Brown v. Plastics Products Division, 07ap-604 (9-9-2008)

2008 Ohio 4543
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedSeptember 9, 2008
DocketNo. 07AP-604.
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2008 Ohio 4543 (Brown v. Plastics Products Division, 07ap-604 (9-9-2008)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Plastics Products Division, 07ap-604 (9-9-2008), 2008 Ohio 4543 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

DECISION
{¶ 1} Relator, Vicky C. Brown, commenced this original action requesting a writ of mandamus that orders respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order *Page 2 denying her temporary total disability compensation for the closed period August 7, 2006 through December 12, 2006, and to enter an order granting said compensation.

{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ. R. 53 and Section (M), Loc. R. 12 of the Tenth Appellate District, this matter was referred to a magistrate who issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law. (Attached as Appendix A.) Because no objections were filed to the magistrate's findings of fact, we adopt them.

I. Magistrate's Findings of Fact

{¶ 3} Following her industrial injury, relator saw an orthopedic surgeon, Bruce Eric Heck, M.D., who wrote in his office notes that relator consented to surgery on her injured right shoulder. On June 21, 2006, he submitted a C-9 requesting authorization for a "rotator cuff repair" scheduled for July 26, 2006. Through its third-party administrator, relator's employer approved the surgery on June 22 but began paying temporary total disability compensation beginning June 26 due to its inability to accommodate relator's medical restrictions.

{¶ 4} According to the notes of Dr. Heck's certified nurse practitioner, relator was hospitalized beginning July 6 for treatment of a blood clot. As a result of the ensuing Coumadin therapy, relator's surgery was cancelled. On July 19, Dr. Heck completed a MEDCO-14 form indicating relator could return to work with restrictions from July 18 to September 20, 2006. On the MEDCO form, he indicated relator had not reached maximum medical improvement.

{¶ 5} In a letter dated July 30, 2006, the employer's claims representative, Kim Yoder, asked Dr. Heck whether "this patient reached maximum medical improvement for the allowed conditions of this claim based on the fact that surgery has been put on hold *Page 3 for a blood clot? * * * Has the patient reached Maximum Medical Improvement as defined above until time that the approved surgery can be performed?" Dr. Heck responded affirmatively. As a result, the employer terminated relator's temporary total disability compensation. Although Dr. Heck, in a September 24, 2006 MEDCO-14 form, again indicated relator had not reached maximum medical improvement, the district hearing officer and the staff hearing officer denied relator's request for temporary total disability compensation during the closed period at issue based on Dr. Heck's response to the claims representative's query.

II. Magistrate's Conclusions of Law

{¶ 6} On those facts, the magistrate recognized the resulting issue is whether the response of relator's orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Heck, to the July 30, 2006 inquiry of the employer's claims representative regarding relator's maximum medical improvement is some evidence on which the commission could rely to deny temporary total disability compensation for the closed period at issue. The magistrate determined the answer is no, because the claims representative's question to Dr. Heck misstates the law. As the magistrate explained, "[t]he * * * query suggests that, as a matter of law, the industrial injury can be determined to be at [maximum medical improvement] if surgery has been put on hold for a blood clot. That suggestion is a misstatement of the law relating to [maximum medical improvement]. As relator here correctly points out, a non-allowed condition cannot be used to advance or defeat a claim for compensation. State ex rel. Waddle v. Indus. Comm. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 452." (Magistrate's Decision, ¶ 50.)

{¶ 7} Because the magistrate concluded Dr. Heck's response is not some evidence on which the commission could rely, the magistrate determined the court should *Page 4 issue a writ of mandamus. The Industrial Commission and the employer, Plastics Products Division, both filed the same objections to the magistrate's conclusions of law.

III. Objections

OBJECTION NO. 1

The Magistrate erred in finding that the Commission abused its discretion when some evidence shows that the claimant's condition was static not temporary during the disputed period.

OBJECTION NO. 2

The Magistrate erred by finding that the Commission used the wrong standard for eligibility of [temporary total disability].

Because the objections are interrelated, we address them jointly. Together they require us to decide whether relator is entitled to temporary total disability compensation for the four-month period her shoulder surgery was delayed due to Coumadin therapy for a non-industrial blood clot.

{¶ 8} None of the parties to the action disputes the magistrate's general proposition of law that a non-allowed condition cannot be used to advance or defeat a claim for compensation. Here, even absent the blood clot, relator was unable to return to her former position of employment due to medical restrictions arising from her industrial injury. Moreover, her employer was unable to provide her with a job that accommodated her medical restrictions. Under such circumstances, relator ordinarily would be entitled to temporary total disability compensation.

{¶ 9} Similarly, the parties do not seriously dispute the commission's general proposition that "[a] condition is not temporary when the condition will, `with reasonable *Page 5 probability, continue for an indefinite period of time without any present indication of recovery therefrom.'" (Industrial Commission Objections.) State ex rel. Moran v. Indus. Comm., Franklin App. No. 01AP-1446, 2002-Ohio-4307, ¶ 32, citing State ex rel. Miller v. Indus.Comm. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 58. Thus, under the commission's definition, relator's condition would no longer be temporary if it would continue for an indefinite period of time without any present indication of recovery, and temporary total disability compensation would be inappropriate.

{¶ 10} Nothing in the record, however, suggests relator's Coumadin therapy would continue for an indefinite period of time. Indeed, although Dr. Heck initially indicated he felt the therapy would continue for many months, the evidence at the time of the hearings before the district hearing officer and the staff hearing officer demonstrated the therapy lasted no more than four months. On such facts, we cannot say that relator's inability to undergo surgery as a result of the Coumadin therapy would continue, with reasonable probability, for an indefinite period of time so as to render her condition other than temporary and permit a finding of maximum medical improvement. Cf. State ex rel. Greggv. Indus. Comm. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 405 (noting that if claimant were to undergo surgery, improvement might occur, but the claimant had 16 years to seek surgery and did not do so, permitting the doctor to exclude it as a reasonable possibility and to diagnose maximum medical improvement).

{¶ 11}

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Related

State ex rel. Foster v. Indus. Comm.
2021 Ohio 4221 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2021)

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Bluebook (online)
2008 Ohio 4543, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-plastics-products-division-07ap-604-9-9-2008-ohioctapp-2008.