Brumbach v. Commissioner
Opinion
MEMORANDUM FINDING OF FACT AND OPINION
PETERSON,
Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioners' 1982 Federal income tax in the amount of $ 5,986.00. After a concession by petitioners, the sole issue is whether petitioners are entitled to an investment credit in excess of the amount allowed by respondent.
This case was submitted without trial pursuant to Rule 122. The j oint stipulation of facts and attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference.
Petitioners, husband and wife, were residents of Twin Falls, Idaho at the time they filed their petition in this case.
On October 15, 1982, petitioners entered into a Dairy Cow Management Contract with Idaho Livestock Leasing Services, Inc. (Idaho). The contract stated that petitioners wished to conduct a business of owning and leasing dairy cows. The contract provided that Idaho, as*449 attorney-in-fact of petitioners, would act as petitioners' agent in carrying on their cattle leasing activity. Apparently, Idaho performed all management functions of the business. During 1982 petitioners purchased at least 47 cattle. Petitioners claim that the total cost of the 47 cattle, including a 10 percent commission to Idaho for each purchase, was $ 48,653. Between December 10, 1982, and December 31, 1982, petitioners leased the 47 cattle to 3 different parties in 7 separate lease agreements. The term of each lease was 4 years. On their 1982 Federal income tax return petitioners claimed an investment credit in the amount of $ 4,865 for the purchase of cattle.
Respondent disallowed the credit on the ground that the leased cattle did not qualify for the credit since the 4 year term of the lease was in excess of 50 percent of the 7 year useful life of the property as provided for in section 46(e)(3)(B). Petitioners do not dispute respondent's application of the law, but argue that the cattle had a useful life of 8.5 years, thus meeting the requirement of the statute that the term of the lease be less than 50 percent of the useful life.
Petitioners contend that
Section 46(e)(3) provides that the useful life of section 168 recovery property is the present class life determined under section 168(g)(2). Recovery property is defined as tangible personal property subject to an allowance for depreciation that is used in a trade or business. Sec. 168(c)(1)(A). Section 168(g)(2) defines present class life as the class life applicable under Section 167(m). Section 167(m)(1) states that class lives are to be prescribed by the Secretary.
Asset guideline periods were established in
Additionally, petitioners claim that
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1987 T.C. Memo. 450 (Brumbach v. Commissioner) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.