IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JANARD BROWN, § § No. 532, 2013 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below: § v. § Superior Court of the § State of Delaware, in and for STATE OF DELAWARE, § New Castle County § Plaintiff Below, § Cr. I.D. No. 1209007265 Appellee. §
Submitted: September 24, 2014 Decided: October 9, 2014
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, RIDGELY and VALIHURA, Justices.
ORDER
This 9th day of October 2014, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and
the record below, it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant below, Janard Brown (“Brown”) appeals from his
convictions and sentencing for drug dealing and driving after judgment prohibited.
The trial court sentenced Brown to fifteen years at Level V incarceration,
suspended after eight years at decreasing levels of supervision, for drug dealing;
and one year at Level V incarceration for driving after judgment prohibited. On
appeal, Brown argues: (1) that the police officer who arrested Brown did not have
probable cause to arrest him; (2) that the police officer did not have reasonable
suspicion to stop and frisk him; (3) that, under Delaware law, a police officer may not summarily arrest a suspect for driving with a suspended license; and (4) that
Brown’s sentence for drug dealing violated due process. We find no merit to these
arguments and affirm.
2. On September 10, 2012, a police officer pulled Brown over for
driving without wearing a seatbelt. The officer recognized Brown from prior
encounters. Based on a search of a database the officer had personally conducted
roughly one month before, the officer believed Brown had been driving with a
suspended license. The officer placed Brown under arrest and conducted a search
incident to arrest. The search uncovered 0.85 grams of crack cocaine hidden in
Brown’s shoe and $483 in his pocket. On April 23, 2013, Brown filed a motion to
suppress the evidence recovered from the search. The trial court denied Brown’s
motion.
3. This Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress for an
abuse of discretion.1 This Court reviews factual findings to determine whether the
trial court abused its discretion “in determining whether there is sufficient evidence
to support the findings and whether those findings were not clearly erroneous.”2
To the extent this Court examines the trial court’s legal conclusions, this Court
1 Stafford v. State, 59 A.3d 1223, 1227 (Del. 2012). 2 Id.
2 reviews them de novo.3 The question of whether probable cause exists for an arrest
in a given case is a mixed question of fact and law.4
4. We find that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress
because its determination that there was probable cause to arrest Brown is
supported by the record. A police officer is permitted to arrest if the officer has
reasonable ground to believe that the individual has committed a misdemeanor in
the officer’s presence.5 Here, the officer had probable cause to believe a
misdemeanor under 21 Del. C. § 2801 (driving after judgment prohibited) had
occurred in the officer’s presence. In other words, Delaware law allows an officer
to arrest an individual when the officer has probable cause to believe the individual
is driving with a suspended license.
5. The Wilmington Police Department considered Brown a person of
interest. The officer testified that after pulling Brown over, he recognized Brown
from past investigations and arrests. Brown also knew the identity of the officer
and identified the officer by his last name. The officer testified that he believed
Brown was driving with a suspended license at the time of the stop based on a
3 Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1284-85 (Del. 2008). 4 Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 750 (Del. 2006). 5 11 Del. C. § 1904(a)(1).
3 search of a database roughly one month before.6 The officer placed Brown under
arrest and two other police vehicles arrived at the scene. The trial court credited
the officer’s testimony and found that probable cause existed for Brown’s arrest.7
We defer to the trial court’s factual findings and do not believe they are clearly
erroneous.
6. We further find that the officer was permitted to conduct a search
incident to arrest. Officers may conduct a search of the space within an
individual’s immediate control incident to the individual’s arrest.8 This space
includes “the area from which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.”9 In a search incident to arrest, it does not matter whether
the arresting officer believes that the arrestee is armed, dangerous or likely to
destroy evidence.10 Further, “[e]ven if the offense [for which the individual is
arrested] is nonthreatening, an officer may conduct a search incident to arrest.”11
7. The officer searched Brown’s person after he was placed under arrest.
The search was of the space within Brown’s immediate control – his pockets and
6 At trial, the State introduced Brown’s certified driving record as an exhibit. That record indicated that on September 10, 2012, the date of the arrest, Brown’s license was suspended. Brown does not deny this fact. 7 Appendix to Appellant’s Opening Brief at A19 (“[T]he court credits the officer’s testimony that he knew that he recognized Defendant and knew his license had been suspended.”). 8 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009). 9 Id. (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). 10 Stafford, 59 A.3d at 1231. 11 Id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973)).
4 shoes – and was conducted immediately after the arrest. We find that the search
incident to arrest was valid. Accordingly, we find that the motion to suppress was
properly denied.
8. Brown also argues on appeal that the stop, detention and search
violate his rights under Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution. We find
that Brown has not fully and fairly raised this argument at the trial court below.
Brown merely cited to the Delaware Constitution in his motion to suppress as the
basis under which he should not have been detained and searched. As this Court
held in State v. Meades12 and Ortiz v. State,13 there must be more than a mere
citation to legal authority for the issue to be preserved on appeal. Accordingly, we
do not address Brown’s constitutional argument as it is not properly before this
Court.
9. We find the remaining issue regarding Brown’s sentence to be without
merit. Our standard of review for sentences imposed by trial courts is generally
limited when the sentence is within the statutory limit proscribed by the
legislature.14 We find that the sentence imposed is within the statutory limit and
12 947 A.2d 1093, 1096-97 (Del. 2008) (explaining that for an argument to be preserved on appeal, there must be more than “one, indirect reference” to the argument). 13 869 A.2d 285
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JANARD BROWN, § § No. 532, 2013 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below: § v. § Superior Court of the § State of Delaware, in and for STATE OF DELAWARE, § New Castle County § Plaintiff Below, § Cr. I.D. No. 1209007265 Appellee. §
Submitted: September 24, 2014 Decided: October 9, 2014
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, RIDGELY and VALIHURA, Justices.
