1 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 2 Sep 25, 2023 3 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 MICHAEL SCOTT BRUMBACK, an No. 1:22-cv-03093-MKD individual, and GIMME GUNS, a sole 8 proprietorship, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE AND 9 Plaintiffs, DECLARATORY RELIEF
10 v. ECF No. 20 11 ROBERT W. FERGUSON, in his official capacity as Washington State Attorney 12 General; JOHN R. BATISTE, in his official capacity as Chief of the 13 Washington State Patrol; ROBERT UDELL, in his official capacity as the 14 Sheriff for Yakima County, Washington; and JOSEPH A. BRUSIC, in his official 15 capacity as County Prosecutor for Yakima County, 16 Defendants, 17 ALLIANCE FOR GUN 18 RESPONSIBILITY,
19 Defendant-Intervenor.
20 1 Before the Court is Plaintiffs Michael Scott Brumback’s and Gimme Guns’ 2 Motion for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief. ECF No. 20. On November 23,
3 2022, the Court held a hearing on the motion. ECF No. 37. Simon Peter Serrano 4 and Austin Hatcher appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs. Kristin Beneski, R. July 5 Simpson, and Andrew W. Hughes appeared on behalf of Defendants Robert W.
6 Ferguson, in his official capacity as Washington State Attorney General, and John 7 R. Batiste, in his official capacity as the Chief of the Washington State Patrol 8 (“State Defendants”). Callie A. Castillo appeared on behalf of Defendants Joseph 9 A. Brusic, in his official capacity as Yakima County Prosecuting Attorney, and
10 Robert Udell, in his official capacity as Yakima County Sheriff (“Yakima County 11 Defendants”). Zachary J. Pekelis appeared on behalf of Defendant-Intervenor 12 Alliance for Gun Responsibility (“Alliance”).
13 Plaintiffs’ instant motion seeks a preliminary injunction enjoining 14 enforcement of Engrossed State Senate Bill 5078 (“ESSB 5078”) and its effective 15 amendments to RCW 9.41 et seq, and declaring ESSB 5078 unconstitutional. ECF 16 No. 20 at 2, 11. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Plaintiffs’
17 motion. 18 BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff Brumback is a United States citizen, resident of Washington, and
20 retired armed services member who has never been convicted of a crime. ECF No. 1 1-8 at 1-3 ¶¶ 1-7. He owns a number of different firearms. ECF No. 1-8 at 2 ¶ 2. 2 Brumback has, for many years, owned and used ten-, fifteen-, twenty-, and thirty-
3 round ammunition magazines for his firearms. ECF No. 1-8 at 10 ¶ 31. 4 Plaintiff Gimme Guns is a sole proprietorship located in Selah, Washington, 5 owned and operated by Charles Gilroy since January 2015. ECF No. 1-9 at 1-2
6 ¶¶ 2-3. Gimme Guns is a federally licensed firearms dealer. ECF No. 1-9 at 1-2 7 ¶ 2. Gimme Guns sells handguns, rifles, magazines, and other gun accessories. 8 ECF No. 1-9 at 2 ¶¶ 5-6. Gimme Guns sells on average 4,500 firearms every year. 9 ECF No. 1-9 at 2 ¶ 5.
10 On March 23, 2022, Washington Governor Jay Inslee signed ESSB 5078 11 into law. 2022 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 104, § 6. ESSB 5078 amended RCW 9.41 12 to add a new section that provides, “[n]o person in this state may manufacture,
13 import, distribute, sell, or offer for sale any large capacity magazine, except as 14 authorized in this section.” Id. § 3; RCW 9.41.370(1). A “large capacity 15 magazine” is defined as follows: 16 an ammunition feeding device with the capacity to accept more than 10 rounds of ammunition, or any conversion kit, 17 part, or combination of parts, from which such a device can be assembled if those parts are in possession of or 18 under the control of the same person, but shall not be construed to include any of the following: 19 (a) An ammunition feeding device that has been 20 permanently altered so that it cannot accommodate more than 10 rounds of ammunition; 1 (b) A 22 caliber tube ammunition feeding device; or 2 (c) A tubular magazine that is contained in a lever-action 3 firearm.
4 RCW 9.41.010(25). ESSB 5078 went into effect on July 1, 2022. 2022 Wash. 5 Sess. Laws, ch. 104 § 6. 6 Brumback avers that it is his intent and desire to purchase an ammunition 7 magazine with the capacity to hold more than ten rounds. ECF No. 1-8 at 5 ¶ 14. 8 On July 1, 2022, Brumback was refused a sale of a thirty-round rifle magazine at 9 two different gun stores. ECF No. 1-8 at 6-8 ¶¶ 23-26. On July 9, 2022, 10 Brumback went to Gimme Guns to purchase a thirty-round rifle magazine and was 11 denied. ECF No. 1-8 at 8 ¶ 27. Prior to ESSB 5078, Gimme Guns had sold, on 12 average, “a couple dozen” magazines with the capacity to hold more than ten
13 rounds every week. ECF No. 1-9 at 2 ¶ 8. Gimme Guns has denied sales of such 14 magazines since the passage of ESSB 5078. ECF No. 1-9 at 2 ¶ 9. 15 On July 14, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint for Injunctive and 16 Declaratory Relief in Yakima County Superior Court. ECF No. 1-4. On July 21,
17 2022, the State Defendants filed a Notice of Removal. ECF No. 1. On July 27, 18 2022, the State Defendants filed an Amended Notice of Removal. ECF No. 3. The 19 same day, the Alliance filed a Motion to Intervene, ECF No. 4, which the Court
20 1 granted on September 27, 2022, ECF No. 19. Plaintiffs filed the instant motion on 2 October 3, 2022. ECF No. 20.
3 LEGAL STANDARD 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a) provides for preliminary injunctions. “A preliminary 5 injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat.
6 Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted). To obtain a 7 preliminary injunction, a movant must establish “that (1) he is likely to succeed on 8 the merits of his claim, (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent the 9 preliminary injunction, (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) a
10 preliminary injunction is in the public interest.” Baird v. Bonta, No. 23-15016, 11 2023 WL 5763345, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 7, 2023) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). 12 “When . . . the nonmovant is the government, the last two Winter factors ‘merge.’”
13 Id. (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)). 14 The first factor is considered “a threshold inquiry” and “the most important 15 factor.” Id. (quoting Env’t Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Carlson, 968 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 16 2020)). “As a general matter, district courts must consider all four Winter factors,”
17 although “a court need not consider the other factors if a movant fails to show a 18 likelihood of success on the merits.” Id. (internal quotation marks, alterations, and 19 citations omitted). Further, the Ninth Circuit applies a “sliding scale” approach to
20 these factors. Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. 1 of Educ., No. 22-15827, 2023 WL 5946036, at *13 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 2023) 2 (citation omitted). “[A] stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker
3 showing of another.” Id. (citation omitted). If a plaintiff demonstrates that the 4 “balance of equities ‘tips sharply in [his] favor,’ the plaintiff must raise only 5 ‘serious questions’ on the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of success.”
6 Id. (quoting All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 7 2011)). 8 Where a plaintiff alleges a constitutional injury, “the first factor is especially 9 important.” Baird, 2023 WL 5763345, at *3. “If a plaintiff in such a case shows
10 he is likely to prevail on the merits, that showing usually demonstrates he is 11 suffering irreparable harm no matter how brief the violation.” Id. (citation 12 omitted). “And his likelihood of succeeding on the merits also tips the public
13 interest sharply in his favor because it is ‘always in the public interest to prevent 14 the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.’” Id. (quoting Riley’s Am. Heritage 15 Farms v. Elsasser, 32 F.4th 707, 731 (9th Cir. 2022)). The district court should 16 “pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary
17 remedy of injunction.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. 18 DISCUSSION 19 The question before the Court at this stage is not, as Plaintiffs assert,
20 “whether [ESSB 5078] and its effective amendments to [RCW 9.41 et seq.] 1 impairs and/or infringes upon the right of Washington citizens to keep and/or bear 2 arms.” ECF No. 20 at 2. The question before the Court is whether Plaintiffs have
3 made the requisite showing under the relevant standard. Here, the relevant 4 standard is that governing preliminary injunctions, and the relevant showing is (1) 5 a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm in the
6 absence of relief, and (3) that equity, balanced between Plaintiffs’ interests and the 7 public’s interest, favors the Plaintiffs. See Baird, 2023 WL 5763345, at *2. 8 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 9 As explained above, the first Winter factor is “the most important” and is
10 “especially important when a plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation and injury.” 11 Baird, 2023 WL 5763345, at *3. The Complaint asks the Court to declare ESSB 12 5078 unconstitutional pursuant to the Second Amendment of the United States
13 Constitution and Article I, section 24 of the Washington Constitution, and to enjoin 14 its enforcement. ECF No. 1-4 at 2. 15 1. The Second Amendment 16 “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
17 right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. 18 amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the United States Supreme Court 19 clarified that the Second Amendment right is “an individual right to keep and bear
20 arms.” 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). The Court noted that self-defense is “the central 1 component of the right” and that the right is “not unlimited.” Id. at 599, 626 2 (emphasis in original). In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held that the
3 Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state infringement of 4 this Second Amendment right. 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). 5 In N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, the Court articulated a test
6 for Second Amendment challenges to firearm regulations. 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2126 7 (2022). The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Alaniz, articulated the Bruen test as 8 follows: 9 [W]hen the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively 10 protects that conduct. To justify its regulation, . . . the government must demonstrate that the regulation is 11 consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with 12 this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second 13 Amendment’s “unqualified command.”
