1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 JESSICA MICHELLE BROWN, Case No.: 2:23-cv-00187-JAD-NJK
4 Plaintiff
5 v. Order Screening Complaint and Denying Motion to Stay Action 6 STATE OF NEVADA, et al., [ECF Nos. 1-1, 6] 7 Defendants
9 Plaintiff Jessica Brown brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming 10 that her Eighth Amendment rights were violated when she was falsely arrested for shoplifting in 11 October 2016 and December 2022 and criminally charged and detained. Because Brown applies 12 to proceed in forma pauperis,1 I screen her complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. I find that 13 Brown has not pled any colorable claims for relief, she brings claims that are not properly joined 14 in a single lawsuit, and she has not identified a proper defendant for any of her claims. So I 15 dismiss the complaint entirely with leave to amend. And I deny Brown’s request to stay this 16 lawsuit until after she’s released on probation in July 2023.2 17 I. Screening standard 18 Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner 19 seeks redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity.3 In 20 its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are 21 22 1 ECF No. 4. 23 2 ECF No. 7. 3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 1 frivolous or malicious, or that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 2 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.4 All or part of the complaint 3 may be dismissed sua sponte if the prisoner’s claims lack an arguable basis in law or fact. This 4 includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable, like claims against defendants who
5 are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest that clearly does not exist, as 6 well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations or fantastic or delusional scenarios.5 7 Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot 8 prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief.6 In making 9 this determination, the court takes all allegations of material fact as true and construes them in 10 the light most favorable to the plaintiff.7 Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less 11 stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,8 but a plaintiff must provide more 12 than mere labels and conclusions.9 “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a 13 complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.”10 “Determining whether a 14 complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the
15 reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”11 16 17
4 See id. at § 1915A(b)(1)(2). 18 5 See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989); see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 19 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 6 See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). 20 7 See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). 21 8 Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); see also Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that pro se pleadings must be liberally construed). 22 9 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 23 10 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 11 Id. 1 II. Screening the complaint 2 Brown sues the State of Nevada, Wal-Mart, and Goodwill for events that allegedly 3 happened when she was a free citizen and detained at Clark County Detention Center (CCDC). 4 She seeks monetary relief in the forms of prepaid home, car, and education and injunctive relief
5 of dropping the criminal charges against her. Brown brings two claims and alleges the 6 following. 7 Factual allegations 8 Brown was diagnosed with several mental health illnesses in 2012 and 2013, including 9 schizophrenia, bi-polar depressive disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. In October 2016 10 while Brown was “in [her] addiction” and as her schizophrenia developed, Brown went shopping 11 for a sweater. She was approached by the store’s manager while she shopped. When they 12 approached the front of the store, the manager told Brown that she couldn’t leave with the items 13 she’d collected in the store. Brown responded, “Tim is going to die anyway you can have it.” 14 Brown then “politely” handed the manager everything she had collected from the store, leaving
15 only her own pepper spray and knife in her hand. 16 The manager told Brown that she had to go with him, and he tried to grab her. Confused, 17 Brown fled and was apprehended by police “a few blocks up the street.” Brown was charged 18 with robbery and other crimes and “wrongly” placed in CCDC where she was “overly 19 medicated” and “legal attorneys denied all [her] pleas/requests for clarification help or rightful 20 explaining[.]” Brown spent four months in solitary confinement. 21 Brown went shopping again in December 2022. She approached the door with two items 22 in her hand and “attempt[ed] to throw a fit behind the mocking/disrespectful threats also 23 embarrassment in a store full of people” when an employee named A. Woods tried to touch her. 1 Brown was surrounded by 6–7 employees, so she held up her knife “attempting to protect 2 [herself] if Mrs. Woods touched [her].” Woods saw the knife and said she knows where Brown 3 lives. Brown left as “Metro” was called. 4 Woods testified in court that the store’s managers instructed the 6–7 employees to
5 apprehend Brown because she was “86.” Brown had previous encounters with that manager 6 accusing Brown of stealing at the dressing room and stalking Brown while she shopped in the 7 store. Brown called the manager a “clueless b****.” The two bickered some more and Brown 8 left the store and waited next door with “bat in hand” while Metro was at a nearby movie theater. 9 Brown approached an officer and explained what happened. The officer said that is 10 correct and told Brown to leave, so she did. But Brown was arrested and charged with crimes, 11 and she’s currently detained at CCDC, which “is illegal.” 12 Based on these allegations, Brown contends that defendants engaged in cruel and unusual 13 punishment and wrongfully incarcerated her. I liberally construe the complaint as bringing 14 claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause about Brown being forcibly
