Brozozowski v. Swedish Crucible Steel Co.

298 N.W. 485, 298 Mich. 146, 1941 Mich. LEXIS 534
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJune 2, 1941
DocketDocket No. 39, Calendar No. 41,473.
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 298 N.W. 485 (Brozozowski v. Swedish Crucible Steel Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brozozowski v. Swedish Crucible Steel Co., 298 N.W. 485, 298 Mich. 146, 1941 Mich. LEXIS 534 (Mich. 1941).

Opinion

Chandler, J.

This is an appeal by defendant from an award by the department of labor and in *148 dustry awarding to plaintiff compensation for total disability.

Inasmuch as we believe the controversy involved is largely a question of fact, and the findings of the department being brief, we deem it advisable to quote here the department’s findings and conclusions in full:

“Plaintiff testified in the above matter that on or about March 19, 1940, while at work as a laborer wheeling sand and dipping “slush” out of a well he suffered a serious pain in his left inguinal region. Defendant disputed that he had a hernia. He was examined by a medical commission appointed by this department under Act No. 10, pt. 7, § 6, Pub. Acts 1912 (1st Ex. Sess.), as added by Act.No. 61, Pub. Acts 1937 (occupational disease amendment). The commission reported that he was suffering from a left inguinal hernia.

“Plaintiff’s testimony as to the occurrence is that he was lifting a pail of slush out of a well when he felt a sharp pain in his stomach; that he reported to his foreman, Bulak, the following day. On advice of the steward of his union he ceased work on March 19, 1940.

“Defendant argues that a hernia is not an occupational disease under Act No. 10, pt. 7, Pub. Acts 1912 (1st Ex. Sess.), as added by Act No. 61, Pub. Acts 1937. In this, we think, it is mistaken. It is not only specifically set up in the schedule in section 2 of [part 7 of] the act but occupational diseases are extended to conditions as well as diseases. A purist in the use of language probably might say that a hernia was not a disease but it is clearly a condition and is compensable under subdivision 28 of section 2 of [part 7 of] the act. In this case the employee suffered the pain in his stomach as he says. He seeks compensation for a hernia. He was examined *149 by a commission appointed by this department and found to have a hernia and we are bound by the commission’s determination. Defendant filed a report of a noncomp ensable accident stating that the nature and cause of injury was: ‘Claims rupture from lifting pail of solvent.’ It was dated March 20, 1940. Defendant had notice or knowledge of the accident. It resulted from the lifting of the pail of solvent from the well which was directly within his employment and arose out of it and plaintiff testified that he advised the foreman of the accident on the following day. That ought to be sufficiently prompt to comply with the statute.

“The deputy commissioner awarded compensation to plaintiff for total disability from March 20, 1940, until further order of the department at the rate of $18 per week, in which he was correct. His award is affirmed.”

Appellant’s statement of questions involved follows :

“1. Did plaintiff produce evidence that he suffered a total disability?

“2. Did plaintiff suffer a hernia in the nature of an occupational disease?”

The counterstatement of questions involved by appellee is as follows:

“1. Is there sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the award that plaintiff sustained an occupational disease (hernia) for which he is entitled to compensation?

“2. Is there a question of law involved in this appeal?”

It is unnecessary to cite authorities on the proposition that on appeals from the department of labor and industry, the findings of fact by the department when supported by competent evidence are final.

*150 We will discuss the questions raised by the appellant in the following order: First, did plaintiff suffer a hernia in the nature of an occupational disease?

Prior to 1937 a disability arising from an occupational disease was not compensable.

Act No. 10, pt. 7, § 2, Pub. Acts 1912 (1st Ex. Sess.), as added by Act No. 61, Pub. Acts 1937, provides :

“The disablement of an employee resulting from an occupational disease or condition described in the following schedule shall be treated as the happening of a personal injury by accident within the meaning of this act and the procedure and practice provided in this act shall apply to all proceedings under this part except where specifically otherwise provided herein:”

Subsection 28 of section 2 of part 7 contains this provision applying to hernia:

“Disability arising from hernia clearly recent in origin and resulting from a strain, arising out of and in the course of employment, and promptly reported to employer.”

There is very little, if any, conflict in the testimony given at the hearing, the only witness sworn on behalf of plaintiff being himself, and but two witnesses, one being an investigator, of defendant, and the other an interpreter who interpreted for such investigator in obtaining a statement from plaintiff on March 25, 1940, which statement was admitted in evidence by the deputy commissioner on the offer of defendant.

The testimony taken before the deputy commissioner shows that plaintiff was employed by defendant as a sand mixer; his duties were to load sand,on a wheelbarrow and wheel it across the plant *151 to a mixing machine. A part of his duties was twice a week for about two hours to bail out of a well a composition referred to as slush. To do this he used a five gallon pail attached to a pole about 4 to 6 feet long; after lifting the slush from the well he would carry it 10 or 15 feet to dump it on a pile. The work performed by plaintiff the rest of the time was loading sand on a wheelbarrow and wheeling it from the room in which it was stored to a machine in which it was used.

Plaintiff testified that on March 9, 1940, he was mixing sand from 7:30 a.m. to 12 o ’clock and at 12: 30 p.m. he started to empty the well. After lifting about four pails from the well he felt “a pain in the right groin and darkness came to my eyes.” The next day plaintiff told his foreman, Bulak, that he had ruptured himself. The foreman replied: “The company will fix it up.” The plaintiff quit work on March 18, 1940.

On March 20, 1940, defendant filed with the department of labor and industry a report of noncom-pensable accident. On May 7, 1940, plaintiff filed notice and application of adjustment of claim under the occupational disease amendment. On May 17th following defendant filed its answer denying liability. On June 5th the department appointed three disinterested physicians connected with the University Hospital to examine plaintiff and make report of their examination to the department as to whether or not plaintiff was suffering from a right and left inguinal hernia. The report of physicians so appointed, which was filed with the department on June 21, 1940, follows:

“Re: John Brozozowski v. Swedish Crucible Steel Co.

“This is to certify that John Brozozowski, Name of Examinee, was examined on the — day of *152 1940, at University Hospital, Ann Arbor, Michigan and, after said examination, we the undersigned, appointed pursuant to Act No. 10, pt. 7, § 6, Pub. Acts 1912 (1st Ex. Sess.), as added by Act No. 61, Pub.

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Bluebook (online)
298 N.W. 485, 298 Mich. 146, 1941 Mich. LEXIS 534, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brozozowski-v-swedish-crucible-steel-co-mich-1941.