14 69 F.4th 1124, 1128 (2023) (quoting 142 S. Ct. at 2126); see also Baird, 2023 WL 15 5763345, at *5; Teter v. Lopez, 76 F.4th 938, 948 (9th Cir. 2023). 16 Following Bruen, courts must ask two questions when considering a Second 17 Amendment challenge. First, whether the Second Amendment’s “plain text” 18 covers the conduct targeted by regulation. Alaniz, 69 F.4th at 1128. Second, if the 19 conduct is covered, whether the government has demonstrated that the regulation 20 “is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Alaniz, 1 69 F.4th at 1128 (citing 142 S. Ct. at 2130, 2134-35). The “burdens at the 2 preliminary injunction stage track the burdens at trial.” Baird, 2023 WL 5763345,
3 at *2. Here, if Plaintiffs demonstrate that the Second Amendment’s plain text 4 covers the conduct prohibited by ESSB 5078, “the regulation will stand only if the 5 government can ‘affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the
6 historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear 7 arms’ in the United States.” Id. at *5 (quoting Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2127). 8 i. Whether the Second Amendment’s Plain Text Covers the Regulated Conduct 9 The plain text of the Second Amendment gives the Court three points of 10 inquiry to contend with: “the right of [1] the people [2] to keep and bear [3] Arms . 11 . . .” U.S. Const. amend. II; Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2134-35; Teter, 76 F.4th at 948- 12 50; Alaniz, 69 F.4th at 1128. To determine the meaning of “constitutional text,” a 13 court should “rel[y] on history.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2130. Although the meaning of 14 the Second Amendment is “historically fixed,” its protections “appl[y] to new 15 circumstances.” Id. at 2132. 16 A district court is “entitled to decide a case based on the historical record 17 compiled by the parties.” Id. at 2130 n.6. It is Plaintiffs who seek a preliminary 18 injunction. Therefore, it is Plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate the plain text of the 19 Second Amendment covers conduct prohibited by ESSB 5078. See Baird, 2023 20 WL 5763345, at *2. 1 a. The People 2 In Bruen, it was “undisputed that petitioners . . . —two ordinary, law-
3 abiding, adult citizens—are part of ‘the people’ whom the Second Amendment 4 protects.” 142 S. Ct. at 2134 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 580). Similarly here, 5 Defendants do not dispute that Brumback, the individual plaintiff, is one of “the
6 people” with a right to keep and bear arms protected the Second Amendment. See 7 ECF No. 22; ECF No. 23 at 6-7; ECF No. 32 at 10-12. 8 The State Defendants and Alliance argue that Gimme Guns’ right to sell 9 firearms is not protected under the Second Amendment. ECF No. 23 at 24
10 (“Gimme Guns’ rights as a seller are nonexistent . . . .”); ECF No. 32 at 28 (“[T]he 11 Second Amendment does not protect Gimme Guns’ ability to sell firearm 12 accessories.”). However, no party addresses whether Gimme Guns is among “the
13 people” for Second Amendment purposes.1 14
15 1 Legal persons share in certain constitutional liberties afforded to individuals. See, 16 e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010) (First Amendment); 17 Physicians’ Servs. Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Bernadino Cnty., 825 F.2d 1404, 1407 18 (9th Cir. 1987) (Fourteenth Amendment due process rights); Cal. Diversified 19 Promotions, Inc. v. Musick, 505 F.2d 278, 283 (9th Cir. 1974) (same). Legal
20 persons do not share in others, and for certain rights, their extension to legal 1 The Court need not resolve the question, here, because in Washington, “[a] 2 sole proprietorship does not have legal standing to sue or be sued in its own right.”
3 Dolby v. Worthy, 173 P.3d 946, 947 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). Federal courts apply 4 state law to determine whether a sole proprietorship is a separate legal entity. See 5 Bowerman v. Field Asset Servs., Inc., 60 F.4th 459, 473 (9th Cir. 2023). “A sole
6 proprietorship is legally indistinguishable from its owner.” Mikolajczak v. Mann, 7 406 P.3d 670, 673 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). Gilroy, in his affidavit, identifies 8 Gimme Guns as a sole proprietorship. ECF No. 1-9 at 1 ¶ 2. Although the State 9 Defendants refer to Gimme Guns as an LLC in their brief, there is no evidence in
10 the record disputing Gilroy’s assertion. See ECF No. 23 at 3. 11 The Court construes the Complaint as asserting Gilroy’s rights, rather than 12 asserting the rights of Gimme Guns as a legal person. Insofar as the Second
14 persons is circumstantially attenuated. See, e.g., W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. 15 of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648, 656 (1981) (noting “the Privileges and 16 Immunities Clause is inapplicable to corporations”); Braswell v. United States, 487 17 U.S. 99, 109-10 (1988) (holding that neither a corporation nor its representatives 18 have a Fifth Amendment privilege); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 19 U.S. 356, 364 (1973) (holding that holding corporations, but not individuals, liable
20 for ad valorem taxes did not “transcend the requirements of equal protection”). 1 Amendment concerns Gilroy, the Court is satisfied that he is an “ordinary, law- 2 abiding, adult citizen” and is “part of ‘the people’ whom the Second Amendment
3 protects.” See Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2134. 4 b. To Keep and Bear 5 ESSB 5078 declared that “[n]o person in this state may manufacture, import,
6 distribute, sell, or offer for sale any large capacity magazine, except as authorized 7 in this section.” RCW 9.41.370(1). The section authorizes sales to the armed 8 forces, the state, law enforcement, or out-of-state persons. RCW 9.41.370(2). 9 Plaintiffs acknowledge that ESSB 5078 does not prohibit mere ownership or
10 possession. ECF No. 20 at 17. Plaintiffs invoke the body of pre-Bruen case law 11 tying the right to keep and bear arms to a right to procure them. ECF No. 20 at 17, 12 24-26; ECF No. 34 at 5-6, 13.
