Browning v. Browning

Supreme Court of Georgia

Browning v. Browning

298 S.E.2d 496, 250 Ga. 450, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 545

CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

DecidedJanuary 4, 1983

Docket39250

StatusPublished

This text of 298 S.E.2d 496 (Browning v. Browning) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Browning v. Browning, 298 S.E.2d 496, 250 Ga. 450, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 545 (Ga. 1983).

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Opinion

Weltner, Justice.

The parties were divorced pursuant to a final judgment and decree which incorporated a separation agreement providing in part as follows: “It is further agreed between the parties in the event a suit for divorce is filed for either of the parties hereto, that this Agreement shall be made a judgment of the Court.” Upon the former wife’s application for contempt, the former husband filed a motion to vacate and set aside the decree on the ground that it was void as against public policy in that it was a contract to facilitate a divorce. The trial court agreed, and entered an order declaring the decree void as contrary to public policy. We granted discretionary appeal from that order.

In Sanders v. Colwell, 248 Ga. 376 (1) (283 SE2d 461) (1981), this Court abolished the nettlesome distinction which the case law had created between contracts incident to a divorce and contracts to facilitate a divorce, overruling Warren v. Warren, 235 Ga. 234 (219 SE2d 161) (1975), and its predecessors.

This case is controlled by Sanders v. Colwell, supra, and the trial court was without authority to declare the original decree and the separation agreement to be void as against public policy.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur. [451]*451Decided January 4, 1983. Smith, Patrick & Wardlaw, Karen Wardlaw, for appellant. Albert B. Wallace, for appellee.

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Weltner, Justice.

The parties were divorced pursuant to a final judgment and decree which incorporated a separation agreement providing in part as follows: “It is further agreed between the parties in the event a suit for divorce is filed for either of the parties hereto, that this Agreement shall be made a judgment of the Court.” Upon the former wife’s application for contempt, the former husband filed a motion to vacate and set aside the decree on the ground that it was void as against public policy in that it was a contract to facilitate a divorce. The trial court agreed, and entered an order declaring the decree void as contrary to public policy. We granted discretionary appeal from that order.

In Sanders v. Colwell, 248 Ga. 376 (1) (283 SE2d 461) (1981), this Court abolished the nettlesome distinction which the case law had created between contracts incident to a divorce and contracts to facilitate a divorce, overruling Warren v. Warren, 235 Ga. 234 (219 SE2d 161) (1975), and its predecessors.

This case is controlled by Sanders v. Colwell, supra, and the trial court was without authority to declare the original decree and the separation agreement to be void as against public policy.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur. [451]*451Decided January 4, 1983. Smith, Patrick & Wardlaw, Karen Wardlaw, for appellant. Albert B. Wallace, for appellee.

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Bluebook (online)

298 S.E.2d 496, 250 Ga. 450, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 545, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/browning-v-browning-ga-1983.

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