Brown v. Wayne County Pennsylvania

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 15, 2021
Docket3:18-cv-00155-MEM
StatusUnknown

This text of Brown v. Wayne County Pennsylvania (Brown v. Wayne County Pennsylvania) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Wayne County Pennsylvania, (M.D. Pa. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NOEL L. BROWN, :

Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-155

v. : (MANNION, D.J.)

WAYNE COUNTY : PENNSYLVANIA, et al. : Defendants :

ORDER Presently before the court are two report and recommendations (“Reports”) of Magistrate Judge William I. Arbuckle. (Doc. 87; Doc. 88). The First Report, (Doc. 87), recommends that a motion to dismiss the case as frivolous, (Doc. 70), filed by the defendants Wayne County, Wayne County Sheriff’s Department, Sergeant Patricia Krempasky, Wayne County District Attorney’s Office, Wayne County Public Defender’s Office, Wayne County Correctional Facility, Warden Kevin Bishop, and Lieutenant Justin Rivardo, (collectively, “Wayne Defendants”), be granted. The Second Report, (Doc. 88), recommends that the plaintiff Noel Brown’s (“Brown”) claims in his Amended Complaint, (Doc. 69), against defendants the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), Monroe County, the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill (“SCI-Camp Hill”), Michael Jezercak, Sharon Palmer, PSP Honesdale Barracks, PSP Swiftwater Barracks, PSP Fern Ridge Barracks, Robert Yeager, Michael

Brown, Thomas O’Brien, and Trooper Joseph Diehl, (collectively, “DOC Defendants”), as well as the claims against Monroe County, the Days Inn Tannersville Hotel, Camilo Jacer, and the Brodheadsville Post Office of

Monroe County, be dismissed. It additionally recommends that the court decline to retain jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims against the Days Inn Tannersville, Jacer, and Monroe County. Plaintiff filed objections to the Second Report. (Doc. 89). Wayne

Defendants filed a brief in opposition to Plaintiff’s objections. (Doc. 90). Plaintiff responded with a motion to strike Wayne Defendant’s brief in opposition, (Doc. 91), as well as brief in support, (Doc. 92). Wayne

Defendants filed a brief in opposition. (Doc. 93). Plaintiff did not file a reply brief and the time to do so has expired. When objections are timely filed to the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge, the district court must review de novo those portions of

the report to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). Although the standard is de novo, the extent of review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge

and the court may rely on the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper. Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F.Supp.2d 496, 499 (M.D.Pa. 2000) (citing U.S. v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).

Even where no objection is made, the court should, as a matter of good practice, “satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) advisory

committee notes; see also Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 469 (M.D.Pa. 2010) (citing Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1987) (explaining judges should give some review to every report and recommendation)). Nevertheless, whether timely objections are

made or not, the district court may accept, not accept, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); M.D.Pa. Local Rule 72.31.

In his First Report, Judge Arbuckle recommends that Wayne Defendants’ motion to dismiss once again be granted. He notes that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint reiterates the same claims against the same twenty-three defendants that were previously dismissed for failure to state a

claim. (Doc. 66; Doc. 68). Despite being granted an opportunity to cure the deficiencies identified in his original complaint, Plaintiffs has failed to do so. Applying the relevant law, the First Report concludes Plaintiff’s Section 1983

claims against Wayne Defendants fail due to lack of personal involvement, and those against individual defendants fail under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Additionally, Plaintiff’s defamation-type claims fail because

they are devoid of any supporting facts; his excessive force claim against Rivardo fails for lack of an allegation of force; and his claims against Bishop are not legally cognizable. Finally, the First Report recommends that

Plaintiff’s claims against Wayne County fail because he does not allege that a policy or custom caused the violations of his constitutional rights. Thus, the First Report recommends Wayne Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (Doc. 70), be granted.

In his Second Report, after conducting a preliminary review of Plaintiff’s Amendment Complaint, Judge Arbuckle again recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against DOC Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1915A, this time, without further leave to amend. The Second Report recommends that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the DOC, SCI Camp Hill, PSP Fern Ridge Barracks, PSP Honesdale Barracks, and PSP Swiftwater Barracks be dismissed as those entities are not persons subject

to liability under Section 1983. Additionally, it recommends Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims on behalf of his business against Palmer, Brown, Jezercak, and Yeager be dismissed since corporations such as his must be

represented by licensed counsel, and that his allegation that those defendants be charged with kidnapping likewise be dismissed since a Section 1983 claim is not the appropriate vehicle for pursuing criminal

charges. The Second Report further recommends that the Fourth Amendment claims against O’Brien and Diehl be dismissed because Plaintiff does not allege any facts regarding a lack of probable cause. Next, the

Second Report recommends that Plaintiff’s Monell claims against Monroe County be dismissed since, as with Wayne County, he does not allege that a policy or custom caused the violations of his constitutional rights. Finally, the Second Report recommends that Plaintiff’s claims against the

Broadheadsville Post Office be dismissed pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to articulate any legal claim. With respect to the state law harassment and defamation-type claims Plaintiff alleges

against Jacer, the Days Inn Tannersville, and Monroe County, the Second Report recommends they be dismissed without prejudice since, if the Reports are adopted, all federal claims will have been dismissed and retaining supplemental jurisdiction is not appropriate here.

Ultimately, the Reports recommend that the court decline to grant further leave to amend since to do so would be inequitable and futile insofar as Plaintiff has already been permitted to file an amended complaint but used

that opportunity to file virtually the same complaint. As before, Defendant has filed objections to the Second Report; however, his objections once again do nothing more than repeat the same

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Related

United States v. Raddatz
447 U.S. 667 (Supreme Court, 1980)
Heck v. Humphrey
512 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Brown v. Astrue
649 F.3d 193 (Third Circuit, 2011)
Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply International, Inc.
702 F. Supp. 2d 465 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 2010)
Rieder v. Apfel
115 F. Supp. 2d 496 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 2000)
Henderson v. Carlson
812 F.2d 874 (Third Circuit, 1987)

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Brown v. Wayne County Pennsylvania, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-wayne-county-pennsylvania-pamd-2021.