Bruce Allen Speight v. Pamela Kay Stefek Speight

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: February 4, 2004
• Docket: CA-0003-1152
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 03-1152

BRUCE ALLEN SPEIGHT

VERSUS

PAMELA KAY STEFEK SPEIGHT

**********

APPEAL FROM THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF SABINE, NO. 54922 HONORABLE ROBERT EDWARD BURGESS, DISTRICT JUDGE

BILLY HOWARD EZELL JUDGE

Court composed of John D. Saunders, Jimmie C. Peters, and Billy Howard Ezell, Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

John William Pickett Attorney at Law P. O. Box 250 Many, LA 71449 (318) 256-3846 Counsel for: Plaintiff/Appellee Bruce Allen Speight

James Scott Seaman Attorney at Law 860 Washington St. Natchitoches, LA 71457 (318) 352-4449 Counsel for: Defendant/Appellant Pamela Kay Stefek Speight EZELL, JUDGE.

In this case, Pamela Speight appeals the decision of the trial court that the

interim periodic spousal support granted to her terminated at the rendering of her

divorce from Bruce Speight. She asserts that the trial court erred in ruling that the

interim support terminated when it did and that the trial court erred in failing to find

Mr. Speight in contempt of court for failure to pay the support. For the following

reasons, we reverse and render.

On March 27, 2002, Mr. Speight filed for divorce from Ms. Speight in Sabine

Parish. She answered and requested interim spousal support. By judgment filed

September 17, 2002, Mr. Speight was ordered to pay Ms. Speight $400 a month in

support, “beginning August 1, 2002 and to continue thereafter until further orders of

the court.”

On November 7, 2002, the trial court granted Ms. Speight a final divorce. At

the hearing, the trial court ordered counsel for Ms. Speight to set the rule for

permanent alimony, which she said she would be seeking. This was never filed, and

Ms. Speight remarried soon thereafter. The date of the remarriage is not in the record

before this court.

On February 3, 2003, Ms. Speight filed a motion seeking past-due support as

well as a motion of contempt and attorney’s fees. She sought support through

February 1, 2003. At trial on the matter, the trial court ruled that the interim support

terminated on November 7, 2002, the date of the granting of the divorce. The trial

court also dismissed Ms. Speight’s motion for contempt and attorney’s fees. Ms.

Speight appeals this decision.

Ms. Speight asserts two assignments of error on appeal; that the trial court erred

in ruling that the interim support terminated on November 7, 2002, and that the trial

court erred in failing to find Mr. Speight in contempt of court for failure to pay

1 support past that date. We agree that the trial court erred in ruling that the interim

support terminated on the date of the divorce.

A spouse’s right to claim interim periodic support is based on the

statutorily-imposed duty of spouses to support each other during their marriage.

McAlpine v. McAlpine, 94-1594 (La. 9/5/96), 679 So.2d 85. It is designed to assist the

claimant spouse in sustaining the same style or standard of living that he or she

enjoyed while residing with the other spouse, pending the litigation of the divorce.

Daigle v. Daigle, 96-541 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/96), 689 So.2d 478. Interim periodic

support exists “to maintain the status quo without unnecessary economic dislocation

until a determination of the amount of final support can be made, and until a period

of time for adjustment elapses that does not exceed, as a general rule, one hundred

eighty days after the judgment of divorce.” Defatta v. Defatta, 32,636, 32,637, p.2

(La.App. 2 Cir. 2/1/00), 750 So.2d 503, 504-05. Additionally, La.Civ.Code art. 113

(emphasis ours), states:

Upon motion of a party or when a demand for final spousal support is pending, the court may award a party interim spousal support allowance based on the needs of that party, the ability of the other party to pay, and the standard of living of the parties during the marriage, which award of interim spousal support allowance shall terminate upon the rendition of a judgment awarding or denying final spousal support or one hundred eighty days from the rendition of judgment of divorce, whichever occurs first. The obligation to pay interim spousal support may extend beyond one hundred eighty days from the rendition of judgment of divorce, but only for good cause shown.

The record in this case indicates that the trial court intended the interim support

to terminate on November 7, 2002. The trial court stated that it “had no intention of

[the support] going past the judgment of divorce” because counsel for Ms. Speight

stated in court that she would be filing for permanent support.

However, in Defatta, supra, the trial court determined that interim support

2 should be extended to the wife for one hundred eighty days past the judgment of

divorce. In that matter, interim support had been established by a consent judgment.

The husband challenged the trial court’s ruling, arguing that the extension of support

past the date of the divorce judgment equated to a modification of the consent

agreement. The first circuit disagreed, ruling that the trial court considered the

statutes governing interim support, and that under those statutes the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in extending support despite the consent agreement.

In this case, the support was not created by the consent of the parties, but rather,

by the will of the court. Here, Mr. Speight can not claim that Ms. Speight agreed to

any limitation on support.

Furthermore, an order extending interim spousal support one hundred eighty

days from the date of the rendition of the judgment of divorce is unnecessary, since

the support should not have terminated until then anyway. Bickham v. Bickham,

02-1307 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/9/03), 849 So.2d 707. “Good cause” is required only for

“extending interim spousal support beyond one hundred and eighty days from the

rendition of the judgment of divorce,” and need not be shown to allow interim support

to continue for one hundred eighty days after the judgment of divorce. Id at 712.

Moreover, La.Civ.Code art. 113 is clear. “Interim spousal support terminates

not upon the rendition of the judgment of divorce, but upon the rendition of a

judgment awarding or denying final spousal support or one hundred eighty days from

the rendition of the judgment of divorce, whichever comes first.” Bickham, 849 So.2d

at 712.

In this case, there was no request for final spousal support. Therefore, Ms.

Speight’s interim spousal support would terminate by operation of law one hundred

eighty days from the judgment of divorce. The support should have continued in

3 favor of Ms. Speight for one hundred eighty days, or until the time she remarried.

Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is reversed and remanded to determine the

date of the former Ms. Speight’s remarriage.

Because the trial court erred in determining the date on which the spousal

support terminated, the trial court could not correctly rule upon Ms. Speight’s motion

to hold Mr. Speight in contempt of court for failure to pay the support past that date.

Accordingly, this too should be reconsidered upon remand.

The decision of the trial court is reversed and remanded. Costs of this appeal

are assessed against Bruce Speight.