IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
ANGELA BROWN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CV 125-026 ) ARTHUR SLATER; BEEMAC, INC.; and ) JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 13, ) ) Defendants. )
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
In consideration of the record, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS this case be REMANDED to the State Court of Richmond County, Georgia, based on lack of subject- matter jurisdiction, the parties’ request to transfer this case to the Middle District of Georgia be DENIED AS MOOT, (doc. no. 11), and this civil action be CLOSED. I. BACKGROUND Following a motor vehicle accident, Plaintiff filed this action in the State Court of Richmond County, Georgia, and Defendant Arthur Slater filed a Notice of Removal on February 4, 2025, asserting diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000. (Doc. no. 1-1, pp. 3-5.) There is no specific amount of damages claimed in the complaint. (See generally doc. no. 1-2, pp. 1-12.) On February 6, 2025, the Court entered an Order explaining why Defendant Slater’s expectation that the amount in controversy will exceed $75,000 is insufficient to serve as the basis for satisfaction of the amount in controversy. (Doc. no. 5.) Further, the Court ordered the removing Defendant to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating that the jurisdictional amount is in controversy. (Id. at 2.) When Defendant Slater failed to timely respond, the Court extended the deadline to comply. (Doc. no. 11.) In response, the parties submitted a wholly conclusory stipulation in which the parties “agreed that the amount of controversy in this matter is in excess of $75,000” and request this case be transferred to the Middle District of
Georgia. (Doc. no. 12, p. 2.) There is no documentation in support of the stipulation. II. DISCUSSION
Generally, a defendant may remove an action from state court when the federal court would possess original jurisdiction over the subject matter, “except as otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The Court construes the removal statute narrowly. Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 766 (11th Cir. 2010). “Indeed, all doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). A removing defendant has the burden to establish federal jurisdiction. See Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007). And the removing party must point to
facts, not conclusory allegations, to meet its burden. See Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2001). “A court’s analysis of the amount-in-controversy requirement focuses on how much is in controversy at the time of removal, not later.” Pretka, 608 F.3d at 751. Moreover, “[w]here, as here, the plaintiff has not pled a specific amount of damages, the removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement.” Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319. Although a defendant need not “banish all uncertainty about” the amount in controversy, the Court requires a removing defendant to make “specific factual allegations establishing jurisdiction
[that can be supported] . . . with evidence combined with reasonable deductions, reasonable inferences, or other reasonable extrapolations.” Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754; see also Dudley v. Eli Lilly & Co., 778 F.3d 909, 913 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining “pertinent question is what is in controversy in the case, not how much the plaintiffs are ultimately likely to recover. (citations, emphasis, and quotation omitted)). That is, the existence of jurisdiction should not be “divined by looking to the stars.” Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1215. An indeterminate claim for damages is not dispositive but should not be ignored by the
Court. See Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058, 1064 (11th Cir. 2010). Rather, “courts may use their judicial experience and common sense in determining whether the case stated in a complaint meets federal jurisdictional requirements.” Id. at 1062 (footnote omitted). The Court’s analysis is also guided by the following cautionary words from the Eleventh Circuit: Because jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, the district court should be leery of any stipulations the parties offer concerning the facts related to jurisdiction. Given that the parties share the goal of having this case decided in federal court, the district court should be especially mindful of its independent obligation to ensure that jurisdiction exists before federal judicial power is exercised over the merits of the case.
Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1275 (11th Cir. 2000). Here, Defendant Slater has failed to meet his burden by a preponderance of the evidence to show the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. The original complaint itemized no damages, and the parties have advanced only a factually-unsupported stipulation concerning the amount in controversy. The stipulation does not satisfy the removing Defendant’s burden to provide evidence establishing the jurisdictional amount is in controversy. See Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2001) (requiring removing party to point to facts, not conclusory allegations, to meet its burden).