13 In one such pre-Bruen case, the Ninth Circuit explained that “the core 14 Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense ‘wouldn’t mean 15 much’ without the ability to acquire arms.” Teixeira v. Cnty. of Alameda, 873 F.3d 16 670, 677 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 704 (7th
17 Cir. 2011)). More broadly, “the Second Amendment protects ancillary rights 18 necessary to the realization of the core right to possess a firearm for self-defense.” 19 Id. The Ninth Circuit previously presumed that “the right to possess a firearm
20 includes the right to purchase one.” Jones v. Bonta, 34 F.4th 704, 715-16 (9th Cir. 1 2022) vacated and remanded, 47 F.4th 1124 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). 2 The Ninth Circuit has separately explained that “the Second Amendment does not
3 independently protect a proprietor’s right to sell firearms.” Teixeira, 873 F.3d at 4 690. 5 It appears facially true and supported by pre-Bruen Ninth Circuit case law
6 that, should the Second Amendment right protect citizens’ ability to keep and bear 7 large capacity magazines, the right extends to the ability to buy, import, and sell 8 them in Washington. See Luis v. United States, 578 U.S. 5, 26 (2016) 9 (“Constitutional rights thus implicitly protect those closely related acts necessary
10 to their exercise.”) (Thomas, J., concurring). Indeed, the State Defendants and 11 Alliance do not spend much of their briefs disputing the conclusion. They advance 12 arguments on this point only to dispute that Plaintiffs’ showing of harm
13 necessitates a preliminary injunction. See ECF No. 23 at 23-24; ECF No. 32 at 26- 14 28. 15 But given the lack of post-Bruen authority, and Bruen’s instruction that a 16 court must interpret the text of the Second Amendment through the lens of history,
17 the Court must insist upon a historical record demonstrating that the Second 18 Amendment right to the manufacture, import, distribute, sell, or offer for sale of 19 arms. 142 S. Ct. at 2130. The current record lacks such evidence; therefore, the
20 Court cannot reach a conclusion on the subject. As the burden belongs to the 1 Plaintiffs, the Court must find that the insufficiency of evidence and authority 2 weighs against a preliminary injunction. At a future trial on the merits, a sufficient
3 demonstration as to the intent of the Framers of the Second Amendment, rooted in 4 history, may warrant a contrary finding. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2130 n.6 (a court is 5 “entitled to decide a case based on the historical record compiled by the parties.”).
6 c. Arms 7 The weapon, or part of a weapon, at issue in this case is “an ammunition 8 feeding device with the capacity to accept more than 10 rounds of ammunition,” 9 including conversion kits or modifications made to enable capacity in excess of ten
10 rounds while excluding tubular ammunition feeding devices. RCW 9.41.010(25). 11 The question presented is whether the Second Amendment right was meant to 12 encompass magazines that can carry more than ten rounds.
13 There is little authority post-Bruen as to which modern instruments 14 constitute “arms” for Second Amendment purposes. It is well-established that 15 handguns, the target of regulation in Heller, 554 U.S. at 628, McDonald, 561 U.S. 16 at 750, and Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2122, are well within the ambit of the Second
17 Amendment right. The Supreme Court heavily implied in Caetano v. 18 Massachusetts that stun guns are covered as well. 577 U.S. 411, 411-12 (2016) 19 (per curiam). The only post-Bruen Ninth Circuit opinion concerning the definition
20 of “arms,” so far, is Teter, 76 F.4th at 948-49. In Teter, the Ninth Circuit found 1 that “bladed weapons facially constitute ‘arms’ within the meaning of the Second 2 Amendment.” Id. at 949.
3 In a pre-Bruen opinion,2 the Ninth Circuit found that the Northern District of 4 California “did not clearly err in finding, based on the record before it, that a 5 regulation restricting possession of certain types of magazines burdens conduct
6 falling within the scope of the Second Amendment.” Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 7
8 2 Before Bruen, the Ninth Circuit’s test for Second Amendment challenges first 9 asked “whether the challenged law burdens conduct protected by the Second 10 Amendment,” then sought to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to review 11 the challenged regulation. See Jones v. Bonta, 34 F.4th 704, 714 (9th Cir. 2022), 12 vacated and remanded, 47 F.4th 1124 (9th Cir. 2022). The Bruen Court referred to
13 this first step as “broadly consistent with Heller.” 142 S. Ct. at 2127. Although 14 “broadly consistent,” the Ninth Circuit in Alaniz did not precisely retain the first 15 step of its pre-Bruen test and instead found that Bruen demanded “a textual 16 analysis” as part of the initial showing of whether the Second Amendment
17 concerns the given conduct. 69 F.4th at 1128. The Court, here, cites to pre-Bruen 18 cases as informative of whether the Ninth Circuit may consider certain pieces of 19 machinery as “arms” for Second Amendment purposes, but it is unclear whether
20 the Ninth Circuit will reach the same conclusions post-Bruen. 1 779 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2015). The magazines at issue in Fyock were also 2 those capable of accepting more than ten rounds. Id. at 994-95. The Ninth Circuit
3 again considered a ban of magazines capable of accepting more than ten rounds in 4 a November 2021 opinion, which has since been vacated by the Supreme Court in 5 light of Bruen and remanded to the Southern District of California. See Duncan v.
6 Bonta, 19 F.4th 1087, 1098 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) vacated and remanded, 49 7 F.4th 1228 (9th Cir. 2022). In Duncan, the Ninth Circuit “assum[ed], without 8 deciding, that [the large capacity magazine ban] implicates the Second 9 Amendment.” 19 F.4th at 1103.3 The Ninth Circuit had elsewhere found that
10 “without bullets, the right to bear arms would be meaningless. A regulation 11 eliminating a person’s ability to obtain or use ammunition could thereby make it 12 impossible to use firearms for their core purpose.” Jackson v. City & County of
13 San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 967 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated by Alaniz, 69 F.4th at 14 1127-28. 15 With no higher court having decided that large capacity magazines are or are 16 not “arms,” the Court must discern an analytical framework to answer the question.
