Brownfield v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC

584 F. App'x 874

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 1, 2014
• Docket: 12-56676
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

Kyle Brownfield (Brownfield) appeals from the judgment entered' in favor of Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (Jaguar) following a jury trial of Brownfield’s case alleging that Jaguar violated the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, also known as California’s lemon law. See Cal. Civ.Code § 1790 et seq.

This case turned on whether Jaguar was given a reasonable number of opportunities to repair Brownfield’s vehicle. The parties submitted conflicting jury instructions to explain “reasonable opportunities” as used in the Act, and the district court modified the standard jury instruction (CACI 3202) to include the following, additional paragraph:

This instruction is entitled “Reasonable Opportunities Explained.” Opportunities is plural. That is because, under the law that applies in this case, for Plaintiff to be entitled to relief for any particular problem with her Jaguar, she must show that she brought the car in to Jaguar for the repair of that particular problem on more than one occasion. 1

Brownfield takes issue with the use of the phrase “any particular problem” in the instruction. However, the instruction “fairly and adequately cover[ed] the issues presented, correctly state[d] the law, and [was] not ... misleading.” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir.2014) (en banc). As the case chiefly relied upon by Brownfield demonstrates, and as recognized by Brownfield during oral argument, California Song-Beverly cases use the terms “problem” and “defect” interchangeably. See, e.g., Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of Cal., Inc., 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 793, 799, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 731 (2006). Brownfield also acknowledged during oral argument that both parties were given an opportunity to explain their respective theories of the case to the. jury in light of the instructions.

AFFIRMED.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Circuit Rule 36-3.

1 . Jaguar’s argument that the instruction was modified pursuant to the court’s discretion to enforce its evidentiary rulings is unsupported, because the court explicitly stated that the reason for the modification was a “modest potential for some confusion among the jurors ...”