Brunshae Steadman v. State

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 16, 2009
Docket10-07-00105-CR
StatusPublished

This text of Brunshae Steadman v. State (Brunshae Steadman v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brunshae Steadman v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).

Opinion

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

 

No. 10-07-00105-CR

Brunshae Steadman,

                                                                                    Appellant

 v.

The State of Texas,

                                                                                    Appellee


From the 52nd District Court

Coryell County, Texas

Trial Court No. 18,512

Opinion on remand


            On original submission, the Court, with Chief Justice Gray dissenting, reversed Brunshea Steadman’s conviction for aggravated assault due to factual insufficiency.  See Steadman v. State, 262 S.W.3d 401 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. granted).  The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that we “failed in several respects to conduct a proper factual sufficiency review.”  See Steadman v. State, 280 S.W.3d 242, 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).  The sole issue on remand is whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support Steadman’s conviction for aggravated assault by his sexual organ.  We affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

            Under factual sufficiency review, we ask whether a neutral review of all the evidence demonstrates that the proof of guilt is so weak or that conflicting evidence is so strong as to render the jury’s verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.  Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  We review the evidence weighed by the jury that tends to prove the existence of the elemental fact in dispute and compare it with the evidence that tends to disprove that fact.  Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7.  We do not indulge in inferences or confine our view to evidence favoring one side.  Rather, we look at all the evidence on both sides and then make a predominantly intuitive judgment.  Id.

ANALYSIS

The State may prove penetration by circumstantial evidence.  See Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).  The State need not establish actual penetration of the vaginal opening in order to establish aggravated sexual assault by a defendant’s sexual organ:

[M]ere contact with the outside of an object does not amount to a penetration of it.  But pushing aside and reaching beneath a natural fold of skin into an area of the body not usually exposed to view, even in nakedness, is a significant intrusion beyond mere external contact. 

Vernon v. State, 841 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).  Evidence of the slightest penetration is sufficient to uphold a conviction, so long as it has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Luna v. State, 515 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).

L.N. told her grandmother that Steadman “laid down on top of me and played with me,” touched her “tutu,” meaning her vaginal area, and touched her with his penis “[d]own in her stride,” also meaning her vaginal area.  L.N. was suffering from a green discharge and had previously complained of her “tutu” hurting and bleeding. 

Nurse Annette Wendeborn testified that greenish discharge in a child L.N.’s age is uncommon and suggests a sexually transmitted disease.  She opined that the infection was caused by some kind of sexual contact.  Dr. Barry Phillips testified that L.N.’s exam revealed a green watery discharge, “mild reddish irritation,” and no “evidence of trauma.”  He does not “routinely” see discharge from a child who has never had a menstrual cycle or sexual intercourse.  L.N. could have had any number of bacterial infections and the irritation could have been caused by using the restroom, bathing, scratching, or wearing old underwear.  L.N. tested positive for gonorrhea.

Steadman tested positive for both gonorrhea and chlamydia.  He told Deputy Armando Paniagua that he touched L.N. by rubbing her sexual organ with his finger and penetrated her with his finger under her clothing.  In his statement, Steadman wrote, “I was playing with my self and got cum on my finger, I was drunk at the time I touch [L.N.] with my hand, I never did do anything other than that.”  He used gestures to show Paniagua what he did to L.N.  After writing his statement, Steadman denied doing anything to L.N. and stopped the interview.

L.N. told sexual assault nurse examiner Deborah Kleypas that Steadman put his penis on her bottom, “tutu,” and “pee pee.”  During L.N.’s exam, Kleypas and Dr. Pamela Greene observed v-shaped notches in L.N.’s hymen and posterior fourchette.  Kleypas testified that these findings are not “definitive proof of sexual abuse,” but could have resulted from abuse and were consistent with the abuse that L.N. described.

Kleypass testified that anything passing beyond the labia majora constitutes penetration of the female sexual organ, such as “rubbing up and down;” “it doesn’t necessarily have to go in the vagina to be penetration.”  Kleypas and Greene explained that penetration of a child’s sexual organ by the male sexual organ is difficult.  Greene explained that a child’s vaginal opening is so tiny that the male penis could not enter without “ripping it from the vagina all the way to the rectum.”  Kleypas testified that in probably ninety percent of sexually abused children, “something has passed the labia majora.”  The percentage is much less with regard to the frequency of vaginal penetration.  Eighty-five to ninety percent of the time there is no injury to the labia majora or labia minora.  Greene testified that seventy-five percent of exams are normal.

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Related

Watson v. State
204 S.W.3d 404 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2006)
Luna v. State
515 S.W.2d 271 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1974)
Johnson v. State
23 S.W.3d 1 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Steadman v. State
262 S.W.3d 401 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2008)
Villalon v. State
791 S.W.2d 130 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1990)
Vernon v. State
841 S.W.2d 407 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1992)
Steadman, Brunshae
280 S.W.3d 242 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2009)

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Brunshae Steadman v. State, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brunshae-steadman-v-state-texapp-2009.