Brown v. Puget Sound Reduction Co.

110 F. 383, 1901 U.S. App. LEXIS 4866
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Washington
DecidedJuly 3, 1901
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 110 F. 383 (Brown v. Puget Sound Reduction Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Puget Sound Reduction Co., 110 F. 383, 1901 U.S. App. LEXIS 4866 (circtdwa 1901).

Opinion

HANFORD, District Judge.

The defendant is the proprietor of, and engaged in operating, ore-smelting works at Fverett, in the state of Washington, and has set up for use in its establishment one ore- . roasting furnace constructed by representatives of the complainant according to the specifications of his patent; also one ore-roasting furnace constructed by the Park & Lacey Company according to the specifications of the Ropp patent; and a third ore-roasting furnace .of the style known as the “Holthoff-Wethey Furnace,” constructed by the Edward P. Allis Company, according to the specifications of the Wethey patents. The several patents referred to all cover improvements in apparatus for stirring the ore during the process of roasting, and moving it continuously upon the hearth from the feeding hopper to the discharge end of the oven. Previous to Mr. Brown’s invention, the process of rabbling the heated ore in reverberating furnaces was done either by manual labor by means of rakes thrust into the oven through side openings, or by mechanism entirely within the oven, and exposed to the injurious effects of heat, fumes, and dust. The hand operation was slow and expensive, and all machinery operating within the hot chamber of the oven was soo.n destroyed by the 'deleterious effects of heat, fumes, and dust. The primary object of Mr. Brown’s patent is to utilize power for operating rabbling apparatus, and to protect the running gear from exposure to the heat, fumes, and dust within the ovens; and the means to accomplish this object, described in his specifications, consists of a .brick arch containing two central compartments, one above the other, which constitute the ovens in which the ore is.roasted. On each side of the central compartment there is a supplemental chamber within the outer walls of the arch, and separated from the central [385]*385compartment by a partition wall, which is divided by a longitudinal slot, the upper part of the partition being suspended from above, and the part below the slot being supported by the same construction which supports the floor or hearth of the oven. Within these supplemental chambers a track is constructed upon which trucks are made to run, and from each truck an arm, to which blades for plowing the ore are attached, extends laterally through the slot into the central compartment. The trucks are attached to endless chains mounted upon pulley wheels, which are rotated by mechanical power, and by this means they are impelled to move upon the tracks forward from the feed end of the upper oven to the other end, and down to the tracks below, and back to the starting point, passing revolving-doors which close each end; and as the trucks move the blades stir the mass of heated ore within the ovens, and keep it moving gradually from the feed end of the upper oven to an opening in the hearth near the other end, through which it descends to the lower hearth, and is then moved the same way in the opposite direction to the place of discharge. The arch is braced and strengthened by iron or steel T rails set upright outside of the walls, and bound by cross-ties under the bottom and over the top; and the outside walls have openings, with doors, for regulating the admission of air.

In the argument which has been made before me, counsel for the complainant has claimed an infringement by the defendant of only the first claim of the patent, which is in the following words:

“(1) In an ore-roasting furnace, having means for stirring and advancing-the ore, a supplemental chamber at the side of the main roasting chamber, and cut off from said main chamber by a wall or partition, and carriers in said supplemental chambers, connected with the stirrers, but removed from the direct action of the heat, fumes, and dust, substantially as herein described.”

The validity of the complainant’s patent has been adjudicated in the United States circuit court for the district of Colorado, and the decision rendered by Judge Hallett in that case has been affirmed by the United States circuit court of appeals for the Eighth circuit, and in the same case it was also adjudged that a furnace constrtícted according to the specifications of the Ropp patent infringes the Brown patent (Metallic Extraction Co. v. Brown [C. C. A.] 104 Fed. 345); and the decision referred to has been followed in another district within the Eighth circuit. After reading all the affidavits filed in this case, and giving due consideration to the arguments, I find that no new evidence of sufficient importance to distinguish this case from the cases which have been adjudged in the Eighth circuit has been furnished, and the opinions referred to appear to me to rest upon the facts and the law. While this court is not bound by the rule of comity to decide a patent case contrary to a belief in the mind of the judge as to the right of the matter, still the decisions of other courts should have weight in resolving any doubts. Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U. S. 485-496, 20 Sup. Ct. 708, 44 L. Ed. 856. I consider that the reasons set forth in the opinions of Judge Hallett and Judge Thayer are good and sufficient, and I find no ground to justify this court in rendering a conflicting decision.

[386]*386The defendant makes a special defense, and claims the right to use the Ropp furnace on the ground that it was installed as a substitute for one of Brown’s patented furnaces, which it bought and paid for, and which was removed because it did not work satisfactorily. In an affidavit by the manager of the defendant company it is asserted that two of Brown’s furnaces were installed by the defendant, and that they proved to be defective and unsatisfactory, so that the defendant could not compete with other smelting companies because of expenses and losses, occasioned by frequent interruptions caused by the breaking of the partition walls, which made it necessary to'shut down and cool off, as the interior walls in the Brown furnace are not accessible, and cannot be repaired without cooling the entire furnace sufficiently for workmen to enter them; and that, having paid the complainant a royalty for the use of his patent, he should not be heard to complain because the defendant has incurred the expense of constructing a new furnace upon a different pattern. This special defense cannot be maintained. It is well settled by numerous authorities that the monopoly granted by letters patent is absolute during the term of the patent, and the owner of it is entitled by the law' to prohibit all use of infringing machines and structures. The purchaser of a patented machine or structure has the right to use what he has bought, but no right to make another machine or structure like it, nor to buy one from an infringer. His right to use the patent is a mere incident to his ownership of the particular machine or structure sold to him by the patentee, and when it is worn out or destroyed the right to use the invention ceases. Wilson v. Simpson, 9 How. 109, 13 L. Ed. 66; Cotton Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U. S. 89-95, 1 Sup. Ct. 52, 27 L. Ed. 79; Wade v. Metcalf (C. C.) 16 Fed. 130; Machine Co. v. Gibson (C. C.) 46 Fed. 488; Id. (C. C.) 50 Fed. 423; Id., 5 C. C. A. 451, 56 Fed. 143; Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Pacific Steam Whaling Co. (C. C.) 93 Fed. 672. Upon the showing made, the complainant is clearly entitled to have an injunction restraining the defendant from making any further use of the Ropp furnace until the final hearing.

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Bluebook (online)
110 F. 383, 1901 U.S. App. LEXIS 4866, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-puget-sound-reduction-co-circtdwa-1901.