18 3 The Southern District of California, on remand, granted an injunction against 19 California’s large capacity magazine ban. ECF No. 149, Duncan v. Bonta, No. 17- 20 CV-01017-BEN (S.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2023). 1 To begin, it is clear that the heart of the analysis is whether the instrument is a 2 “weapon[] of offence, or armour of defence,” or “any thing that a man wears for
3 his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.” 4 Heller, 554 U.S. at 581 (citing 18th-century dictionaries). The Second 5 Amendment “extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms,
6 even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.” Bruen, 142 S. 7 Ct. at 2132 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582). 8 The State Defendants and the Alliance urge the Court to find that large 9 capacity magazines fall outside of the Second Amendment’s plain text because
10 they are “military-style weapons,” ECF No. 23 at 9, and “dangerous and unusual,” 11 ECF No. 32 at 18. After submission of the parties’ briefs, the Ninth Circuit, in 12 Teter, squarely rejected that argument. See 76 F.4th at 949-50. Interpreting
13 Heller, the court explained that “it is irrelevant whether the particular type of 14 firearm at issue has military value[.]” Id. at 949 (citing 554 U.S. at 581). Nor does 15 a weapon’s purported association with criminality render it outside of the 16 definition of “arms.” Id. The Ninth Circuit found that Heller “did not say that
17 dangerous and unusual weapons are not arms.” Id. at 950. Rather, “the historical 18 tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons” should be 19 considered during Bruen step two, with the burden on the government to
20 demonstrate that the target of regulation is dangerous or unusual. Id. 1 The State Defendants and the Alliance also argue that large capacity 2 magazines are not commonly used for self-defense and therefore are not covered
3 by the Second Amendment. ECF No. 23 at 3, 14; ECF No 32 at 16. Case law 4 suggests that commonality and self-defense matter, to some degree, for Bruen step 5 one. The Bruen Court explained that “the Second Amendment’s definition of
6 ‘arms’ is fixed according to its historical understanding,” but “that general 7 definition covers modern instruments that facilitate armed self-defense.” 142 S. 8 Ct. at 2132 (citing Caetano, 577 U.S. at 411-12). Further, the Bruen Court, 9 applying the standard it created for the first time, noted in step one that that
10 handguns are “weapons ‘in common use’ today for self-defense.” Id. at 2134. The 11 Alaniz court quoted that language when articulating Bruen step one. 69 F.4th at 12 1128. The Teter court concluded that bladed weapons were “arms” after
13 consulting a 1774 dictionary definition, but also found no genuine dispute of 14 material fact that butterfly knives are commonly owned for lawful purposes 15 including self-defense, before moving on to Bruen step two.4 76 F.4th at 949-50. 16
17 4 Although the Teter court appeared to place the burden of this common-use-for- 18 self-defense inquiry onto the government, it is perhaps instructive that the Ninth 19 Circuit addressed the question as part of Bruen step one, before moving on to
20 Bruen step two. 76 F.4th at 950. 1 Justice Alito’s concurrence in Caetano, joined by Bruen’s eventual author 2 Justice Thomas, explained that “the pertinent Second Amendment inquiry is
3 whether [the weapon is] commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful 4 purposes today.” 577 U.S. at 420 (emphasis in original). Justice Alito explained 5 that the stun gun was within the Second Amendment right because hundreds of
6 thousands of them have been sold to private citizens, and they “are widely owned 7 and accepted as a legitimate means of self-defense across the country.” Id. 8 Heller further indicates that the Second Amendment’s reference to “arms” is 9 not entirely divorced from common use or self-defense. The Heller Court
10 explained that an earlier decision, United States v. Miller, stood for the proposition 11 that “the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically 12 possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled
13 shotguns.” 554 U.S. at 625 (citing 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). That proposition 14 was “in ‘accord[ance] with the historical understanding of the scope of the 15 right[.]’” Id. The Court explained that “the sorts of weapons protected were those 16 ‘in common use at the time.’” 554 U.S. at 627 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179).
17 Heller explains that handguns fall within the Second Amendment’s protection 18 because they “are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense 19 in the home . . . .” Id. at 629. Two years later in McDonald, the Court reaffirmed
20 1 that “individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second Amendment 2 right.” 561 U.S. at 767 (emphasis in original).
