Bruce Wayne Houser v. Bonnie Young

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: March 18, 2010
• Docket: 01-09-00343-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued March 18, 2010

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-09-00343-CV

__________

BRUCE WAYNE HOUSER, Appellant

V.

BONNIE YOUNG, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 172nd District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. E174,330

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Appellant, Bruce Wayne Houser, who is incarcerated and represents himself pro se, contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his lawsuit against appellee, Bonnie Young, and the other defendants below on the ground that he failed to comply with the requirements of Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

          We affirm.

Background

          In his petition, Houser names Anita Breaux, Dennis Hall, Thomas Cordle, Rodney Graves, Wesley Freeman, Bonnie Young, Kelli Ward, and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) as defendants. Houser alleges that in 2004, after he “reposted” a motion to reinstate in another unrelated lawsuit that he had filed, TDCJ officials threatened his “life, safety, and property.” After these threats, he was subsequently strip searched, forcefully removed from his cell, and then placed in a “strip cell,” where he was denied his eyeglasses, basic hygiene equipment, and medications. Houser’s personal items were confiscated, and he sustained personal injuries. Houser complains that he continued to suffer wrongful retaliation from the defendants who were involved in an “illegal criminal conspiracy.” Within his petition, Houser included an “affidavit relating to previous filings,” in which he listed three other lawsuits that he had previously filed.

          In her motion to dismiss Houser’s lawsuit, Young argued that the trial court should dismiss Houser’s lawsuit because he had failed to file an affidavit related to previous filings, file certified copies of his inmate trust account, and show that he had exhausted his administrative remedies. Young also argued that the trial court should dismiss Houser’s lawsuit because it was frivolous or malicious.

          After reviewing the pleadings and Young’s motion to dismiss, the trial court signed an order granting Young’s motion on the ground that Houser’s lawsuit is frivolous.    

Standard of Review

          We generally review a trial court’s dismissal of an inmate’s suit under Chapter 14 for abuse of discretion. See Wilson v. TDCJ-ID, 268 S.W.3d 756, 758 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.); Thompson v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice–Inst. Div., 33 S.W.3d 412, 414 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). When a lawsuit is dismissed as frivolous for having no basis in law or in fact, and no fact hearing was held, our review focuses on whether the inmate’s lawsuit has an arguable basis in law, which we review de novo. Scott v. Gallagher, 209 S.W.3d 262, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

Dismissal

          In his sole issue, Houser contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his lawsuit under Chapter 14.

          Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code governs inmate litigation. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 14.001–.014. (Vernon 2002). Under Chapter 14, a trial court may dismiss an inmate suit brought in forma pauperis, either before or after service of process, by finding that it is frivolous or malicious. Id. § 14.003(a)(2). In determining whether a claim is frivolous or malicious, the trial court may consider whether: (1) the claim’s realistic chance of ultimate success is slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or in fact; (3) it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim; or (4) the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts. Id. § 14.003(b)(1)–(4). In finding that a claim is frivolous or malicious, the court “may” hold a hearing “before or after service of process” and “it may be held on motion of the court, a party, or the clerk of the court.” Id. § 14.003(c).

          An inmate seeking to proceed, other than a suit under the Family Code, in forma pauperis must file a separate affidavit or declaration describing each suit the inmate has previously filed pro se,. Id. § 14.004. The affidavit or declaration must (a) describe the operative facts for which relief was sought; (b) list the case name, cause number, and the court in which the suit was brought; (c) identify each party named in the suit; and (d) state the result of the suit, including whether the suit was dismissed as frivolous or malicious. Id. § 14.004(a)(2). These requirements were enacted to allow the trial court to determine whether an inmate’s present claim is similar to a previously-filed claim. See Clark v. Unit, 23 S.W.3d 420, 422 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied.) (stating that “[t]he purpose of section 14.004 is to curb the constant, often duplicative, inmate litigation, by requiring the inmate to notify the trial court of previous litigation and the outcome”).

          In his affidavit related to previous filings, Houser identified three prior lawsuits. Although he identified the court in which the lawsuits were filed and the cause numbers of the lawsuits and claimed each of these lawsuits was “current,” he did not adequately describe the operative facts for which relief was sought in each of these lawsuits. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.004(a)(2)(A). For example, with regard to the first lawsuit identified, he simply stated that he had brought that lawsuit for “recovery of damages for violations upon my person and property.” In regard to the second and third lawsuits, he stated that he had brought them for a “five day stay in a strip cell and injuries to my person and property” and for an illegal library restriction. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that such descriptions did not sufficiently state the “operative facts” of these lawsuits to evaluate whether the facts here are substantially similar. See id. Houser also failed to identify, with respect to any of these three lawsuits, the case name or the identity of any of the defendants named in the lawsuits. See id. § 14.004(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C). Because Houser failed to comply with the affidavit requirements of section 14.004, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Houser’s lawsuit. See Clark, 23 S.W.3d at 422 (holding that because appellant did not state operative facts for which relief was sought in prior suits, trial court was unable to consider whether current claim was substantially similar to prior claims and, thus, trial court did not err in dismissing case).

          Finally, we note that nothing in Chapter 14 precludes a trial court from dismissing an entire lawsuit based upon a motion to dismiss filed by one party. In fact, as noted above, Chapter 14 provides that a trial court may dismiss a claim, either “before or after service of process,” if it finds that the claim is frivolous or malicious or that the inmate filed an affidavit or unsworn declaration required by Chapter 14 that the inmate knew was false. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(a). Moreover, Chapter 14 provides that a trial court may hold a hearing “before or after service of process” and “it may be held on motion of the court, a party, or the clerk of the court.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(c). These provisions permit a trial court to dismiss a case under Chapter 14 at the request of one party.

          We overrule Houser’s sole issue.

          Conclusion

          We affirm the order of the trial court.

                                                                        Terry Jennings

                                                                        Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Hanks, and Bland.