Bruder v. Wolpert

Supreme Court of Minnesota

Bruder v. Wolpert

227 N.W. 46, 178 Minn. 330, 1929 Minn. LEXIS 1179

CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota

DecidedOctober 18, 1929

DocketNo. 27,502.

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 227 N.W. 46 (Bruder v. Wolpert) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bruder v. Wolpert, 227 N.W. 46, 178 Minn. 330, 1929 Minn. LEXIS 1179 (Mich. 1929).

Pincite

Opinion

Stone, J.

After a directed verdict for defendant, plaintiff appeals from the order denying her motion for a new trial.

The action is for rent claimed to have accrued under an oral lease of a residence. It did not appear from the complaint that the alleged'lease was for more than one year. The evidence for plaintiff is that in August of 1927 the parties made an oral agreement that defendant “was to rent the property” until September 6, 1928, when plaintiff expected to lose title by reason of the expiration of the year of redemption from a foreclosure and her failure to redeem. Defendant denies that agreement and defended upon the ground, as stated in his answer, that he “was a tenant at will of said premises from June 1, 1927, to and including November 30, 1927;” that on October 31 of that year he “served notice in writing that he would vacate said premises and terminate his tenancy at Avill” on November 30, 1927; and that he did vacate accordingly. Plaintiff admits the payment of rent for the period of his actual occupancy.

*331 The record does not disclose precisely the ground upon which the motion for a directed verdict was granted. It is sought to be sustained here for the reason, among others, that the alleged oral lease, being for a term of more than one year, is within our statute of frauds [G. S. 1923 (2 Mason, 1927) §§ 8459, 8460] and therefore void. That position is unassailable, and on that ground alone the verdict for defendant was rightly directed.

Our statute is not construed as one prescribing a mere rule of evidence but rather as precluding the substantive right of action upon an oral contract within it. Therefore this defendant, having by answer denied the making of the contract set up in the complaint, properly invoked the statute although he did not plead it. Hanson v. Marion, 128 Minn. 468, 151 N. W. 195; Bean v. Lamprey, 82 Minn. 320, 84 N. W. 1016.

Order affirmed.

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Stone, J.

After a directed verdict for defendant, plaintiff appeals from the order denying her motion for a new trial.

The action is for rent claimed to have accrued under an oral lease of a residence. It did not appear from the complaint that the alleged'lease was for more than one year. The evidence for plaintiff is that in August of 1927 the parties made an oral agreement that defendant “was to rent the property” until September 6, 1928, when plaintiff expected to lose title by reason of the expiration of the year of redemption from a foreclosure and her failure to redeem. Defendant denies that agreement and defended upon the ground, as stated in his answer, that he “was a tenant at will of said premises from June 1, 1927, to and including November 30, 1927;” that on October 31 of that year he “served notice in writing that he would vacate said premises and terminate his tenancy at Avill” on November 30, 1927; and that he did vacate accordingly. Plaintiff admits the payment of rent for the period of his actual occupancy.

*331 The record does not disclose precisely the ground upon which the motion for a directed verdict was granted. It is sought to be sustained here for the reason, among others, that the alleged oral lease, being for a term of more than one year, is within our statute of frauds [G. S. 1923 (2 Mason, 1927) §§ 8459, 8460] and therefore void. That position is unassailable, and on that ground alone the verdict for defendant was rightly directed.

Our statute is not construed as one prescribing a mere rule of evidence but rather as precluding the substantive right of action upon an oral contract within it. Therefore this defendant, having by answer denied the making of the contract set up in the complaint, properly invoked the statute although he did not plead it. Hanson v. Marion, 128 Minn. 468, 151 N. W. 195; Bean v. Lamprey, 82 Minn. 320, 84 N. W. 1016.

Order affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

227 N.W. 46, 178 Minn. 330, 1929 Minn. LEXIS 1179, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bruder-v-wolpert-minn-1929.

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