3 These difficult and unsettled questions of law aside, Plaintiffs fail to 4 demonstrate their likelihood of success on the merits for a far simpler reason. A 5 magazine is a part of a firearm, rather than a “weapon[] of offence, or armour of
6 defence,” or a “thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or 7 useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.” See Heller, 554 U.S. at 581. On its 8 own, it cannot be used to attack or defend; a magazine with increased capacity 9 simply reduces the frequency of reloads required when discharging a firearm. See
10 ECF No. 35 at 7-8 ¶¶ 30-38; ECF No. 26 at 3-4 ¶¶ 7-13; ECF No. 27 at 12 ¶¶ 13- 11 14; ECF No. 33 at 4 ¶ 8. 12 Other district courts that have confronted this question are split. Compare
13 Or. Firearms Fed’n v. Kotek, No. 2:22-CV-1085-IM, 2023 WL 4541027, at *25- 14 26 (D. Or. July 14, 2023) (concluding that large capacity magazines “are not 15 ‘bearable arms’ as that term is used in Second Amendment jurisprudence”) and 16 Ocean State Tactical, LLC v. Rhode Island, No. 22-CV-246 JJM-PAS, 2022 WL
17 17721175, at *13 (D.R.I. Dec. 14, 2022) (holding that plaintiffs “failed to meet 18 their burden of establishing that [large capacity magazines] are “Arms” within the 19 textual meaning of the Second Amendment”) with ECF No. 149, Duncan v. Bonta,
20 No. 17-CV- 1017-BEN, at *20 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2023) (concluding that “a 1 magazine falls within the meaning of ‘arms’”), Hanson v. District of Columbia, 2 No. 22-2256 (RC), 2023 WL 3019777, at *6-7 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2023) (“[large
3 capacity magazines] are ‘arms’ within the meaning of the Second Amendment[,]” 4 and collecting pre-Bruen cases reaching the same conclusion), and Barnett v. 5 Raoul, No. 3:23-CV-209-SPM, 2023 WL 3160285, at *8 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2023)
6 (“magazines are ‘arms’ as used in the plain text of the Second Amendment.”). 7 Those decisions are not binding, and as the Supreme Court has instructed, 8 this Court is “entitled to decide a case based on the historical record compiled by 9 the parties.” See Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2130 n.6. “The principle of party
10 presentation . . . requires the court to rely on the parties to frame the issues for 11 decision.” Baird, 2023 WL 5763345, at *3 (quotation and citation omitted). It 12 remains Plaintiffs’ burden to establish that the weapon at issue falls within the
13 Second Amendment’s purview. See Baird, 2023 WL 5763345, at *5. Plaintiffs 14 have offered insufficient evidence suggesting that the text of the Second 15 Amendment was meant to include large capacity magazines. 16 Plaintiffs’ evidentiary submissions to date are (1) Brumback’s Declaration,
17 ECF No. 1-8; (2) Gilroy’s Affidavit, ECF No. 1-9; and (3) the affidavit of William 18 McKnight, an expert on Use of Force, ECF No. 35. 19 Brumback’s Declaration offers little more than conclusory assertions that
20 large capacity magazines fall within the right to bear arms. See, e.g., ECF No. 1-8 1 at 4 ¶ 11, 5 ¶¶ 14-15, 10-12 ¶¶ 33-37. Brumback offers that he is “familiar with 2 the types and general prevalence of firearms and their accessories in common use
3 within the United States and with the US Population in general” due to his personal 4 experience living in various states as a civilian and in the military. ECF No. 1-8 at 5 23 ¶ 62. As he explains:
6 the United States has over 400 million firearms, with about 20 million of those being AR-15’s. At least 150 million 7 pistol and rifle ammunition magazines exist that can hold over 10 rounds of ammunition. That data confirms that 8 semiauto[matic] rifles like the AR-15 and magazines over 10 rounds are in “common use” in the US, including 9 Washington state.
10 ECF No. 1-8 at 26-27 ¶ 72 (footnotes omitted). His source for these datapoints is 11 an internet article from a website called “www.guns.com.” ECF No. 1-8 at 26 ¶ 72 12 n.5. 13 Gilroy’s Affidavit explains that he is the proprietor of Gimme Guns, a 14 firearms store, and that he has often sold large capacity magazines and has a right 15 to do so. See ECF No. 1-9. 16 McKnight’s Affidavit explains the mechanics of firearms, physiological 17 reactions in self-defense scenarios, and opines that a limit on magazine capacity 18 limits an individual’s ability to defend themselves. See ECF No. 35. While 19 McKnight avers that large capacity magazines are used to enhance the self-defense 20 capacity of firearms, he does not assist the Court in determining whether 1 magazines are “arms” according to the Framers of the Second and Fourteenth 2 Amendments.
3 Plaintiffs assert in their brief that “[t]hese magazines have been legal since 4 our nation and state’s founding and have been in common use for a century or 5 more.” ECF No. 20 at 4. In support, Plaintiffs point to a number of internet
6 articles, including a Wikipedia page, which purport to offer facts on the history of 7 firearm magazines. ECF No. 20 at 4-5 nn.4-12. 8 The Court “is not strictly bound by all rules of evidence” when considering a 9 preliminary injunction. Ticketmaster LLC v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d
10 1096, 1103 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2007). Rather, evidentiary standards are relaxed to 11 accommodate “[t]he urgency of obtaining a preliminary injunction” which 12 “necessitates a prompt determination and makes it difficult to obtain affidavits
13 from persons who would be competent to testify at trial.” Flynt Distrib. Co., Inc. 14 v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984). “The trial court may give even 15 inadmissible evidence some weight, when to do so serves the purpose of 16 preventing irreparable harm before trial.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Republic
17 of Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1363 (9th Cir. 1988) (“It was within the 18 discretion of the district court to accept this hearsay for purposes of deciding 19 whether to issue the preliminary injunction.”). However, the Court declines to
20 consider the internet articles as substantive evidence. The untested hearsay articles 1 purport to offer historical facts and analysis without any basis for the Court to vet 2 the accuracy of the assertions made within.