15 medicated and placed in solitary confinement while she was detained at CCDC following her 16 arrest in October 2016; claims challenging her October 2016 arrest and related detention, 17 criminal case, conviction, and sentence; and claims challenging her December 2022 arrest and 18 related detention and criminal case. I find that Brown’s complaint suffers from several defects, 19 so I dismiss the complaint in its entirety, grant leave to amend, and provide Brown guidance for 20 filing a properly formatted complaint. 21 22 23 1 Brown must comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 18, and 20. 2 A plaintiff’s complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 3 that [she] is entitled to relief.”12 Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.”13 A party 4 must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a
5 single set of circumstances.”14 And “each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence 6 . . . must be stated in a separate count.”15 7 A basic lawsuit is a single claim against a single defendant. Federal Rule of Civil 8 Procedure (FRCP) 18(a) allows a plaintiff to add multiple claims to the lawsuit when they are 9 against the same defendant. FRCP 20(a)(2) allows a plaintiff to join multiple defendants to a 10 lawsuit where the right to relief arises out of the same “transaction, occurrence, or series of 11 transactions or occurrences” and “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise 12 in the action.” However, unrelated claims that involve different defendants must be brought in 13 separate lawsuits.16 This rule is not only intended to avoid confusion that arises out of bloated 14 lawsuits, but also to ensure that inmates pay the required filing fees for their lawsuits and prevent
15 inmates from circumventing the three strikes rule under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.17 16 Brown’s complaint does not comply with these rules because it seeks to assert claims 17 about three separate occurrences or series of occurrences that are not related and involve 18
12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 19 13 Id. at 8(d)(1). 20 14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). 21 15 Id. 16 See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that “[a] buckshot complaint 22 that would be rejected if filed by a free person—say, a suit complaining that A defrauded the plaintiff, B defamed him, C punched him, D failed to pay a debt, and E infringed his copyright, 23 all in different transactions—should be rejected if filed by a prisoner”). 17 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 1 different defendants. For example, Brown raises claims about (1) her arrest in October 2016 and 2 subsequent detention, criminal case, conviction, and sentence; (2) the conditions of her 3 confinement at CCDC following her October 2016 arrest; and (3) her arrest in December 2022 4 and related detention and criminal case. Brown cannot combine claims about these three
5 unrelated events or series of events that involve different defendants into a single lawsuit. I 6 therefore dismiss the entire complaint without prejudice and grant her leave to file an amended 7 complaint that narrows these topics. 8 If Brown elects to file an amended complaint, she must choose which claim or related 9 claims she wishes to pursue in this action. Brown is advised that each claim raised in her 10 amended complaint must be permitted by either Rule 18 or Rule 20. Brown may state a single 11 claim against a single defendant. Brown may then add any additional claims to her action that 12 are against the same defendant under FRCP 18. Brown may also add additional claims against 13 other defendants if those claims arise from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 14 transactions as her original claim.18 Brown must comply with the procedures set forth in
15 General Order No. 2021-05 that apply to all non-habeas civil filings of pro se inmates. If 16 Brown’s amended complaint sets forth unrelated claims that violate joinder rules, the court will 17 dismiss the claims it finds to be improperly joined. 18 Brown should attempt to identify proper defendants. 19 In the instant complaint, Brown sues the State of Nevada, Goodwill, and Wal-Mart. But 20 plaintiffs generally cannot pursue § 1983 claims or state-law claims against the State of Nevada 21 or its agencies in federal court because the State has not waived its Eleventh Amendment 22 23
18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); accord General Order No. 2021-05 at p. 5. 1 sovereign immunity.19 And private parties like Goodwill and Wal-Mart generally do not act 2 under color of state law and therefore cannot be the targets of civil-rights claims under § 1983.20 3 The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “private parties may act under color of state law when the 4 state significantly involves itself in the private parties’ actions and decision making at issue.”21
5 But Brown does not plead facts that the State of Nevada was involved in the store employees’ 6 decisions to report Brown to the police for her alleged misconduct in Wal-Mart or Goodwill. I 7 therefore dismiss the State of Nevada with prejudice because amendment would be futile. And I 8 dismiss Wal-Mart and Goodwill without prejudice. This means Brown has leave to amend to 9 plead true facts that Wal-Mart or Goodwill acted under color of state law in connection with an 10 alleged constitutional violation. 11 Municipalities are not vicariously liable for their employees’ conduct. 12 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) operates CCDC. A municipality 13 like LVMPD may be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if the municipality itself causes 14 the violation at issue.22 To state a claim for municipal or county liability, a plaintiff must allege
