Brundage v. Deardorf

92 F. 214, 12 Ohio F. Dec. 518, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 2126
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedMarch 7, 1899
DocketNo. 596
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 92 F. 214 (Brundage v. Deardorf) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brundage v. Deardorf, 92 F. 214, 12 Ohio F. Dec. 518, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 2126 (6th Cir. 1899).

Opinion

LURTON, Circuit Judge.

This suit involves the use and control of a certain church property known as “Fairview Church,” situated in Defiance county, Ohio. This property was originally conveyed, in 1874, to three persons, and “their successors in office,” as trustees for the use of the Church of the United Brethren in Christ. The appellants, complainants below, claim to be trustees in succession to those named in the deed, and have been duly elected to their office by an annual conference having jurisdiction over the territory within which Fairview Church is situated, which is in fellowship with one of two distinct ecclesiastical divisions into which the original United Church of the United Brethren in Christ is now divided, each of such divisions claiming to be the true and only original church described in the deed. The contention of the complainants was and is that they hold the legal title to said Fairview Church in trust for the use of a local congregation which is in fellowship and association with the annual and general conferences under whose authority complainants hold office. Prior to May 13, 1889, the Church of the United Brethren in Christ was a united, single, ecclesiastical organization, governed by a system of judicatories consisting of an official board having authority in and over a particular congregation, quarterly and annual conferences having jurisdiction over the churches within a particular, territory, and a general conference, composed of representatives elected by the annual conferences, which had jurisdiction over all. A division occurred in the general conference of 1889, and a small minority withdrew from the place in which the conference was in session, and organized themselves into a general conference, and claimed to be the true and only organization having valid succession and authority as the general conference of the church. This division extended into many of the annual conferences and congregations. Those thus withdrawing were in large part a party which, in the United Church, had been known as “Radicals”; those remaining were called “Liberals”; and for the purpose of distinguishing these distinct ecclesiastical organizations, each calling themselves the Church of the United Brethren in Christ, we shall call that branch of the church to which complainants belong “Radicals,” and the branch to which defendants are attached “Liberals.” The defendants, now appellees, are the pastor in charge of Fairview Church and three trustees, all of whom hold office by due appointment under the annual and general conferences to which the Liberals adhere. The complainants are all citizens of the state of Indiana, and the defendants are all citizens of the state of Ohio, and federal jurisdiction results from this diversity of citizenship.

Complainants claim that they, and they only, are entitled to the exclusive control of said church property, and to cause it to be applied to the ecclesiastical uses and purposes to which it should be devoted as a church edifice for the use of a congregation subordinate to that division of the church under which they hold office. They pray the aid of a court of equity in preventing what they call a diversion of the property from the trusts to which it is properly devoted, and ask the injunctive process of the court to prevent the appellee who claims to be the pastor in charge from officiating therein as pastor, [216]*216and to prevent tbe other defendants from usurping'the office and functions of .trustees of said church, and from interfering or intermeddling with complainants in their official duties as the only legal trustees of said property. They claim that the remedy at law by action of ejectment is inadequate, inasmuch as they, as well as the defendants, are but trustees holding for the use of beneficiaries, whose rights can only be adequately declared and enforced through the equitable remedy of injunction. A demurrer going to the jurisdiction in equity was filed by the defendants, and, after full argument, was overruled by Taft, Circuit Judge, whose opinion is reported in 55 Fed. 839. The case made is one in which trustees may rightfully apply to a court of equity for aid and assistance. The mere fact that the legal title must be determined is not enough to defeat equitable jurisdiction. Two sets "of trustees, each claiming to be the exclusive legal trustees, are contending over the use and possession of property claimed under the same deed. The title depends upon the character of the trust. When that is declared, it is the peculiar province of a court of equity to’prevent a diversion of the property from its lawful and' proper use. The remedy by injunction to prevent a perversion of property devoted to ecclesiastical uses is peculiarly adapted to meet the necessities of the case, for trustees, whether in sympathy with the trust or adverse thereto, will be controlled and compelled to devote the property to the uses to which it was intended through the coercive power of the writ of injunction. The remedy at law, upon the facts of the case, is not adequate, and the demurrer was properly overruled.

The question at issue involves the identity of the church which is the declared beneficiary under the deed with that represented by one or the other of the contending divisions into which that church was divided in 1889. ■ The cause of that division was the adoption and promulgation of a new constitution and confession of faith by the general conference which assembled in that year at York, in Pennsylvania. The compláinants say that they, and those whom they represent, adhere to the old constitution and the old confession of faith, and thus are able to present an infallible standard by which their identity with the church as it existed at the date of the deed may be determined. They say, also, that .the defendants, and that organization for which they stand, have adopted a new and fundamentally different constitution and confession of faith by revolutionary methods, and have, therefore, no rightful claim to be organically the successor of the church formerly united under the old constitution and confession of faith. Upon these premises they contend that, where property is conveyed for the uses of a congregation as a place of worship, a trust is created which will be enforced for the purpose of maintaining that form of religious worship and profession of faith to which the property was originally devoted, and that such a trust will be enforced in favor of that part of the society adhering to and maintaining the original principles upon which it was founded, without regard to whether it be a minority of the particular congregation or a minority of the larger body, of which the congregation is but a subordinate member. It may be conceded that, if property is dedicated by will or deed of the donor for the express purpose of being held and ex[217]*217clusively used for the teaching, support, or maintenance of some specific dogma, or creed, or form of religion, and that purpose is declared by the instrument under which the property is held, a trust arises, and that a court of equity will prevent a perversion of the trust attached to its use. Fo long as there are persons or agencies within the meaning of the original dedication, and willing to carry out the uses intended to be maintained by the donor, a court of equity, upon their application, will extend its aid in executing the trust. But the deed under which Fairview Church is held is one of bargain and sale; the Church of the United Brethren in Christ being the vendee for a valuable consideration, paid by it. We have, therefore, no inquiry to make as to the purpose and intent of the donor, and no trust for a specific form of religious worship to enforce.

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Bluebook (online)
92 F. 214, 12 Ohio F. Dec. 518, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 2126, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brundage-v-deardorf-ca6-1899.