3 The injunctive relief that Plaintiffs seek is significant. They ask “for the 4 entry of an Order enjoining Defendants from enforcing ESSB 5078 . . . and 5 declaring the same to be unconstitutional . . . .” ECF No. 20 at 11. ESSB 5078 is
6 the product of the democratically elected Washington legislature. If the Court is to 7 declare ESSB 5078 unconstitutional, it will not do so lightly. Injunctive relief is 8 “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the 9 plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (citation omitted). The
10 Court will not reduce the evidentiary rigor required for an injunction such that 11 Plaintiffs may obtain one here by citing to articles found on the internet, without 12 explaining their academic and scientific worth, or historic accuracy.
13 Further, Plaintiffs may not simply rely upon pre-Bruen case law to prove 14 their case. See ECF No. 34 at 10-11 (citing cases from 2011 to 2017). While such 15 authority may be of some persuasion, Bruen explicitly rejected the test applied by 16 the circuit courts following Heller. See Alaniz, 69 F.4th at 1128. The gravity of
17 the relief requested, and the uncertainty of prior authority in Bruen’s wake, 18 demands a renewed analysis that rests upon a reliable evidentiary showing. The 19 Court must insist that there be a historical record in order to make a determination
20 on the meaning of the word “arms” as used in the Second Amendment. 1 Specifically, whether “arms” includes magazines, or large capacity magazines. See 2 142 S. Ct. at 2130 n.6.
3 At present, the evidence in the record is insufficient to establish that 4 Plaintiffs are likely to prove that large capacity magazines fall within the Second 5 Amendment right. The instant decision is primarily the result of Plaintiffs’
6 insufficient evidentiary showing, and should not be read to preclude a contrary 7 finding at a trial on the merits.5 It is pertinent to note, however, that no party, at 8 this stage, has demonstrated a historical record adequately supporting their 9 respective positions on the question of whether the Second Amendment covers
10 large capacity magazines.6 11
12 5 Similarly, the Court requires reliable evidence to find that large capacity 13 magazines are “in common use today for self-defense.” Alaniz, 69 F.4th at 1128. 14 Plaintiffs attempt to demonstrate the commonality of large capacity magazines for 15 self-defense with tenuous evidence and citations to pre-Bruen authority. ECF No. 16 20 at 4; ECF No. 34 at 10-11. As discussed above, it remains unclear whether this
17 finding is a factor in the Bruen test, at step one or two. However, the current state 18 of authority suggests that it is at least worthwhile to consider. 19 6 The State Defendants, for their part, have attempted to submit a historical record.
20 See ECF Nos. 28, 29, 30. However, their history experts have unanimously 1 Having found that Plaintiffs have not met their burden, the Court declines to 2 continue to Bruen step two, “at which the ‘government must then justify its
3 regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical 4 tradition of firearm regulation.’” Alaniz, 69 F.4th at 1128 (quoting Bruen, 142 S. 5 Ct. at 2130).
6 7
8 concluded that more time is needed to render expert reports. ECF No. 28 at 3 ¶ 5, 9 4 ¶ 8 (explaining that “[i]t will take some time for me to translate the information 10 from the photos into usable data for this case” and that “[m]y work is not done”); 11 ECF No. 29 at 15 ¶ 21 (“The account above summarizes my initial opinion in this 12 case. However, these are areas that I seek to explore in greater detail.”); ECF No.
13 30 at 10 ¶ 12 (explaining that “it will take six to nine months to delve deeply 14 enough into the areas outlined above to formulate an expert report”). The 15 proposed reports would apparently address the question of whether there is a 16 historical analogue for ESSB 5078. See, e.g., ECF No. 28 at 5 ¶ 9. The Court
17 would also require historical support to find that the Second Amendment did not 18 refer to large capacity magazines when it codified a pre-existing right to keep and 19 bear arms, should the State Defendants and the Alliance advance the same
20 argument at a trial on the merits. 1 2. The Washington Constitution 2 Article I, section 24 of the Washington State Constitution provides as
3 follows: 4 The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or the state, shall not be impaired, but nothing 5 in this section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain or employ an armed 6 body of men.
7 Although repeatedly citing to it, Plaintiffs’ motion largely treats the Washington 8 Constitution as an afterthought to its federal counterpart. See, e.g., ECF No. 20 at 9 6, 23. Plaintiffs argue, without explanation, that the Washington Constitution is 10 modified by the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence. ECF No. 20 11 at 26 (“With the standard set forth in Bruen, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis will be 12 modified to review Second Amendment cases . . . this will be true, too, for the 13 Washington Supreme Court in analyzing the question under the Washington 14 Constitution . . . .”). Plaintiffs’ argument runs contrary to unambiguous 15 Washington Supreme Court authority. See State v. Jorgenson, 312 P.3d 960, 963 16 (Wash. 2013) (en banc) (“[T]he state and federal rights to bear arms have different
17 contours and mandate separate interpretation.”). Plaintiffs argue, without citing to 18 a single decision of a Washington court, that “inherent in the Washington 19 constitution is the right to defend oneself” and that this statement “clearly grant[s]
20 1 individual rights to possess, purchase, and sell high capacity magazines without 2 government interference.” ECF No. 20 at 23.