15 that she suffered a constitutional deprivation that was the product of a policy or custom of the 16 19 Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co-op., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991); cf. Clark 17 v. St. of Wash., 366 F.2d 678, 681–82 (9th Cir. 1966) (concluding that the Washington State Bar Association is a state agency and immune from suit under Eleventh Amendment); accord Will v. 18 Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (holding that states are not persons for purposes of § 1983); see Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.031(3) (stating that the State of Nevada does not 19 waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Stanley v. Trustees of California State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the supplemental 20 jurisdiction statute, “does not abrogate state sovereign immunity for supplemental state law claims”). 21 20 Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707–08 (9th Cir. 1991). 22 21 Rawson v. Recovery Innovations, Inc., 975 F.3d 742, 753 (9th Cir. 2020, cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 69 (2021). 23 22 City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). 1 local government unit.23 “Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s 2 lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to 3 practically have the force of law.”24 But municipalities are not vicariously liable under § 1983 4 for their employees’ actions.25
5 A policy has been defined as “a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made 6 from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final 7 policy with respect to the subject matter in question.”26 The weight of authority has established 8 that a “policy can be one of action or inaction” within the meaning of Monell.27 And “[b]oth 9 types of claims require that the plaintiff prove a constitutional violation.”28 10 Claims about conditions of confinement at CCDC after October 2016 arrest 11 Fourteenth Amendment—forcible medication 12 Brown might be attempting to plead a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 13 Process Clause about being forcibly medicated while she was detained at CCDC. The United 14 States Supreme Court held in Washington v. Harper that “the Due Process Clause permits the
15 State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against 16 h[er] will, if the inmate is dangerous to h[er]self or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s 17 medical interest.”29 But the Due Process Clause requires certain essential procedural protections 18
19 23 Id. 24 See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). 20 25 Id. at 60. 21 26 Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690); see also Waggy v. Spokane Cnty. Washington, 594 F.3d 707, 713 (9th Cir. 2010). 22 27 Waggy, 594 F.3d at 713 (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388). 23 28 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 29 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990). 1 to ensure that the decision to medicate an inmate against her will is neither arbitrary nor 2 erroneous.30 Although a court must examine the procedures used in the case before it, the 3 Supreme Court has held that notice, the right to be present at an adversary hearing, and the right 4 to present and cross-examine witnesses are sufficient procedures to meet the requirements of due
5 process.31 In United States v. Loughner, the Ninth Circuit held that “when the government seeks 6 to medicate a detainee—whether pretrial or post-conviction—on the grounds that [she] is a 7 danger to [herself] or others, the government must satisfy the standard set forth in Harper.”32 8 But “[i]f the government seeks to medicate involuntarily a pretrial detainee on trial 9 competency grounds, that is a matter of trial administration and the heightened standard 10 announced in [Sell v. United States] applies.”33 In Sell, the Supreme Court set out the standards 11 for when the government may administer antipsychotic drugs involuntarily to a mentally ill 12 criminal defendant to render her competent for trial. The Supreme Court held that (1) a court 13 must find that important governmental trial interests are at stake; (2) involuntary medication will 14 significantly further these government interests without causing side effects that will interfere
15 significantly with the criminal defendant’s fair trial rights; (3) involuntary medication is 16 necessary to further the government’s interests, taking into account less intrusive alternatives; 17 and (4) the administration of the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient’s best medical 18 interest in light of her medical condition.34 19 20
21 30 Id. at 228, 236. 31 Id. at 235. 22 32 United States v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731, 752 (9th Cir. 2012). 23 33 Id. at 750. 34 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 , 180–81 (2003); see Loughner, 672 F.3d at 747. 1 Brown’s vague and conclusory allegations that she was “overly medicated” and “being 2 tortured in terms of [her] meds” fail to state a colorable claim that she was unconstitutionally 3 medicated while detained at CCDC. Problems with this claim include that Brown does not plead 4 facts about her medications and the circumstances surrounding the decision to medicate her. Nor
