * shares.” In dismissing the action, the court said (101 U.S. 216, at pages 217, 218, 25 L.Ed. 864): “Undoubtedly, the object was to furnish additional security to creditors, and to have the payments when made applied to the liquidation of debts. So, too, it is clear that the obligation is one that may be enforced by the creditors; but as it is to or for all creditors, it must be enforced by or for all. * * * A suit at law by one creditor to recover for himself alone is entirely inconsistent with any idea of distribution. As the liability of the stockholder is not to any individual creditor, but for contribution to a fund, out of which all creditors are to be paid alike, the appropriate remedy is by suit to enforce the contribution, and not by one creditor alone to appropriate to his own use that which belongs to others equally with himself.”

Alsop v. Conway, 188 F. 568 (C.C.A.6), certiorari denied 223 U.S. 720, 32 S.Ct. 523, 56 L.Ed. 629, was a suit brought by creditors for themselves and all other creditors to enforce against stockholders, in an amount equal to the par value of the stock held by the defendants, a liability created by a statute very similar to that involved in the case at bar. The court allowed the action in equity, saying at page 575 of 188 F.: “Under these statutes it is clear that a proceeding for the enforcement of the equal and ratable liability imposed by statute can be maintained only by one or more creditors on behalf of all, and not by one creditor to secure payment of his own debt to the exclusion of others. * * * The amounts recovered on account of such double liability thus become a trust fund, properly administered in equity and distributed among creditors who by the bill are brought before the court and are made parties to the proceeding. * * * The suit below was thus essentially a proceeding for the collection, administration, and distribution of the trust fund. Such proceeding is properly brought in equity.”

Hirshfeld v. Fitzgerald, 157 N.Y. 166, 178, 179, 51 N.E. 997, 46 L.R.A. 839; Pfohl v. Simpson, 74 N.Y. 137; Smith v. Huckabee, 53 Ala. 191; Harris v. First Parish of Dorchester, 23 Pick. (40 Mass.) 112, also-hold that the proper proceeding to enforce-the liability of stockholders created by statutes like that here involved, is a suit in. equity to collect a fund for the benefit of all the creditors.

The contention of the appellees that individual creditors can enforce their rights, only in separate actions at law against each stockholder would create an impossible situation as the facts here illustrate. There are 91 defendants, the majority owning less than 25 shares each. Appellant creditors are owed $132,000, and the claims of bondholders alone against the-bank total $42,000,000. Appellees in this, suit own stock having a par value of $1,-189,600. With the liability of the stockholders as one to all creditors, appellants-can bring a single representative suit in equity for the collection of the amount of the stockholders’ liability and, after collection, this can be distributed by the court among the creditors as their interests appear.

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Bluebook (online)
85 F.2d 20, 1936 U.S. App. LEXIS 4014, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brusselback-v-cago-corporation-ca2-1936.