ORDER
This 9th day of October 2014, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and
the record below, it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant below, Janard Brown (“Brown”) appeals from his
convictions and sentencing for drug dealing and driving after judgment prohibited.
The trial court sentenced Brown to fifteen years at Level V incarceration,
suspended after eight years at decreasing levels of supervision, for drug dealing;
and one year at Level V incarceration for driving after judgment prohibited. On
appeal, Brown argues: (1) that the police officer who arrested Brown did not have
probable cause to arrest him; (2) that the police officer did not have reasonable
suspicion to stop and frisk him; (3) that, under Delaware law, a police officer may not summarily arrest a suspect for driving with a suspended license; and (4) that
Brown’s sentence for drug dealing violated due process. We find no merit to these
arguments and affirm.
2. On September 10, 2012, a police officer pulled Brown over for
driving without wearing a seatbelt. The officer recognized Brown from prior
encounters. Based on a search of a database the officer had personally conducted
roughly one month before, the officer believed Brown had been driving with a
suspended license. The officer placed Brown under arrest and conducted a search
incident to arrest. The search uncovered 0.85 grams of crack cocaine hidden in
Brown’s shoe and $483 in his pocket. On April 23, 2013, Brown filed a motion to
suppress the evidence recovered from the search. The trial court denied Brown’s
motion.
3. This Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress for an
abuse of discretion.1 This Court reviews factual findings to determine whether the
trial court abused its discretion “in determining whether there is sufficient evidence
to support the findings and whether those findings were not clearly erroneous.”2
To the extent this Court examines the trial court’s legal conclusions, this Court
1 Stafford v. State, 59 A.3d 1223, 1227 (Del. 2012). 2 Id.
2 reviews them de novo.3 The question of whether probable cause exists for an arrest
in a given case is a mixed question of fact and law.4
4. We find that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress
because its determination that there was probable cause to arrest Brown is
supported by the record. A police officer is permitted to arrest if the officer has
reasonable ground to believe that the individual has committed a misdemeanor in
the officer’s presence.5 Here, the officer had probable cause to believe a
misdemeanor under 21 Del. C. § 2801 (driving after judgment prohibited) had
occurred in the officer’s presence. In other words, Delaware law allows an officer
to arrest an individual when the officer has probable cause to believe the individual
is driving with a suspended license.
5. The Wilmington Police Department considered Brown a person of
interest. The officer testified that after pulling Brown over, he recognized Brown
from past investigations and arrests. Brown also knew the identity of the officer
and identified the officer by his last name. The officer testified that he believed
Brown was driving with a suspended license at the time of the stop based on a
3 Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1284-85 (Del. 2008). 4 Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 750 (Del. 2006). 5 11 Del. C. § 1904(a)(1).
3 search of a database roughly one month before.6 The officer placed Brown under
arrest and two other police vehicles arrived at the scene. The trial court credited
the officer’s testimony and found that probable cause existed for Brown’s arrest.7
We defer to the trial court’s factual findings and do not believe they are clearly
erroneous.
6. We further find that the officer was permitted to conduct a search
incident to arrest. Officers may conduct a search of the space within an
individual’s immediate control incident to the individual’s arrest.8 This space
includes “the area from which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.”9 In a search incident to arrest, it does not matter whether
the arresting officer believes that the arrestee is armed, dangerous or likely to
destroy evidence.10 Further, “[e]ven if the offense [for which the individual is
arrested] is nonthreatening, an officer may conduct a search incident to arrest.”11
7. The officer searched Brown’s person after he was placed under arrest.
The search was of the space within Brown’s immediate control – his pockets and
6 At trial, the State introduced Brown’s certified driving record as an exhibit. That record indicated that on September 10, 2012, the date of the arrest, Brown’s license was suspended. Brown does not deny this fact. 7 Appendix to Appellant’s Opening Brief at A19 (“[T]he court credits the officer’s testimony that he knew that he recognized Defendant and knew his license had been suspended.”). 8 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009). 9 Id. (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). 10 Stafford, 59 A.3d at 1231. 11 Id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973)).
4 shoes – and was conducted immediately after the arrest. We find that the search
incident to arrest was valid. Accordingly, we find that the motion to suppress was
properly denied.
8. Brown also argues on appeal that the stop, detention and search
violate his rights under Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution. We find
that Brown has not fully and fairly raised this argument at the trial court below.
Brown merely cited to the Delaware Constitution in his motion to suppress as the
basis under which he should not have been detained and searched. As this Court
held in State v. Meades12 and Ortiz v. State,13 there must be more than a mere
citation to legal authority for the issue to be preserved on appeal. Accordingly, we
do not address Brown’s constitutional argument as it is not properly before this
Court.
9. We find the remaining issue regarding Brown’s sentence to be without
merit. Our standard of review for sentences imposed by trial courts is generally
limited when the sentence is within the statutory limit proscribed by the
legislature.14 We find that the sentence imposed is within the statutory limit and
12 947 A.2d 1093, 1096-97 (Del. 2008) (explaining that for an argument to be preserved on appeal, there must be more than “one, indirect reference” to the argument). 13 869 A.2d 285, 290-91, n.4 (Del. 2005) (finding that a citation to Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution without a legal argument or citation to other authority does not support a conclusory declarative statement that Appellant’s rights had been violated). 14 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1992); Ward v. State, 567 A.2d 1296, 1297-98 (Del. 1989).
5 took into account aggravating and mitigating factors. Accordingly, we find that
Brown’s sentence does not violate his due process rights.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen L. Valihura Justice