5 does Brown identify the person or persons who decided to medicate her, even if she does not 6 know their true name or names. 7 But it does not yet appear that Brown cannot state any set of facts upon which relief 8 could be granted. So I dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment forcible-medication claim without 9 prejudice, and I grant leave to amend this claim. If Brown chooses to amend and attempts to 10 replead this claim, she should allege true facts about who decided to medicate her, why that 11 decision was made, when she was medicated, and how she was medicated. 12 Brown is cautioned that the use of John Doe or similar means as a placeholder for a yet 13 unidentified defendant is not favored in the Ninth Circuit. However, flexibility is allowed in 14 cases in which the identity of a party will not be known before filing a complaint but can
15 subsequently be determined through discovery.35 If Brown does not know the true name of any 16 defendant who is responsible for an alleged constitutional violation, she should allege sufficient 17 facts to show that the person’s name can be determined through discovery. For example, Brown 18 can allege facts describing the defendant and the approximate dates, times, and locations of 19 events the defendant allegedly participated in. 20 Fourteenth Amendment—solitary confinement 21 Brown also might be attempting to plead a claim about being placed in solitary 22 confinement at CCDC after her arrest in October 2016. A pretrial detainee’s claims challenging 23
35 Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). 1 unconstitutional conditions of confinement fall under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 2 Clause.36 “The placement of pretrial detainees in safety cells [or solitary confinement] is 3 ‘punishment’ in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment only if prison officials act with 4 deliberate indifference to the inmates’ needs.”37 The court evaluates Fourteenth Amendment
5 conditions-of-confinement claims under the objective deliberate-indifference standard.38 To 6 establish unconstitutional conditions of confinement, a pretrial detainee must prove that, 7 (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those 8 conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available 9 measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk 10 involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant 11 caused the plaintiff’s injuries.39
12 When addressing the objective reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct, a pretrial detainee 13 may show that “the challenged governmental action is not rationally related to a legitimate 14 governmental objective or that it is excessive in relation to that purpose.”40 15 Brown’s vague and conclusory allegation that she spent four months in solitary 16 confinement fails to state a colorable claim that she was punished under the Fourteenth 17 Amendment. The problem is that Brown does not plead facts about her placement in solitary 18 19 20 36 See Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2018). 21 37 Cf. Anderson v. Cnty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995) (regarding use of “safety cells for suicidal and mentally disturbed inmates”). 22 38 See id. 23 39 Id. at 1125; see also Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016). 40 Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397–98 (2015). 1 confinement. Nor does she identify the person or persons who placed or kept her in solitary 2 confinement, even if she does not know their true name or names. 3 But it does not yet appear that Brown cannot state any set of facts upon which relief 4 could be granted. So I dismiss her Fourteenth Amendment solitary-confinement claim without
5 prejudice, and I grant leave to amend this claim. If Brown chooses to amend and attempts to 6 replead this claim, she should allege true facts about who decided to place her in solitary 7 confinement, why that decision was made, and the conditions she experienced in confinement. 8 Claims about the October 2016 arrest and related occurrences 9 To the extent Brown is attempting to assert federal claims about her October 2016 arrest 10 and related detention, criminal case, conviction, or sentence, she fails to state a colorable claim 11 for relief because she does not allege that her conviction or sentence have been invalidated. The 12 Supreme Court explained in Heck v. Humphrey that, “in order to recover damages for [an] 13 allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions 14 whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove
15 that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, 16 declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into 17 question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.”41 “A claim 18 for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been . . . 19 invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.”42 When a district court dismisses under Heck, the 20 21 41 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994); see Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 22 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that § 1983 claims for false arrest and false imprisonment were barred by Heck because, to prevail on them, the plaintiff “would have to 23 demonstrate that there was no probable cause to arrest him”). 42 Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. 1 dismissal is required to be without prejudice so that the plaintiff “may reassert [her] claims if 2 [she] ever succeeds in invalidating [her] conviction.”43 3 If Brown chooses to amend and attempts to replead this claim, she should plead true facts 4 to show that her conviction or sentence arising out of her October 2016 arrest have been
5 invalidated. Alternatively, if Brown’s conviction or sentence have not been invalidated and she 6 is attempting to challenge their validity, she may file a habeas corpus petition in a new action, 7 under a new case number, and either pay the $5 fee for filing that proceeding or apply to proceed 8 in forma pauperis. 9 Claims about December 2022 arrest and related occurrences 10 To the extent Brown is attempting to assert federal habeas claims about her December 11 2022 arrest and related pending detention and criminal case, she fails to state a colorable claim 12 for relief because the comity-based Younger abstention doctrine prevents federal courts from 13 interfering with pending state court criminal proceedings by granting injunctive or declaratory 14 relief, even if there is an allegation of a constitutional violation, unless there is an extraordinary
