Brown v. Peck

2 Wis. 261
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 15, 1853
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 2 Wis. 261 (Brown v. Peck) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Peck, 2 Wis. 261 (Wis. 1853).

Opinion

By the Court,

Smith, J.

The bill is filed in this case to avoid and set aside a deed of the complainant to the defendant, Bosaline Peck, for a certain tract of land in the county of Sauk, which he alleges was made, executed and acknowledged under duress.

The bill states, that in the month of May, A. D. 1847,. the complainant purchased the land in question from the United States, and received the register’s duplicate therefor; that in the night of the 23d of November following, while he was in bed at the tavern house of Marcus Warren, in Prairie du Sac, in said county of Sauk, he was forcibly seized therein, [276]*276and dragged out of Ms bed, into the street, by some twenty or more persons, among whom were Luther Peg]^ James Christy, James H. Haines, John Craw- ^or<^ William Canfield, Thomas Remington, Westley Clement, and others unknown, and by them illegally, by force and the infliction of bodily injury, after haying dragged the complainant from his bed, compelled to go to the village of Prairie du Sac, and then, to execute a deed of the said land to the said Rosaline Peck, which was witnessed by John B. Crawford, and Cyrus Leland, notary public, and bore date the said 23d day of November, lSáí ; and compelled him to acknowledge the receipt of one hundred dollars from the said Rosaline.

The bill further states, that the said persons acted as the friends and agents of the said Rosaline, either by her express procurement previous to, or with her approval afterwards, of their violent and riotous acts ; that the said sum of $100 was furnished by her, and was left with Leland, the notary, and that the complainant never received or applied for said money. That the deed was altogether and wholly involuntary, &c.

The testimony taken and produced on the hearing, more than sustains the allegations of the bill, and exhibits a case of the most lawless violence and maltreatment on the part of the persons charged in the bill. The "complainant was forcibly and violently taken from his bed, in the midst of the night, with no clothing but his shirt. At the very moment of their attack upon him, the rioters demanded of him to make a deed of the land to the widow Peck; five or six men had hold of his arms and legs. He refused, and continued to refuse to execute the deed. They soon took him from the house by force. It was in cold [277]*277weather. He was thrown down and rolled in the mud and water, and mud and snow was thrown upon him. After having been a considerable time subjected to such kind of treatment, he promised, if they would go back, he would give Mrs. Peck a deed. He was then taken to Fife’s tavern, when the notary was sent for, who came with a deed ready prepared, which was 'then and there executed by the complainant. The hour was somewhat after midnight. The hundred dollars was laid on the table by Luther Peck, and was taken charge of by the notary. The notary describes the complainant as “ wet, muddy, cold and shivering; he seemed to .be agitated, shivered with cold, and spoke with difficulty; his face was muddy.” Such is a meagre outline of the evidence produced on the part of the complainant, drawn from the actors themselves, and is uncbntradicted and unmitigated.

“ Every legal contract,” says Bacon, “ must be the act of the understanding, which they are incapable of using, who are under restraint and terrors ; and therefore the law requires the free assent of the parties as essential to every contract, and that they be not under any force or violence. 2 Bac. Ab. Title “ Duress,” 402.

It is perfectly apparent to -every one, that there was not that free assent to the mind of the complainant in the execution of the deed in question, which is essential to a valid contract. To enforce a contract entered into under circumstances 'which characterize the transactions proved in this case, would be to withdraw the protection of the court from those unable to protect themselves, and prostitute its sacred functions to the purposes of lawless violence and outrage.

Nor, in a court of equity, is it necessary to observe [278]*278technical distinction sometimes taken between du-minas, and duress of imprisonment, for whether it be per minas vitae, or per minas imprisonum ^ Ge^-i edu^y ^ equally fatal to the contract, if the menaces used, or equivalent acts of violence, are such as to have an undue influence upon the party, and to prevent the exercise of his own free will, in executing the contract, it is voidable. The free, voluntary meeting and mingling, or acquiescence of minds, is a sine qua non in filling contracts. And “though terror and force are not sufficient to make it duress at common law, yet it may be relieved against in equity. 2 Vern. 497.

Without attempting to recapitulate, or to give a further detail of the testimony, it is sufficient to remark, that it is hardly possible to conceive of a case, of a deed extorted by force, menaces and fear, more clearly proved than the one'before us. If there ever was an instance in which the party contracting stood in vinculis, this is one. We are unable to pei’ceive-why the complainant may not reasonably have been-in fear for his life. Dragged down from his bed at-, the dead hour of the night, in cold November-, rolled* two or three times in the mud and snow, and taken-.; cold, shivering, and scarcely able to speak, before a. notary who had the instrument for him to sign ready-prepared to his hand, with a perfect consciousness of" a design on the part of his persecutors further to ■ “lynch” him, if he refused to comply with their requests, without a voice raised in his behalf, or an arm uplifted for his protection, the stoutest heart might reasonably quail, and the most stoical be anxious in regard to the result of the purpose then being ex- ■ ecuted.

[279]*279We must confess to our astonishment, that any officer of the State, acting under the solemnity of his official oath, could have taken the acknowledgment of a deed from a person in the condition, and under the circumstances in which he describes the complainant. But we forbear to comment upon the conduct of the notary, any further than simply remarking, that as this is the first, so we think it will be the last instance of the kind, which may ever come to our notice.

But it is claimed here, that the defendant, Mrs. Peck, was ignorant of the designs of the rioters, and that the outrages upon the complainant were not made by her procurement or with her consent. This does not alter the law or the equities between the parties. The object of the rioters was, to procure this deed for the benefit of Mrs. Peck, and under this deed so obtained, she claims. . She does not occupy the position of an innocent purchaser, and hence we are not called upon to decide any question of that kind so far as she is concerned. By taking the deed of the complainant, obtained as that was, she took it subject to all the equities attending its inception and consummation.

It only remains to consider the rights of the defendant Wood ; and on this head very little need be said. By the answer of Wood, and the circumstances detailed in evidence, we are relieved from the necessity of ascertaining what would have been his equity, (or whether he would have had any,) had he been an actual bona fids purchaser without notice ; in the want of the failure of the grantor’s title.

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Bluebook (online)
2 Wis. 261, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-peck-wis-1853.