Bruce Leroy Raymos v. THE STATE OF TEXAS

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 28, 2024
Docket05-23-00294-CR
StatusPublished

This text of Bruce Leroy Raymos v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (Bruce Leroy Raymos v. THE STATE OF TEXAS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bruce Leroy Raymos v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, (Tex. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Opinion Filed June 28, 2024

S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00294-CR No. 05-23-00295-CR BRUCE LEROY RAYMOS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. 199-83209-2022, 199-83208-2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Reichek, Miskel, and Breedlove Opinion by Justice Reichek Bruce Leroy Raymos appeals his convictions for (1) possession with intent to

deliver cocaine in an amount of one gram or more but less than four grams, and (2)

possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine in an amount of four grams or

more but less than two hundred grams. Appellant contends the evidence was

insufficient to show the penalty group for either of the alleged controlled substances,

and the court’s charge improperly allowed the jury to convict him based on

possession of a controlled substance in a penalty group other than group one.

Appellant additionally asserts the trial court’s judgment should be modified to correctly reflect his pleas to the enhancement paragraphs. We agree the judgments

should be modified in the manner requested and, as reformed, we affirm.

In his first and third issues, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to

support his convictions because the State failed to prove that cocaine and

methamphetamine are penalty group one controlled substances. Appellant

acknowledges this Court has previously held that the penalty group of a controlled

substance is not an element of the offense the State is required to prove. See

Roberson v. State, No. 05-15-00550-CR, 2016 WL 3517937, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Dallas June 20, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Because

the opinion was unpublished, however, appellant urges us to reconsider our holding

based on a more recent opinion out of this Court. We decline to do so.

Appellant relies on our opinion in Engelke v. State, No. 05-21-01077-CR,

2023 WL 3613731 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 24, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) to support his positon that the penalty group of a

controlled substance is an essential element of the offense. Appellant cites the

portion of the opinion stating that “[a] hypothetically correct jury charge for

possession of a penalty group 1 controlled substance with intent to deliver states: a

person commits an offense if the person knowingly manufactures, delivers, or

possesses with intent to deliver a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 1

between four grams or more but less than 200 grams.” Id. at *2. In setting forth the

hypothetically correct jury charge, the opinion did not, as appellant suggests, hold

–2– that the penalty group is an essential element of the offense. Rather the opinion used

the term “Penalty Group 1” to broadly refer to all controlled substances within that

group. The penalty group to which a controlled substance is allocated is determined

by the Texas Legislature and is a question of law, not fact. Plumlee v. State, No. 02-

17-00174-CR, 2018 WL 3153543, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 28, 2018, pet,

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Once the State proves the specific

controlled substance possessed by the defendant, it necessarily proves the penalty

group applicable to the offense. See Cleveland v. State, No. 05-19-00515-CR, 2020

WL 2059912, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 29, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication). We resolve appellant’s first and third issues against

him.

In his second and fourth issues, appellant contends the court’s charge

erroneously asked the jury to determine whether he possessed with intent to deliver

a “controlled substance” which was defined as “a substance, including a drug, an

adulterant, and a dilutant, listed in Schedules I through V or Penalty Group 1, 1-A,

1-B, 2, 2-A, 3, or 4.” Because the definition of the term “controlled substance”

included multiple penalty groups, and there was no evidence presented to show the

penalty group applicable to either cocaine or methamphetamine, appellant contends

the jury could have convicted him for possessing a controlled substance under the

wrong penalty group.

–3– Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the court’s charge did not simply ask the

jury to determine whether he possessed a controlled substance. The jury was asked

specifically to find whether appellant possessed cocaine and methamphetamine with

intent to deliver them. As discussed above, the State did not need to prove the

penalty group applicable to these drugs because the penalty group for each is a matter

of law, not a fact issue for the jury. Id. Once the jury found appellant possessed

cocaine and methamphetamine, they necessarily found he possessed controlled

substances in penalty group one. See id. We conclude the court’s charge properly

instructed the jury. We resolve appellant’s second and fourth issues against him.

In his fifth issue, appellant contends the judgments in each case should be

modified to reflect that he pleaded “true” to the enhancement paragraphs in the

indictments. We agree. We have the power to modify a judgment to speak the truth

when we have the necessary information to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b);

Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813

S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (en banc). Accordingly, in

both trial court cause number 199-83209-2022 and trial court cause number 199-

83208-2022, we modify the judgment to delete the word “NOT” in the section for

“1st Enhancement Paragraph,” thereby revising the entry to read to “PLEADED

TRUE.”

–4– As reformed, the judgment is affirmed.

/Amanda L. Reichek/ AMANDA L. REICHEK JUSTICE Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 230294F.U05

–5– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

BRUCE LEROY RAYMOS, On Appeal from the 199th Judicial Appellant District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 199-83209- No. 05-23-00294-CR V. 2022. Opinion delivered by Justice THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Reichek. Justices Miskel and Breedlove participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows:

In the section of the judgment for “1st Enhancement Paragraph,” we strike the word “NOT” thereby revising the entry to read “PLEADED TRUE.”

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered June 28, 2024

–6– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

BRUCE LEROY RAYMOS, On Appeal from the 199th Judicial Appellant District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 199-83208- No. 05-23-00295-CR V. 2022. Opinion delivered by Justice THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Reichek. Justices Miskel and Breedlove participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows:

In the section of the judgment for “1st Enhancement Paragraph,” we strike the word “NOT” thereby revising the entry to read “PLEADED TRUE.”

–7–

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Related

Asberry v. State
813 S.W.2d 526 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1991)
Bigley v. State
865 S.W.2d 26 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1993)

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