15 circumstance that creates a threat of irreparable injury.44 The Supreme Court has instructed that 16 “federal-court abstention is required” when there is “a parallel, pending state criminal 17 proceeding.”45 Injuries are only irreparable if the threat to a petitioner’s federally protected 18 rights cannot be eliminated through her defense of the criminal case.46 19 20 43 Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995). 21 44 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53–54 (1971). 22 45 Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013) (emphasis added); Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004) (federal courts generally abstain from granting any relief 23 that would interfere with pending state judicial proceedings). 46 Younger, 401 U.S. at 46. 1 Brown’s conclusory allegation that her current detention at CCDC is “illegal” fails to 2 satisfy this standard. Brown’s claims about her December 2022 arrest and related pending 3 detention and criminal case are therefore dismissed without prejudice, and I grant leave to amend 4 if Brown can plead true facts that any threat to her federally protected rights cannot be eliminated
5 through her defense of the criminal case. 6 III. Leave to amend 7 Brown has leave to file an amended complaint choosing which claim or related claims 8 she wants to bring in this action and to cure the other defects identified in this order. If Brown 9 chooses to file an amended complaint, she is advised that an amended complaint replaces the 10 original complaint, so the amended complaint must be complete in itself.47 She must file the 11 amended complaint on this court’s approved prisoner-civil-rights form, and it must be titled 12 “First Amended Complaint.” Brown must follow the instructions on the form. She need not and 13 should not allege very many facts in the “nature of the case” section of the form. Rather, in each 14 claim, she should allege facts sufficient to show what each defendant did to violate her civil
15 rights. And she must file the amended complaint by July 14, 2023. 16 IV. Motion to stay action [ECF No. 6] 17 Brown moves for an “extension” of this lawsuit, arguing that she’ll be placed on 18 probation in July 2023 and “will be able to p[u]rsue the case safely [in] Aug[ust] 2023.”48 19 20
21 47 See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[t]he fact that a party was named in the original complaint is irrelevant; an 22 amended pleading supersedes the original”); see also Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that for claims dismissed with prejudice, a plaintiff is not required 23 to reallege such claims in a subsequent amended complaint to preserve them for appeal). 48 ECF No. 6. 1 Brown explains that she wants a stay because “safety is [her] main concern now.”49 I deny 2 Brown’s motion to stay this case pending her projected release on probation. And I caution 3 Brown that under Nevada Local Rule IA 3-1, a “pro se party must immediately file with the 4 court written notification of any change of mailing address, email address, telephone number, or
5 facsimile number. The notification must include proof of service on each opposing party or the 6 party’s attorney[,]” when applicable.50 “Failure to comply with this rule may result in the 7 dismissal of the action, entry of default judgment, or other sanctions as deemed appropriate by 8 the court.”51 9 V. Conclusion 10 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that a decision on the application to proceed in forma 11 pauperis (ECF No. 4) is DEFERRED. 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to stay this action (ECF No. 6) is 13 DENIED. 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the entire complaint (ECF No. 1-1) is DISMISSED
15 without prejudice. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant State of Nevada is DISMISSED with 17 prejudice. 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Wal-Mart and Goodwill are DISMISSED 19 without prejudice. 20 21 22 49 Id. at 2. 23 50 LR IA 3-1. 51 Id. 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff has until July 14, 2023, to file an amended 2\|complaint. If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, she must use the approved form and will title it “First Amended Complaint.” The amended complaint will be screened in a separate screening order, and the screening process will take many months. If plaintiff does 5] not file an amended complaint by July 14, 2023, this action will be subject to dismissal for 6|| failure to state a claim. 7 Alternatively, if plaintiff's conviction or sentence associated with her October 2016 arrest 8|| has not been invalidated and she is attempting to challenge its validity, then she may file a 9|| habeas corpus petition about that matter in a new action, under a new case number, and either pay the $5 fee for filing that proceeding or apply to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff may not file those documents in this action. 12 The Clerk of the Court is directed to FILE the complaint (ECF No. 1-1) and SEND 13] plaintiff Jessica Michelle Brown copies of the complaint (ECF No. 1-1), the approved form for 14|| filing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint and instructions for the same, the approved application to 15]| proceed in forma pauperis for an inmate and instructions for the same, a blank 28 U.S.C. § 2254 16|| habeas corpus form and instructions for the same, and General Order No. 2021-05. 17 Dated: June 14, 2023
9 US. Distrigt Judge C) 20 21 22 23