Brown v. National Motor Fleets, Inc.

164 So. 2d 489, 276 Ala. 493

• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama
• Decided: February 13, 1964
• Docket: 6 Div. 805
• Status: Published

Opinions

PER CURIAM.

On original deliverance the Chief Justice reversed and remanded the case for reasons given, which opinion will be his dissent. On application for rehearing and further consideration a majority of the Justices hold to the view that the judgment should be affirmed.

The facts in this case appear in the dissenting opinion. The Court thinks that the learned Chief Justice in his dissenting opinion has failed to take due account of the Title of said Act No. 672, which gives notice that the Act shall apply only to "trucks, truck-tractors, trailers, and semi-trailers operated for hire”.

The term “operate for hire” has a well-known and definite meaning in the jurisprudence of this country. The term means in law, in commercial usage, and in ordinary parlance, the transportation of persons or property for compensation and could noLpossibly. apply to a lessor, such as the appellee, which leases the vehicles to a lessee to carry his own goods or products.— Armstrong v. Denver Saunders System Co., 84 Colo. 138, 139, 268 P. 976 (1928); City of Sioux Falls v. Collins, 43 S.D. 311, 178 N.W. 950 (1920); People v. Heckman Trucking Co., Inc., 277 N.Y. 480, 14 N.E. 2d 801 (1938); State v. L. P. Gas Transport Co., Inc., 260 Ala. 637, 71 So.2d 839 (1954); 80 A.L.R. 574.

The fact that Section (b) in the body of the Act purports to enlarge the definition of “for hire” is inefficacious to-render the appellee liable for the license since the enlarged definition is directly conflictory with the Title of the Act which gives no notice of this broad definition and,, as to this appellee, the enlargement of the definition contains more than one subject and would be unconstitutional under Section 45.

It is unnecessary to engage in a-lengthy discourse on the purposes of Section 45 of the Constitution. Suffice it to, say that the Title alone should be considered and a determination made of the object, or objects, it expresses; and the body of the Act, regardless of definition, cannot enlarge the meaning. “ * * * The body should be construed to determine its object or objects. In this process, which necessarily involves serving the legislative intent, we may seek aid from the title. The body also determines the scope of the operation of the act, but it is limited b)^ the maximum scope as expressed in the title and by a minimum scope that does not make the title deceptive.”—Carl H. Manson, “The Drafting of Statute Titles”, 10 Ind. Law Journal, 155, 160.

We think the cases of State v. Hotz GMC Trucks, Inc., 268 Ala. 120, 105 So.2d 98, and Haden v. Rhodes, etc., 271 Ala. 344, 123 So.2d 916 indicate that it has been the opinion of this Court that a vehicle-leased to a lessee under a bona fide lease, where such lessee has complete control and operation of such vehicle and uses same to-carry his own goods, is not operated by the-lessor and, therefore, not operated “for hire” by the lessor.

We are at the conclusion that the Act is broader than the Title and, therefore, that part which is within both the Title and the body of the Act will stand, while that part not indicated by the Title will fall. — Opinion of the Justices, 247 Ala. 195, 23 So.2d 505; and cases cited at 247 Ala., p. 199, 23 So.2d, p. 508.

Rehearing granted, judgment affirmed.

LAWSON, SIMPSON, GOODWYN, COLEMAN and HARWOOD, JJ., concur. LIVINGSTON, C. J., and MERRILL, J., dissent.