Bruce A. Aronson v. FCA US, LLC

District Court, C.D. California·Decided May 18, 2020·No. 2:19-cv-09386·Unknown

Opinion

BRUCE A. ARONSON and SECURE Case No.2:19-cv-09386-JFW-JPR TECH Plaintiffs, STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER1 v.

FCA US LLC; RYDELL CHRYSLER DODGE JEEP RAM and DOES 1 NOTE: CHANGES MADE BY THE COURT through 10, inclusive

Defendants.

1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. B. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT This action is likely to involve documents pertaining to trade secrets or other confidential research, development, or commercial business information, the disclosure of which might cause 1 This Stipulated Protective Order is based substantially on the model protective order provided competitive harm, that is contained in Protected Documents, and which have not been disclosed or made available to the public. Confidential information may include, but is not limited to (1) engineering documents, including design drawings and other technical engineering related specifications, (2) test documents, analysis, and testing procedures; (3) manufacturing specifications and procedures, including communications with and process documents pertaining to FCA US LLC’s suppliers and supplier relationships; (4) internal business or financial information; (5) confidential Customer information and personal identifying information; and (6) any other similar proprietary, confidential, private information, commercially sensitive business information, or competitive intelligence, including but not limited to trade secrets. “Customer” shall mean any person or entity that purchases or otherwise comes to possess FCA US, LLC’s product and/or uses or possesses products/services offered or sold by San Fernando Motor Company dba Rydell Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Local Civil Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. There is a strong presumption that the public has a right of access to judicial proceedings and records in civil cases. In connection with non-dispositive motions, good cause must be shown to support a filing under seal. See Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006), Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002), Makar-Welbon v. Sony Electrics, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 576, 577 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (even stipulated protective orders require good cause showing), and a specific showing of good cause or compelling reasons with proper evidentiary support and legal justification, must be made with respect to Protected Material that a party seeks to file under seal. The parties’ mere designation of Disclosure or Discovery Material as CONFIDENTIAL does not— without the submission of competent evidence by declaration, establishing that the material sought to be filed under seal qualifies as confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable—constitute good cause. Further, if a party requests sealing related to a dispositive motion or trial, then compelling reasons, not only good cause, for the sealing must be shown, and the relief sought shall be narrowly tailored to serve the specific interest to be protected. See Pintos v. Pacific Creditors Ass’n., 605 F.3d 665, 677-79 (9th Cir. 2010). For each item or type of information, document, or thing sought to be filed or introduced under seal in connection with a dispositive motion or trial, the party seeking protection must articulate compelling reasons, supported by specific facts and legal justification, for the requested sealing order. Again, competent evidence supporting the application to file documents under seal must be provided by declaration. Any document that is not confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable in its entirety will not be filed under seal if the confidential portions can be redacted. If documents can be redacted, then a redacted version for public viewing, omitting only the confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable portions of the document, shall be filed. Any application that seeks to file documents under seal in their entirety should include an explanation of why redaction is not feasible. 2. DEFINITIONS 2.1 Action: Bruce A. Aronson, et al. v. FCA US LLC, et al., Central District of California Case No. 2:19-cv-09386-JFW-JPR. 2.2 Challenging Party: a Party or Non-Party that challenges the designation of information or items under this Order. 2.3 “CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items: information (regardless of how it is generated, stored or maintained) or tangible things that qualify for protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and as specified above in the Good Cause Statement. 2.4 Counsel: Outside Counsel of Record and House Counsel (as well as their support staff). 2.5 Designating Party: a Party or Non-Party that designates information or items that it produces in disclosures or in responses to discovery as “CONFIDENTIAL.” 2.6 Disclosure or Discovery Material: all items or information, regardless of the medium or manner in which it is generated, stored, or maintained (including, among other things, testimony, transcripts, and tangible things), that are produced or generated in disclosures or responses to discovery in this matter. 2.7 Expert: a person with specialized knowledge or experience in a matter pertinent to the litigation who has been retained by a Party or its counsel to serve as an expert witness or as a consultant in this Action. 2.8 House Counsel: attorneys who are employees of a party to this Action. House Counsel does not include Outside Counsel of Record or any other outside counsel. 2.9 Non-Party: any natural person, partnership, corporation, association or other legal entity not named as a Party to this action. 2.10 Outside Counsel of Record: attorneys who are not employees of a party to this Action but are retained to represent or advise a party to this Action and have appeared in this Action on behalf of that party or are affiliated with a law firm that has appeared on behalf of that party, and includes support staff. 2.11 Party: any party to this Action, including all of its officers, directors, employees, consultants, retained experts, and Outside Counsel of Record (and their support staffs). 2.12 Producing Party: a Party or Non-Party that produces Disclosure or Discovery Material in this Action. 2.13 Professional Vendors: persons or entities that provide litigation support services (e.g., photocopying, videotaping, translating, preparing exhibits or demonstrations, and organizing, storing, or retrieving data in any form or medium) and their employees and subcontractors. 2.14 Protected Material: any Disclosure or Discovery Material that is designated as “CONFIDENTIAL.” 2.15 Receiving Party: a Party that receives Disclosure or Discovery Material from a Producing Party. 3. SCOPE The protections conferred by this Stipulation and Order cover not only Protected Material (as

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