Bruno v. Schaeffer

District Court, M.D. Louisiana·Decided April 29, 2020·No. 3:16-cv-00001·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. CIVIL ACTION ALBERT BRUNO and ALEX STRAHAN

VERSUS NO. 16-1-BAJ-RLB BRAD SCHAEFFER, ET AL.

ORDER

Before the Court is the Motion to Clarify, or Alternatively, to Modify Protective Order (R. Doc. 127) filed by Relators on March 5, 2020. (R. Doc. 127). The MedComp Defendants and Quantum Defendants filed separate Oppositions on March 25, 2010. (R. Docs. 128 and 129). Relators filed a Reply on April 22, 2020. (R. Doc. 134). This action was initiated as a qui tam action under the False Claims Act pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3729, et seq., by Relators on January 5, 2016. (R. Doc. 1). The United States Government declined to intervene in the action on April 25, 2018. (R. Doc. 53). The Court entered into the record the Agreed Confidentiality and Protective Order (R. Doc. 93-1) on June 13, 2019. Relators request permission from the Court to disseminate discovery documents marked confidential in this qui tam action to counsel for or agents of the United States, either through clarification or modification of the existing Agreed Confidentiality and Protective Order (R. Doc. 93). In support of this request, Relators suggest that the United States is a real party in interest in this litigation, and as a “party” it is entitled to receive such documents obtained through discovery under the terms of the protective order. (R. Doc. 127 at 4-7). In the alternative, Relators request that the protective order be modified to permit such transfer of documents to the United States. The MedComp Defendants respond that, having declined to intervene in the action, the United States is not a real party in interest entitled to civil discovery documents, and that the allowance for deposition transcripts in 31 U.S.C. § 3730 would be rendered unnecessary by such a holding. (R. Doc. 128 at 4-7). The Quantum Defendants respond in Opposition that allowing Relators to provide discovery documents to the United States would deprive Defendants of their

rights under the U.S. Constitution, that Relators have failed to establish good cause for modification of the Protective Order, and that Relators should not be permitted to “use the specter of a criminal proceeding as a litigation tactic in this civil litigation.” (R. Doc. 129 at 1). Relators argue in Reply that, in part supported by the right to approve or veto any settlement under the False Claims Act, the United States is necessarily a real party in interest entitled to discovery. (R. Doc. 134 at 4). Relators also suggest that allowing the United States to access the discovery would not erode the principle purpose of the Protective Order, which was to protect health information as required by HIPAA. (R. Doc. 134 at 4-5).1 The Protective Order in this matter was based on a stipulated agreement between the

parties. (R. Docs. 90, 93). Nothing in the record indicates how the United States was intended to be treated with respect to confidential information under the terms of that agreement. The agreement specifically states that it is between “the parties listed and signing below” (R. Doc. 90 at 1), and it is signed by counsel for the Plaintiff-Relators, the MedComp Defendants and the Quantum Defendants. (R. Doc. 90 at 6-7). The Protective Order then contains various references to the designation and handling of confidential information by the “parties.” (R. Doc. 90). The

1 While Relators suggest that the principle purpose of the Protective Order was to protect health information as required by HIPAA, the Court notes that the Protective Order, as submitted and agreed to by the parties, defines “Confidential Information as “documents and other material entitled to confidential treatment under existing statutory or jurisprudential law,” and lists as examples both trade secrets and protected health information. (R. Doc. 93-1 at 1). terms of the agreement do not include the United States as a party for purposes of the Protective Order. See U.S. ex rel Vaughn v. United Biologics, L.L.C., 907 F.3d 187, 193 (5th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “although the non-intervening government has both an independent and derivative presence in a qui tam lawsuit regardless of whether it chooses to intervene, treating the non-intervening Government as a ‘party’ is inappropriate.”)

At the same time, the Court was not asked, and did not decide, whether the United States should be precluded from receiving such confidential information – it simply was not part of any analysis or briefing by the parties. In addition, the Protective Order itself specifically provides that disclosures of confidential information may occur simply upon further order of the Court. The question, therefore, is whether the United States, in a qui tam action brought under the False Claims Act in which the United States declined to intervene, may be provided discovery documents from the Relator(s) for the express purpose of a related criminal investigation. For the reasons set forth below, the Court holds that it is so entitled and will amend the protective order in place to permit such disclosure.

In Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 156 (5th Cir. 1997), the Fifth Circuit stated that “the United States is a real party in interest even if it does not control the False Claims Act suit,” and went on to hold that the United States had the right and standing to appeal a district court’s approval of a settlement in a False Claims Act suit where it did not intervene, in part based upon its status as a real party in interest as well as the statutory provision granting the United States the power to withhold consent to voluntary settlements even where it does not intervene. Although the holding in Searcy does not concern the situation at hand here, it and the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Vaughn are instructive in setting forth the unique role of the United States in a qui tam action, even when it declines to intervene. “In this capacity, the relator stands in the place of the Government, representing its interests.” Vaughn, 907 F.3d at 192. “Even when the Government declines to intervene, it remains a distinct entity in the qui tam litigation with protected interests. This fact is established by the FCA itself, which affords the Government certain rights in the litigation regardless of its decision not to intervene.” Id. at 193 (citing

various statutory rights of the United States).2 With this framework in mind, we look to other courts that have addressed the current issue. In U.S. ex rel. Stewart v. Louisiana Clinic, 2002 WL 31819130, at *7 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 2002), like the instant matter, the issue was “whether the United States [which had declined to intervene] is entitled to receive copies of the documents produced and, if so, whether those documents should be in unredacted form and whether the United States should be prohibited from using the documents for purposes other than this litigation.” The court concluded both that the United States was entitled to receive copies of the documents produced in discovery and was entitled to those documents in unredacted form.

In so holding, the Stewart court relied on several points. First, the court noted that, even without intervening, the government retained control over certain aspects of the litigation, including the right to veto settlements, the right to intervene at a later date with good cause if beyond 60 days, certain appellate rights and access to documents, and the right to the larger share of any recovery. Id.

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