Bruce Sanford v. Caspar Weinberger, Dean K. Adams v. United States

752 F.2d 636, 27 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 14690
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit·Decided January 11, 1985·No. Appeal 84-1425, 84-1426·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

COWEN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Appellants (defendants) appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, awarding appellees (plaintiffs) overtime pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours during their tours of duty, which spanned periods of 7 consecutive days. We reverse.

I.

Plaintiffs are security guards at the Army’s Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Colorado. To reduce costs following a reduction in force, their supervisors assigned them to new 28-day cyclical work schedules, which took effect in June 1977. Under these schedules, each employee worked a daily shift of 8 hours 1 for 7 consecutive days, followed by 2 days off. The second 7-day tour was also followed by 2 days off. The third 7-day tour was followed by 3 days off.

Previously, the Army had established by regulation an “administrative workweek” for guards at the arsenal which corresponded to the calendar week, running from 12:01 a.m. Sunday until midnight the following Saturday. The so-called “7-2, 7-2, 7-3” schedules were structured so that each guard would work 5 days in 3 of every 4 administrative workweeks and 6 days in the fourth administrative workweek. 2 By so structuring the guards’ schedules, the agency considered itself obligated to pay each employee one day of overtime per 28-day cycle, plus overtime for all hours worked in excess of 8 hours per day. The agency also paid the guards at the rate of time and one-quarter for Sundays worked, none of which fell in the administrative workweek in which they worked 6 days.

Plaintiffs instituted the present action in the district court, claiming that the Army’s work schedule violated section 7(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), and 5 U.S.C. § 5542(a), part of the Federal Employees Pay Act (FEPA). These statutes provide that employees are to be compensated for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in an administrative workweek at one and one-half times their regular hourly rate. 3

The district court held that the government’s work schedule was in violation of both FEPA and the FLSA. The primary ground for this holding was that the 7-2, 7-2, 7-3 schedule violates a regulation promulgated under FEPA, 5 C.F.R. § 610.- *638 111(a)(1), which reads in pertinent part as follows:

The head of each agency * * * shall establish by regulation * * * [a] basic workweek of 40 hours which does not extend over more than 6 of any 7 consecutive days.

The district court also cited 5 C.F.R. § 610.111(b), which read, at times pertinent to this litigation, as follows:

(b) When it is impracticable to prescribe a regular schedule of definite hours of duty for each workday of a regularly scheduled administrative workweek, the head of an agency may establish the first 40 hours of duty performed within a period of not more than 6 days of the administrative workweek as the basic workweek, and additional hours of officially ordered or approved duty within the administrative workweek are overtime work.
[Emphasis added by district court.]

According to the district court, the Army’s work schedule violated this provision, because it required arsenal guards to work 7 consecutive days. The district court found that because the guards’ actual 7-day tours of duty constituted 56 hours of work, plaintiffs are entitled to overtime for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours for each of those periods, pursuant to FEPA, the FLSA, and 5 C.F.R. § 610.111(b). The district court also held that under FEPA and the FLSA, plaintiffs were entitled to overtime pay for all Sundays worked at time and one-half rates, rather than the time and one-quarter they were actually paid.

II.

The key concept in this case is that of the administrative workweek. Under 5 U.S.C. § 6101(a)(2), it is within the discretion of department heads to establish a basic administrative workweek of 40 hours for each full-time employee in their organization. See Acuna v. United States, 479 F.2d 1356, 1362, 202 Ct.Cl. 206 (1973). The term “administrative workweek” is defined in 5 C.F.R. § 610.102(a) as “a period of 7 consecutive calendar days designated in advance by the head of an agency * * *.”

Thus, it is within the parameters of the administrative workweek designated in advance by the Army that it must be determined whether plaintiffs were paid the proper amount of overtime. The number of consecutive days worked by employees, spanning more than one administrative workweek, is irrelevant to this determination. See Harned v. Atlas Powder Co., 192 S.W.2d at 380-81; B-134864 (Comp. Gen. July 27, 1976); B-173779 (Comp.Gen. Nov. 22, 1971).

In the instant case, the parties do not dispute that the Sunday to Saturday administrative workweek was designated in advance by the agency, and that the Army paid plaintiffs at overtime rates for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours for each administrative workweek. Moreover, plaintiffs have not contended that the hours worked on Sundays, for which they were paid time and one-quarter, were not part of the “basic workweek,” for which payment of overtime is not required.

Plaintiffs, instead, make the argument, which was apparently accepted by the district court, that each period of 7 consecutive days of work in the 7-2, 7-2, 7-3 schedule constitutes the true “administrative workweek,” even though it was not designated as such by the agency. Plaintiffs further argue that the calendar week, designated as the administrative workweek by the agency, cannot be properly considered as such, because they work different days each calendar week. We find no support for this position in the applicable statutes or regulations. To the contrary, 5 U.S.C. § 6101(a) and 5 C.F.R. § 610.102(a) leave it solely to the agency to determine which 7 consecutive calendar days constitute the administrative workweek. Moreover, under 5 C.F.R. § 610.111(b), quoted supra, agency heads may designate the *639

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Bruce Sanford v. Caspar Weinberger, Dean K. Adams v. United States, 752 F.2d 636, 27 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 14690 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

752 F.2d 636 (Bruce Sanford v. Caspar Weinberger, Dean K. Adams v. United States) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Eugene Scalia v. State of Alaska
985 F.3d 742 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)
Yanko v. United States
127 Fed. Cl. 682 (Federal Claims, 2016)
Adams v. United States
125 Fed. Cl. 608 (Federal Claims, 2016)
Blair v. United States
15 Cl. Ct. 763 (Court of Claims, 1988)
Presser v. United States
15 Cl. Ct. 672 (Court of Claims, 1988)