Brown v. West Corp.

287 F.R.D. 494, 2012 WL 5400043, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158232
CourtDistrict Court, D. Nebraska
DecidedNovember 5, 2012
DocketNo. 8:11CV284
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 287 F.R.D. 494 (Brown v. West Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nebraska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. West Corp., 287 F.R.D. 494, 2012 WL 5400043, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158232 (D. Neb. 2012).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LYLE E. STROM, Senior District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Rex Brown (“Brown”) to compel discovery (Filing No. 34). The March 26, 2012, protective order (Filing No. 20) has satisfied defendant that its objections based on the proprietary and confidential nature of some documents are no longer necessary (Brief in Opposition, Filing No. 60, at 20 n.11).

The parties have had a difficult time communicating clearly on discovery matters. Many of the issues complained of in plaintiffs motion appear to have been fully and completely resolved by defendant. In addition, many of the alleged failures are the product of insufficiently specific requests. Defendant frequently argues against discovery because of the burden of production. The Rules of Civil Procedure require only a showing of relevance. Though the Court has the obligation under Rule 26(b)(2)(C) to limit discovery where the burden outweighs the likely benefit, many requests that defendant disputes, though they carry significant burdens, are highly relevant to disputed issues. The purpose of discovery is to explore the materials relevant to the claims to determine whether evidence supporting the claims exists. It is with that purpose in mind that the Court addresses the present motion.

[499]*499I. Interrogatory No. 18 and Request No. 13: Electronically Stored Information

Plaintiff asks that the Court compel defendant “to perform an independent search for communications regarding Rex Brown and/or other issues in this matter from all available sources and schedule a conference with the Magistrate to discuss the method of the search and/or monitoring of production of [electronically stored information]” (Motion to Compel, Filing No. 34, at 7). The communications plaintiff seeks are e-mails. The Court reads “other issues” as plaintiffs additional proposed search terms (aside from “Rex Brown”). The Court reads “all available sources” as all sources, electronic and otherwise, from every West employee with even the remotest connection to Rex Brown’s employment at West. Finally, the Court notes the plaintiffs request for an “independent search” — a reference to the defendant’s search procedure which allows the user of the e-mail account to “self search,” as opposed to a search conducted by an information technology specialist.

A. Privilege Log1

The mandate of Rule 26(b)(5) clearly requires a privilege log “whenever a party withholds information otherwise discoverable by claiming that the information is privileged.” Such privilege logs “can aid the court in its resolution of a dispute, but ‘[t]he tribunal ultimately decides what information must be disclosed on a privileged document log.’ ” Prism Technologies, LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 8:10CV220, 2011 WL 5523389, *2 (D.Neb. Nov. 14, 2011) (quoting PaineWebber Group, Inc. v. Zinsmeyer Trusts Partnership, 187 F.3d 988, 992 (8th Cir.1999)). This Court has joined other district courts in assuming privilege for attorney-client communications that transpire after the initiation of litigation in situations where the plaintiff is requesting extensive discovery. Id. The Court sees no reason to depart from that assumption in this ease.

This does not relieve defendant of its remaining burden. While the Court recognizes that some communications between the parties may have left vague the necessity of creating a privilege log (Brief in Opposition, Filing No. 60, at 34), the instant motion makes clear that the plaintiff has not agreed to forgo the strictures of Rule 26(b)(5) for requests aimed at the pre-litigation period or materials in the post-litigation period that were not prepared in anticipation of litigation. The Court will instruct the defendant to produce such logs now.2

B. Independent Search

None of the cases which plaintiff cited hold, as plaintiff claims, that “self-searching is wholly unreliable” (Brief in Support, Filing No. 35, at 18). At best, the cases caution that effective custodian-conducted searches must give specific directions as to search terms and techniques and that the reliability of a self-search cannot be determined without examination of the parameters of the search. See, e.g., Nat’l Day Laborer Org. v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency, No. 10 Civ. 3488(SAS), 2012 WL 2878130 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2012). Nor do the cases suggest a baseline requirement for an independent search.

Still, defendant has refused to produce the litigation hold memo, which appears to be the document that triggered searches by West employees. While such letters are themselves privileged, the information surrounding the letters is not. See Magnetar Tech. Corp. v. Six Flags Theme Park Inc., CA 07-127-LPS-MPT, 886 F.Supp.2d 466, n. 114, 2012 WL 3609715, n. 114 (D.Del. Aug. 22, 2012) (compiling cases). The people to whom the letter was sent, the directions for preservation, the sources identified for search, the terms used for the search, the defendant’s continued efforts to ensure compliance, and any other information relevant to the scope and depth of the preservation or the search must be disclosed in detail so that precise objections can be made and so that defendant’s search can be effectively re[500]*500viewed by this Court. The affidavits by West employees describing their searches are not sufficiently detailed to determine whether defendant has reasonably complied with plaintiffs request for production — in fact, the variety and general language in the affidavits suggests precisely the kind of unguided, unreliable search warned of in National Day. Only production of the search parameters given to those employees can help overcome this suggestion.

To the extent that the parameters of the litigation hold show negligence, bad-faith, or are simply too narrow, the plaintiff can make further motions if the parties cannot agree to expanded terms or sources. To the extent that these parameters delineate the “who” (which employees) and “what” (which files sources), they might also resolve the issue of whether all “available sources” have been searched.

C. Scope of Discovery

Defendant has objected to many of plaintiffs requests as being some combination of “overbroad, burdensome, harassing” and insufficiently specific. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff is entitled to “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). The rules place an additional limit on discovery of Electronically Stored Information only to the extent that the sources are not “reasonably accessible.” Id. at 26(b)(2)(B). More generally, the Court must limit the extent of discovery under Rule 26(b)(2)(C) where the burden or expense of production outweighs the likely benefit. Id. at 26(b)(2)(C) (iii).

The e-mails from John Thielen’s computer found using the plaintiffs name as the search term are clearly relevant to Thielen’s assessment of and attitude toward the plaintiff and, by proxy, Thielen’s ultimate motives for any disparate treatment.

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Bluebook (online)
287 F.R.D. 494, 2012 WL 5400043, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158232, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-west-corp-ned-2012.