3 Washington courts “presume that statutes are constitutional and place the 4 burden to show unconstitutionality on the challenger.” City of Seattle v. Evans, 5 366 P.3d 906, 909 (Wash. 2015) (quotations and alterations omitted). The
6 Washington Supreme Court has “long held that the firearm rights guaranteed by 7 the Washington Constitution are subject to reasonable regulation pursuant to the 8 State’s police power.” Jorgenson, 312 P.3d at 964. 9 In fact, the Washington Supreme Court has expressly distinguished the
10 Washington Constitution from Heller’s analysis: “[W]hile Heller rejected the use 11 of a “freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach” to determine the scope of Second 12 Amendment rights, we read the Washington Constitution’s provisions
13 independently of the Second Amendment . . . .” 312 P.3d at 964 (citations 14 omitted). In contrast to the Bruen test, a Washington court considering a challenge 15 under the Washington constitution must first consider whether a regulation is 16 “reasonably necessary to protect public safety or welfare, and substantially related
17 to legitimate ends sought,” then “balance the public benefit from the regulation 18 against the degree to which it frustrates the purpose of the constitutional 19 provision.” Id. (citations omitted).
20 1 Given the lack of briefing on article I, section 24, the Court finds it would be 2 inappropriate to issue a preliminary injunction at this stage. It is Plaintiffs’ burden
3 to establish that ESSB 5078 violates the Washington Constitution. See Evans, 366 4 P.3d at 909. Plaintiffs failed to engage with the relevant standard for challenges 5 under to article I, section 24. To grant Plaintiffs’ requested relief at this stage
6 would amount to a sua sponte injunction on a scant record. The Court declines to 7 do so. 8 B. The Remaining Preliminary Injunction Factors 9 As explained above, the movant’s likelihood of success on the merits is “a
10 threshold inquiry” and “the most important factor,” such that “a court need not 11 consider the other factors if a movant fails to” show it. Baird, 2023 WL 5763345, 12 at *2. But, the Ninth Circuit applies a “sliding scale” approach to these factors,
13 “such ‘that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of 14 another.’” Fellowship of Christian Athletes, 2023 WL 5946036, at *13. If a 15 plaintiff demonstrates that the “balance of equities tips sharply in [his or her] favor, 16 the plaintiff must raise only ‘serious questions’ on the merits—a lesser showing
17 than likelihood of success.” Id. (quoting All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 18 1135). 19 Although Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they are likely to succeed on
20 the merits, their claim plainly raises “serious questions” as to ESSB 5078’s 1 constitutionality, particularly in light of the uncertainty of Second Amendment 2 jurisprudence following Bruen. See id. Still, the balance of the equities does not
3 favor a preliminary injunction. 4 First, to consider Plaintiffs’ harm, “even a brief deprivation of a 5 constitutional right causes irreparable injury.” Baird, 2023 WL 5763345, at *8;
6 see also Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012). The Second 7 Amendment right is not “a second-class right.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2156 (citing 8 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 780) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, 9 Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment right is not so clearly infringed during the pendency
10 of this litigation to warrant the “extraordinary relief” of a preliminary injunction. 11 See Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. As the State Defendants and the Alliance highlight, 12 ESSB 5078 does not prohibit possession or use of large capacity magazines
13 already owned. ECF No. 23 at 23; ECF No. 32 at 26. Gilroy may be prohibited 14 from selling his existing inventory of large capacity magazines, but “monetary 15 injury is not normally considered irreparable.” Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum 16 Comm’n. v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1980).
17 On the other side of the balance, “[a]ny time a State is enjoined by a court 18 from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form 19 of irreparable injury.” Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (quotations
20 omitted) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers). ESSB 5078 was passed in response to gun 1 violence in Washington. See 2022 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 104, § 1. The 2 Washington Legislature found that large capacity magazines have been used in
3 each of the deadliest mass shooting events since 2009, increase fatalities and 4 injuries in such events, and are frequently employed in the commission of serious 5 violent crimes. Id. The Washington Legislature explained that ESSB 5078 was
6 aimed at reducing gun-related deaths and injuries. Id. Indeed, the State 7 Defendants and the Alliance offer evidence indicating that large capacity 8 magazines are often used to further crime and violence. ECF No. 23 at 12-14; ECF 9 No. 32 at 18-19.
10 Although the import of this evidence to constitutional analysis is in doubt 11 under controlling authority, the Court must consider “the public consequences in 12 employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. The
13 evidence offered by the State Defendants and the Alliance supports the denial of an 14 injunction at this stage of litigation. 15 CONCLUSION 16 For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a
17 likelihood of success on the merits, and a balance of the equities disfavors a 18 preliminary injunction while this litigation is pending. Plaintiffs’ Motion for 19 Injunctive and Declaratory Relief is denied.
20 1 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 2 1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, ECF No. 20,
3 is DENIED. 4 2. The parties shall, on or before October 13 2023, file a joint status 5 report including a proposed schedule for the remainder of this case and, if in
6 dispute, the parties’ respective positions on a proposed schedule. The parties shall 7 confer with each other and the Courtroom Deputy, at 8 Cora Vargas@waed.uscourts.gov, to find a mutually agreeable date for a 9 scheduling conference.
10 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to 11 file this order and provide copies to the parties. 12 DATED September 25, 2023.
13 s/Mary K. Dimke MARY K. DIMKE 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19