Bruce v. Ohio Oil Co.

169 F.2d 709, 1948 U.S. App. LEXIS 3349
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedJuly 15, 1948
Docket3606
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 169 F.2d 709 (Bruce v. Ohio Oil Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bruce v. Ohio Oil Co., 169 F.2d 709, 1948 U.S. App. LEXIS 3349 (10th Cir. 1948).

Opinion

HUXMAN, Circuit Judge.

This was an action brought by the appellant 1 against the Ohio Oil Company and Ramsey Petroleum Corporation 2 seeking an accounting of gas produced from land belonging to Bruce. It arose from the following facts.

Bruce, as owner, together with her husband, now deceased, executed an oil and gas lease to the English Drilling Production Company covering the Southwest Quarter (SW(4) of the Northeast Quarter (NE%) of Section Eleven (11), Township .Five (5) North, Range Nine (9) West, Caddo County, Oklahoma, containing forty (40) acres, more or less. By assignment, the lease on this land, with the exception of the Northeast Quarter (NE1^) thereof (10 acres), became the property of the companies. The lease had been released as to the Northeast ten acres; wells had been drilled on land adjoining the thirty acres, and Bruce claimed these wells drained oil and gas from her land. She instituted an action against the companies for damages on account of the alleged drainage. This suit was settled by agreement of the parties. The settlement was evidenced by a letter in the form of a letter contract. The settlement, in substance, provided that Bruce would execute and deliver to the companies an oil and gas lease to the ten acres not covered by the original lease, covering only all sands below the Wade Sand; that Bruce was to receive a cash payment of $12,500, and a further sum of $12,500, payable only from *711 one-eighth of the seven-eighths of the oil and gas produced from the sands below the Wade Sand from the ten acres, or from such production as was allocated to the ten acres. The lease to the ten acres provided that a well drilled on any part of the forty-acre tract should satisfy the requirements thereof for the drilling of a well.

At the time the lease and letter contract were executed, the First War Powers Act, 1941, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 601 et seq., and Regulations promulgated thereunder regulated the use of critical materials in the drilling of oil and gas wells. So far as material these regulations provided that such materials could not be used in connection with a gas well drilled on a tract of less than 640 acres, except with a permit from the Petroleum Administrator for War. The parties recognized the necessity of obtaining such a permit and also that it might be necessary to combine this acreage with other acreage in order to obtain permission to use critical materials necessary to equip and operate such a well. 3

Upon application by the company, an order was obtained from the Administrator authorizing the drilling of a gas well on Bruce’s forty-acre tract. When this well came in, an application for the use of critical material was made by the company to permit the completion of this well for the production of gas. The application included the forty-acre tract owned by Bruce and an adjoining forty-acre tract known as the Lackey tract. The application stated that, “In order therefore that the correlative rights are protected, both as to royalty owners and lessees, it is necessary that gas wells be allowed to produce on less than the prescribed 640 acres.”

The permit of June 29, 1945, authorizing the use of critical material, provided for the production of gas “ * * * in the manner proposed, provided that all the property interests in the eighty-acre tracts upon which each well is located, 4 as designated on the plat submitted with the application, are consolidated and assigned to that well.” The effect of this permit was to allow the equipment and operation of one well for the two forty-acre tracts and consolidated Bruce’s tract with the Lackey tract.

*712 It is first contended that the company violated its contractural obligation to Bruce by making an application for the drilling of one gas well on the combined Bruce and Lackey acreage. It is urged that the application, in the first instance, should have been confined to’ the Bruce forty without any unitization with other acreage. The trial court found that it would have been useless to have sought permission to equip and operate a gas well on the Bruce forty acres alone. We agree with this finding of the trial court. It is not necessary to elaborate our reasons for approving this finding by the trial court. We think it is sufficient to say that under the conditions due to the war, the regulations promulgated for the conservation of critical war material and under the contracts between the parties, such an application would, as the trial court found, have been unavailing.

The main point upon which appellant relies for reversal is that neither in the letter contract nor in the lease did she agree to or consent to the unitization of her royalty interest with any adjoining acreage, and that all she agreed to was a unitization of her y8 in the %ths of the production allocated to the ten-acre tract until she had received the additional $12,-500 from production. In other words, she claims a right to receive, as a royalty holder, a full y8 of the entire production from the one well. This position is not well taken.

There is no conflict or disagreement between the parties as to the principles of law which control. Thus, it is clear that the leaseholders of two separate tracts may unitize their working interests in their leases without the consent of the royalty holders. It also follows that in the absence of consent by the royalty holders, their interests are not bound by such unitization agreements. In the end, the question is one of ascertaining the understanding and intent of the parties as contained in their written agreements. When considered in the light of the surrounding facts, conditions and circumstances, we find no difficulty in concluding that Bruce, by the letter contract and the executed lease, consented to a unitization of all of her interests in her forty-acre tract with any other tract necessary in order to obtain a permit for the use of critical war materials to enable the equipment and operation of the well.

It is argued that the “property interests”, which the order of June 29, 1945, required to be consolidated and assigned to the well, relates to the working interests under the leases on the two tracts and does not cover the regular royalty interests of the eighty-acre unit, and that, therefore, Bruce’s regular royalty interest was not affected by the order of the P. A. W. Administrator.

This may be conceded for the purpose of this opinion, but it does not answer our question. The question is not what the regulations contemplated by the phrase “property interests”, but is what construction is to be placed upon the letter contract and the lease in question between the parties to this litigation. The language of the contract is that Bruce “will join in any unitization agreement that may be necessary to be executed by the royalty owners in order to unitize the required number of acres or area from which gas may be produced and marketed by the authority that may be required to be obtained from the U. S. Petroleum Administrator for War * * * ” Of course, all that the order did was to fix the area necessary for permission to drill one well or to equip one well with war scarce material. In this case, the Administrator fixed this area at eighty acres.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Moncrief v. Harvey
816 P.2d 97 (Wyoming Supreme Court, 1991)
Heath v. Fellows
526 F. Supp. 723 (W.D. Oklahoma, 1981)
Griffith v. Gulf Refining Co.
60 So. 2d 518 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1952)
Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Baker
197 F.2d 647 (Tenth Circuit, 1952)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
169 F.2d 709, 1948 U.S. App. LEXIS 3349, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bruce-v-ohio-oil-co-ca10-1948.