Likewise, the general request for “compensatory, special, economic, consequential, general, punitive, and all other damages permissible under Georgia law,” (Doc. no. 1-2, p. 11), in the complaint provides no detail or basis upon which the Court can make reasonable deductions, inferences, or other extrapolations. See Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754; see also Williams, 269 F.3d at 1318, 1320 (rejecting contention that amount in controversy facially exceeded $75,000 where complaint alleged trip over curb caused permanent physical and mental injuries, substantial medical expenses, lost wages, diminished earning capacity—all of which
would continue in future—and complaint contained demand for both compensatory and punitive damages in unspecified amounts). As explained above, the Court has an “independent obligation” to ensure federal jurisdiction exists. Morrison, 228 F.3d at 1275. Here, the Court cannot conclude the defense has met its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence the value of this case meets the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold. Indeed, this finding is in line with the conclusions of District
Courts within the Eleventh Circuit. See Williams v. Walmart Stores East, LP, CV 118-083, 2018 WL 3749470, at *2-3 (S.D. Ga.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
ANGELA BROWN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CV 125-026 ) ARTHUR SLATER; BEEMAC, INC.; and ) JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 13, ) ) Defendants. )
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
In consideration of the record, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS this case be REMANDED to the State Court of Richmond County, Georgia, based on lack of subject- matter jurisdiction, the parties’ request to transfer this case to the Middle District of Georgia be DENIED AS MOOT, (doc. no. 11), and this civil action be CLOSED. I. BACKGROUND Following a motor vehicle accident, Plaintiff filed this action in the State Court of Richmond County, Georgia, and Defendant Arthur Slater filed a Notice of Removal on February 4, 2025, asserting diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000. (Doc. no. 1-1, pp. 3-5.) There is no specific amount of damages claimed in the complaint. (See generally doc. no. 1-2, pp. 1-12.) On February 6, 2025, the Court entered an Order explaining why Defendant Slater’s expectation that the amount in controversy will exceed $75,000 is insufficient to serve as the basis for satisfaction of the amount in controversy. (Doc. no. 5.) Further, the Court ordered the removing Defendant to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating that the jurisdictional amount is in controversy. (Id. at 2.) When Defendant Slater failed to timely respond, the Court extended the deadline to comply. (Doc. no. 11.) In response, the parties submitted a wholly conclusory stipulation in which the parties “agreed that the amount of controversy in this matter is in excess of $75,000” and request this case be transferred to the Middle District of
Georgia. (Doc. no. 12, p. 2.) There is no documentation in support of the stipulation. II. DISCUSSION
Generally, a defendant may remove an action from state court when the federal court would possess original jurisdiction over the subject matter, “except as otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The Court construes the removal statute narrowly. Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 766 (11th Cir. 2010). “Indeed, all doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). A removing defendant has the burden to establish federal jurisdiction. See Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007). And the removing party must point to
facts, not conclusory allegations, to meet its burden. See Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2001). “A court’s analysis of the amount-in-controversy requirement focuses on how much is in controversy at the time of removal, not later.” Pretka, 608 F.3d at 751. Moreover, “[w]here, as here, the plaintiff has not pled a specific amount of damages, the removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement.” Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319. Although a defendant need not “banish all uncertainty about” the amount in controversy, the Court requires a removing defendant to make “specific factual allegations establishing jurisdiction
[that can be supported] . . . with evidence combined with reasonable deductions, reasonable inferences, or other reasonable extrapolations.” Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754; see also Dudley v. Eli Lilly & Co., 778 F.3d 909, 913 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining “pertinent question is what is in controversy in the case, not how much the plaintiffs are ultimately likely to recover. (citations, emphasis, and quotation omitted)). That is, the existence of jurisdiction should not be “divined by looking to the stars.” Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1215. An indeterminate claim for damages is not dispositive but should not be ignored by the
Court. See Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058, 1064 (11th Cir. 2010). Rather, “courts may use their judicial experience and common sense in determining whether the case stated in a complaint meets federal jurisdictional requirements.” Id. at 1062 (footnote omitted). The Court’s analysis is also guided by the following cautionary words from the Eleventh Circuit: Because jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, the district court should be leery of any stipulations the parties offer concerning the facts related to jurisdiction. Given that the parties share the goal of having this case decided in federal court, the district court should be especially mindful of its independent obligation to ensure that jurisdiction exists before federal judicial power is exercised over the merits of the case.
Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1275 (11th Cir. 2000). Here, Defendant Slater has failed to meet his burden by a preponderance of the evidence to show the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. The original complaint itemized no damages, and the parties have advanced only a factually-unsupported stipulation concerning the amount in controversy. The stipulation does not satisfy the removing Defendant’s burden to provide evidence establishing the jurisdictional amount is in controversy. See Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2001) (requiring removing party to point to facts, not conclusory allegations, to meet its burden).
Likewise, the general request for “compensatory, special, economic, consequential, general, punitive, and all other damages permissible under Georgia law,” (Doc. no. 1-2, p. 11), in the complaint provides no detail or basis upon which the Court can make reasonable deductions, inferences, or other extrapolations. See Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754; see also Williams, 269 F.3d at 1318, 1320 (rejecting contention that amount in controversy facially exceeded $75,000 where complaint alleged trip over curb caused permanent physical and mental injuries, substantial medical expenses, lost wages, diminished earning capacity—all of which
would continue in future—and complaint contained demand for both compensatory and punitive damages in unspecified amounts). As explained above, the Court has an “independent obligation” to ensure federal jurisdiction exists. Morrison, 228 F.3d at 1275. Here, the Court cannot conclude the defense has met its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence the value of this case meets the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold. Indeed, this finding is in line with the conclusions of District
Courts within the Eleventh Circuit. See Williams v. Walmart Stores East, LP, CV 118-083, 2018 WL 3749470, at *2-3 (S.D. Ga. July 9, 2018) (finding no jurisdiction in slip and fall case with approximately $15,000 in medicals, pre-removal refusal by Plaintiff’s counsel for stipulation of damages less than $75,000, and general request for future damages and ongoing pain and suffering damages), adopted by, 2018 WL 3747454 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 7, 2018) (Hall, C.J); Kenney v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., CV 116-113, 2016 WL 6650845, at *2-3 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 9, 2016) (finding no jurisdiction in pressure washer injury case with $36,000 in medicals, post-removal removal response to request for admission that damages exceed $75,000, and $100,000 settlement demand), adopted by, 2016 WL 7131539 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 6, 2016) (Hall, C.J.); Cobb v. Sanders, CV 116-073, 2016 WL 4197595, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 9, 2016) (finding
no jurisdiction in vehicle accident case with $31,000 in medicals, allegations of general damages, and demand letter for $225,000), adopted by, 2016 WL 4582067 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 1, 2016) (Hall, C.J.); Arrington v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 7:13-CV-154, 2014 WL 657398, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 20, 2014) (finding no jurisdiction in slip-and-fall case with $44,000 in medicals and insufficient evidence to calculate future monetary losses); Cross v. Wal-Mart Stores, E., LP, No. 7:11-CV-21, 2011 WL 976414, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2011) (finding no jurisdiction in slip-and-fall case with $45,000 in medicals, allegations of general damages,
and a demand letter for $125,000); but see Farley v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., No. 5:13-CV- 52, 2013 WL 1748608, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 23, 2013) (finding jurisdiction in premises liability case with $13,000 in medicals and the possibility of two future surgeries). Because the Court finds the removing Defendant has not met his burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence the value of this case meets the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold, the Court need not reach the issue of whether this case should be transferred to a more
convenient federal forum. Accordingly, the parties’ request to transfer this case to the Middle District of Georgia should be DENIED AS MOOT. (Doc. no. 11.) III. CONCLUSION Because there is no subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS this case be REMANDED to the State Court of Richmond County, Georgia, based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the parties’ request to transfer this case to the Middle District of Georgia be DENIED AS MOOT, (doc. no. 11), and this civil action be CLOSED. SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of March, 2025, at Augusta, Georgia.
BRIAN K. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA